Lecture 5: *The Last Dilution of the Panzani Soup.*

Going Beyond the Barthesian Heritage

There is no denying the fact: for all practical purposes, Barthes initiated pictorial semiotics when he wrote his famous analysis of an advertisement for Panzani pasta. All serious approaches to pictorial semiotics have since then started out as critical observations on the Panzani model. Here we will discuss the theoretical and practical defects of Barthes' conception, as they were rendered explicit by the different schools evolving from this criticism. We will explore the illusory parallel, suggested by several scholars, between Barthes and Panofsky, and we will end by inquiring into the residue never redeemed by any of the extent approaches (not counting those simply repeating Barthes' confusions), i.e. the study of ideology and, more broadly, the social role of picture circulation.

Contents

Two accounts could be written about the birth of pictorial semiotics, both taking their point of departure in the middle of the last century. The first story is about the *specificity* of the picture sign, as compared to other signs, and as related to its sub-types. It involves the Peircean notion of iconicity, less as it has been safeguarded by the true Peirceans, but as it emerges from half a century of criticism, by philosophers such as Bierman and Goodman, as well as semioticians such as Eco and Lindekens; and then rehabilitated, by, among others, Groupe μ, and the present author; and it also concerns the Saussurean idea of the way meanings may be organised, again as it was put to confused, and confusing, uses by Eco and others, and then completely reconceived in the light of the findings of perceptual psychology, in particular by the present author. In the second to fourth lectures of this series, we have been looking at different aspects of this narrative.

The second story begins with Roland Barthes inventing a simplistic, but still inspiring, model which he applies to a publicity picture (Fig. 1.); it continues with representatives of the Greimas school, such as Floch and Thürlemann, explaining why this model is inadequate and constructing a new one, with Groupe μ proposing their own, rhetorically-based, model, as well as with the Quebec school insisting on perceptual features, the Australian school taking communicative functions as being fundamental, and the "Swedish school" inventing a second-generation rhetorical model based on Lifeworld expectations and cognitive prototypes (cf. Saint-Martin 1994; Carani 1999). In this adventure, Peircean semiotics proper has hardly taken any part: at the very most, pictures have sometimes (by Bense, Deledalle, Jappy, and others) been brought in to illustrate some Peirceans concepts. This should not be surprising since, by its very nature, Peircean semiotics is much more about what is common to signs and meanings (and some very general kinds of signs and meanings such as icons, indices, and symbols) than about the specificity of semiotic resources such as language, gesture, pictures, and so on.

It is, as the title suggests, the latter story that will concern us here and in the two following lectures. In this version, generic notions are merely invoked in order to construct models, which are then justified by their power to adequately account for individual pictorial items. However, it is a presupposition of the conception defended here, as will become apparent in the following, that the second way of approaching the picture sign can only meaningfully be conducted on the foundations of the first one. Needless to say, this was not the view taken by Roland Barthes, as he first set out to analyze an advertisement for Panzani pasta.

We will first consider the criticism earlier directed at Barthes' analysis by those striving to construct their own models of pictorial semiotics. We will be particularly concerned to show that the notion of connotation introduced by Barthes has nothing to do with the concept of connotation suggested by Hjelmslev, nor by any other current ideas about connotation, in spite of the popularity of this particular aspect of Barthes' analysis. The second part of this lecture will therefore be made up of a close reading of Hjelmslev's own relevant texts. We will then go on, aided by our analysis of connotation, to something which is really much more fundamental for the understanding of the level of pictorial meaning addressed by Barthes: the analysis of the facts and events of the sociocultural life-world, as conveyed by pictures.

Fig. 1. The Panzani advertisment analyzed

This will bring us back to the classical analysis of pictures in terms of narrativity pioneered by Lessing and developed in recent narratology as well as to general notions of events and actions taking place within the framework of society.

5.1. Farewell to the Panzani soup kitchen[1]

Barthes's analysis of the *Panzani* publicity is not, I think, a very good example of a semiotical interpretation, but it is an unavoidable resting-point of any discussion involving pictorial semiotics, having been commented on, and corrected, by most exponents of this speciality, such as Lindekens, Floch, Vilches, Perez Tornero, and Porcher, and by a few other semioticians and linguists, such as Prieto and Kerbrat-Orecchioni. It is also all too often taken to be a typical manifestation of the application of semiotic analysis to pictures by those not themselves versed in semiotics, as well as by some who like to think of themselves as semioticians. And finally, it is of particular interest to us because it will permit us to separate connotation, which Barthes claims to be talking about, from another interesting

1 Parts 5.1. and 5.2 are a revised, rearranged and augmented version of Sonesson 1989, chapters II.1 and II.4.

property of the picture, its relation to the socio-cultural Lifeworld, which is that which the analysis of the Panzani picture really gives us access to, although this is obscured by Barthes' terminology, paradoxically taken to heart particularly by those who want to emphasise the social aspect of semiotic analysis (such as Larsen, Nordström, Ehmer, and, more recently, Kress & van Leeuwen).

The picture analysed is an advertisement for the products of the *Panzani* brand: spaghetti, Italian tomato sauce and grated cheese. In the picture, instances of the products are shown together with a selection of vegetables in a string bag, held up by an invisible hand outside of the frame. The brand name is to be seen on the *Panzani* products, and there is also a short text below the string bag. Barthes first comments on the linguistic message, which he takes to "anchor" the non-coded message of the picture, taking note of what he terms its *denotative* and *connotative* aspects. He then goes on to consider first the "denoted picture" and then its "connoted" part. Barthes' reading is entirely intuitive: he bases his interpretation on *one* isolated text, not, as a structuralist should, on a series of similar texts, and he does not discover any repeatable units, not even units repeating themselves within this single text. The meanings are adduced out of Barthes' own intuitive judgment, justified, we may suppose, by his membership in French culture, and there is no serious effort to isolate the *pertinent* features responsible for the transmission of these meanings. Thus the "structuralism" of this analysis would seem to be completely illusory, imputable to the presence of a series of terms borrowed from the linguistic theories of Saussure and Hjelmslev. And yet, there is perhaps a rudimentary theoretical skeleton that might be operative in the analysis — the distinction between *denotation and connotation*. That is what we must try to investigate in the following pages.

After considering a few of the metaphysical presuppositions of Barthes' analysis we will establish a distinction between four very different notions of connotation, known from the history of ideas, and we will show that Barthes' notion of connotation, to the extent that it has been taken from Hjelmslev, as Barthes himself claims, has nothing to do with Panofsky's levels of interpretation, contrary to what has often been suggested. Barthes' analysis will then be reviewed in the light of Hjelmslev's model, and some problems with this identification will be pointed out.[2] For us, the central problem will be the putative presence of connotations, in one sense or other of the term, in the organization of pictorial meanings, notably as manifested in the Panzani publicity.

Our initial guide to the ideological commitment behind Barthes' approach will be, in particular, a small article by Floch (1978), in which the latter points out a number of features characterising Barthes' conception which conflict with the Greimas school approach. We will then however elaborate on these remarks in a somewhat different sense, both independently, and taking our inspiration from Prieto and others.

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2 It should be noted that many aspects of the Panzani analysis will be left untouched on the following pages: many of them are reviewed in Perez Tornero's (1982) admirable study of the semiotics of publicity born out of Barthes's initiative.

On the purposefulness of pictorial meaning

The first issue opposing Floch to Barthes turns on the *purposefulness* of pictorial meaning. As Barthes himself remarks, he chooses an advertisement for his first real essay on pictorial semiotics because a picture pertaining to such an instrumental genre may safely be supposed to have been given the form it has, not by accident, but with a clear awareness of the ensuing meaning. Since, according to the Greimas school, the degree of awareness does nothing to change the nature of meaning, Floch accuses Barthes of basing his argument on a simplistic theory of communication, of the kind found in the work of Mounin. There is a strange irony to this. Mounin, like Buyssens and to some extent Prieto, interprets Saussure to mean that semiotics should be exclusively concerned with meanings that are similar to linguistic signs (as they conceive it) in being consciously and knowingly communicated to another person. Both Mounin and Prieto distinguish a semiotics of *communication,* concerned with meanings transmitted on purpose, from a semiotics of *signification,* which is wider in scope but of more doubtful legitimacy, or at least more difficult to accomplish in a serious way. Mounin (1970:189ff) criticizes Barthes precisely because he neglects to limit semiotics to purposeful meanings, and even Prieto (1975b:181f) develops his concept of a semiotics of signification as a reaction to Barthes' work. It is true that at least Mounin is concerned with other writings of Barthes'. Yet, it is exceptional for Barthes to attach importance to purpose.

Floch fails to see the point of this choice. But I think Barthes' intuitions here are sound: Every analysis undoubtedly supposes there to be a procedure for separating that which is *relevant* or *pertinent* from the rest of the material, a way of finding the "form" in the "substance", as Hjelmslev would have said. *Allofunctionality*, as I have called this relationships elsewhere (Sonesson 1989a 1992a), requires a *constant,* relative to which something may be varied, as in *commutation*. Given a language system, which is intersubjectively recognized, content and expression may be varied relative to each other, as is done in linguistics. But if there is no pictorial system, if photography (but not drawing) is a "message sans code", as Barthes maintains, then the constant element of allofunctionality needs to be picked up elsewhere, maybe from the purpose of the picture's originator. From this point of view, Barthes' claim really seems rather reasonable in the present case.

There are those, such as Hirsch (1967; 1977), who consider that even the meaning of a verbal text, as against that of the units in the language system, must depend for its determination on our acquaintance with the purpose of its author, no doubt because the combinations of the units and the choice of the signification of an ambiguous term are not given in the language system. The problem is, of course, how we are supposed to be able to determine the purposes of the other, if they are not somehow made manifest. Besides, the distinction between a semiotics of communication and a semiotics of signification seems rather pointless, since all degrees between full awareness and complete automatism may well exist in the employment of all or most semiotic systems (Cf. Sonesson 1989a).

But the present case is different: apart from pornographic pictures, there is probably no pictorial genre that has a more clearly *socially recognized purpose* than publicity pictures. The "deep structure" of any piece of publicity must contain the three elements "Aufforderung zum Konsum", "Produkt", and "positiven Merkmalen des Produktes", as observed by Nöth (1975:44, 63, 83; 1977:49. Cf. Koch 1971:238ff; Lindemann 1976); that is, their purpose is to tell us to buy product X by means of convincing us that it is the best in the world. The *product* itself will usually be present, since it is necessary to create the conditions for its later identification. Features that are positively valued in our society must somehow be *transferred* to the product, in order to create a desire for its consumption. But identification is not enough: the product will also have to be *maximally differentiated* from its competitors (Cf. Koch 1971:55tf) with the help of a "production industrielle des differences" (Baudrillard 1970: 125ff), to be achieved by the publicity, if not already in the object itself. But if this is so, some amount of commutation will be possible, using these purposes.

While all this is undoubtedly true, it is not enough. There may be other purposes, which are not subordinated to the general purpose of selling the product. In the first place, publicity may have other institutionalized, but less overt, purposes, for instance to fortify the values of Capitalist society, either because this may help in the selling of the particular product in the long run, or because publicity also defends Capitalist ideology as such. In the latter case, not only would "social mythology" be used to promote the products, as Williamson (1978:27) tells us, but the reverse would also be true: that the products sell social mythology. Media sociology would have to establish if this is really a conscious purpose of publicity or a subsidiary effect. But publicity, or a given advertisement, may have other purposes as well, which could either be part of the institutional framework, and yet not clearly evident to the very creators of publicity, or be purely personal aims on any level of awareness of these creators. As to the first point, Williamson (1978:12) claims that besides selling products, publicity has come to take over the functions of religion, at least in the creation of symbolic values, and elsewhere she hints repeatedly at a similarity between advertisements and the Freudian dream work. These aims could hardly be entirely subordinated to the selling of the product and the maintenance of Capitalist ideology. Moreover, publicity may leave a certain scope for the kind of poetic "rêverie" that Bachelard (1949) has described in literature and science. Again, it should not be forgotten that publicity might hold a place for the kind of "plastic imagination", which in another century would have been expressed in art, perhaps Academic art, but which is no longer acceptable within the Canons of Modernism.

To conclude on this issue, we will admit that there is a series of *institutionalized purposes* of publicity, which are to a greater or lesser degree *in the public domain,* and which may thus safely be used as constant elements in a *commutation,* but that alongside these there are also other purposes which contribute to the constraints laid on the expression plane of the publicity picture, so that there is no hope of explaining the picture from the

institutionalized purposes alone. Art also has some institutionalized, public purposes, but nobody would think of explaining a painting from these alone. Of course, in our society, publicity is not considered to have other purposes than selling the product. Thus when, like Barthes, we use the mercantile purpose as the constant of our interpretation, we are making use of the *principle of relevance* intrinsic to our society, that is, we are acting as participant observers. Nevertheless, it remains possible that, on a deeper level of participation, we will discover still other purposes.

Varieties of linguistic determinism

Floch's second criticism concerns Barthes' attachment to the *"substances"* of the semiotic systems involved. Barthes in fact takes it for granted, in the very strategy of his argument, that the linguistic and the visual-iconical substances correspond to different "forms", i.e. that their expressions and contents are organized differently. According to the Greimas school, on the other hand, content and expression have each its own organization, so that one and the same content may well be combined with various expressions. In Floch's own analyses, linguistic and visual-iconic "substances" are made to express the same content, as we shall see later. This is of course in contrast to the classical Saussurean conception of the sign, conceived as cutting through two amorphous substances — sound and thinking, in the case of language — in one single cut. Floch's formulation is inexact: if, as Hjelmslev (1954) argues, speech and writing differ not only as to their substances, but also as to their "forms", that is, in their pertinent features, then pictures and writing and/or speech must certainly have different "forms" as well, *at the level of expression*. What Floch really means to criticize is that Barthes thinks that different *expressions,* form and substance together, must have different *contents*. But Floch also separates verbal and pictorial "texts" in the beginning of his analysis, in order to establish the identity of their contents in a later phase.

And in a way, Barthes will also claim in the end that the picture and the words mean the same — but, in his view, this is so because the picture alone has no (accessible) meaning, but needs to borrow it from the words. Thus, the *Panzani* analysis follows the program laid down in *Eléménts de sémiologie*, where we are told that "semiology" is a part of linguistics, not the reverse as Saussure claimed, apparently because the only access to meaning is through the language talking about it — in the same way as Barthes, in *Système de la mode*, chose to analyse clothes, not as such, but as fashion writers talk about them (Cf. Barthes 1964a;l967). While the Greimas school would seem to adopt, to some extent, the linguistic model, because all meaning is considered to be similar to the linguistic kind, or to admit of the same treatment, i.e. for *ontological* or *pseudo-ontological* reasons, the justifications Barthes appears to have for the same choice are rather *epistemological,* and basically opposed to those of the Greimas school. Actually, Barthes seems to think that semiotical systems other than verbal language are inaccessible to analysis, and thus can only be attained *indirectly,* by means of the way language refers to them and describes them. Or perhaps he means to say that it is only verbally that we are

able to take *explicit* cognizance of other semiotic systems. It is only by interpreting it this way that I have been able to make sense of Barthes's argument.

In any event, the argument is not clear: Barthes (1964a:79f) admits that objects, pictures, and behaviour may signify "abondamment, mais ce n'est jamais d'une façon autonome", because the meaning of pictures is confirmed by words, or is even redundant in relation to them, and food and clothing recur to signifiers and signifieds which are the result of a verbal segmentation of the world. "Il n'y a de sens que nommé, et le monde des signifiés n'est autre que celui du langage" (ibid.). In the first quotation, Barthes may be taken to mean that the "abundance" itself is caused by the accompanying words, or that this abundance exists prior to the linguistic message, containing the linguistically confirmed meanings *and something more*. The first of these interpretations is the only one compatible with the second quotation above, and it is also the one rightly criticized by Prieto (1975b:129f), when objecting that all meanings are not linguistic, although contrary to us he thinks they are signs (Cf. Lecture 2 and 3). But the second interpretation is favoured by "Rhétorique de l'image": here, the picture is said to be "polysemic", and the linguistic message is one of the means of fixing or "anchoring" one of these meanings, at the same time "repressing" the others (1964b:31f). In addition, the rest of the article confirms that the problem of the picture is not its lack of meaning, but it's *meaning too much:* there is "une plénitude de virtualités" in the denoted picture (p.34). And out of this "chaîne flottante de signifiés", Barthes informs us (p. 31), "le lecteur peut choisir certains et ignorer les autres". But then a choice, even if only a *subjective* one, is possible without language. There is meaning in the sense of *relevance*. This means that, in the absence of a linguistic message, the "reader" of the photograph has to make himself the choice which is otherwise made by the draughtsman, rendering drawing, in contradistinction to photography, a *code* in Barthes' sense: the separation of significant details from the mass of material (p. 34). So what is the point of having this choice made by language? If it were just in order to be able to *talk* about the picture, Barthes' thesis would be a truism. Perhaps, then, the claim is that language is needed to make the *principle of relevance* employed an objective one.

Before we continue, we should note that the *panlinguisticism* of Barthes echoes *linguistic determinism,* also known as the *Humboldt/Sapir/Whorf-hypothesis,* which claims that the forms of the language we speak condition the ways of our thinking. Even Hjelmslev and Eco have propounded this idea, although the latter, of late, has recognized that the world sets up a certain resistance to linguistic categorization (see Eco 1999:50ff). But it now seems certain from linguistic studies (Cf. Gipper 1972) and from experiments with deaf-mutes (Cf. Furth 1966), that this theory cannot be true in a general sense. When Barthes tells us that food and clothing signify with the help of a segmentation of the world taken over from verbal language, he is simply repeating this theory. This segmentation is probably supposed to have been accomplished by verbal language once and for all. But when he claims that a particular verbal text, present in some advertisement, determines the meaning

of the picture, the segmentation must apparently be made anew on this occasion. The same thing holds for Marin's (1971b) analyses of medals and seals making use of the legends inscribed on them. In these cases, it is *discourse,* not language, which must be taken to determine the pictorial meaning.

This is even clearer when the relevant instances of verbal signs are not included in the picture, but separate from it, as in fashion discourse, which Barthes (1967) believes is ascribing meaning to fashion, and the description of a painting, which, according to Marin (1971a; 1977), must be analysed instead of the painting, which is, in itself, inaccessible to analysis. In the case of Marin's medals and Barthes' publicity, the verbal text could be taken to express the interpretation of the originator of the picture, thus specifying the *public, institutionalised purposes* of medals and advertisements, respectively. Thus, there is a kind of *objectivity* here, because the principle of relevance introduced by the creator is respected (and Hirsch would agree). But the interest of the choice made by the fashion writers, or by an anonymous descriptor of a painting, is less obvious.

Marin fortunately seems to forget rather quickly that his subject matter is a description of a painting, rather than the painting itself. Maybe Marin's aim is really, as Schefer (1971:178) critically observes in his review, to *reduce* the painting to its "literary reading". In that case, only the principle of relevance would be taken from the description but, unlike what happened in the case of the principle of relevance embodied in the publicity text, it is not clear what instance would be responsible for the reduction. If the interpretation of a particular critic had been referred to (Cf. Vodička 1976), then, exactly as in the case of the journalistic vision of fashion, we could inquire into the influence of these interpretations on the intersubjective meaning of the facts — but not when, as here, the identity of the facts and the interpretations is postulated beforehand.

Nevertheless, when there is contiguity between the verbal and the visual-iconic text, the suggestion that the former may "anchor" the meaning of the latter seems more justified. But let us now consider what really happens in Barthes' *Panzani* analysis. As Prieto (1975b:193ff) observes, the brand name "Panzani", which is the only linguistic message discussed by Barthes, is actually a visual-iconic sign representing a linguistic sign, for it is only found on the packages in the picture; and the real linguistic message, "Pâtes – Sauces – Parmesan à l'italienne de luxe", is not even mentioned by Barthes. I think we could admit (against Prieto) that the brand name, as well as all the rest that is written on the labels in the picture, continue to function linguistically, although they are visually and iconically reproduced, but it is more serious that Barthes ignores the principal part of the linguistic message.

This is however only the beginning of the paradox. Under the heading "The linguistic message", nothing is said about the particular case of the *Panzani* publicity, contrary to what happens on the pages dedicated to the pictorial message; only the functions of anchoring and relay are discussed in general terms. This general analysis only touches on the "connotations" of the brand name; it is never shown to "anchor" the pictorial meaning of the advertisement. Instead, when proceeding to consider the pictorial

message, Barthes (p. 27) tells us it "livre aussitôt une série de signes discontinus". And with no apparent difficulty, Barthes goes on to list a series of themes that are prominent in the picture, though not at all linguistically expressed. In spite of his explicit claims, Barthes, in his analytical practice, would seem to agree with Prieto (1975 b: 196 f) that it is really the picture (in which Prieto includes the labels), not the text, that could do without the other without losing its meaning. Maybe, as in the case of the meals and the clothing, Barthes wants to argue that the *categories* by means of which the pictorial meaning is expressed are linguistic in origin. But then the determination is from *language,* not from this particular *discourse,* there is no *anchoring,* i.e. the problem of a choice among the abundant pictorial meaning is left unresolved, and in fact there is very little reason anyhow to believe such a linguistic determination is taking place.

But there is also the possibility that Barthes uses the term "linguistic" in a very Pickwickian sense indeed. In fact, it is only the "image dénotée", deprived not only of the linguistic message, but also of what Barthes calls "les signes de connotation", i.e. the "themes" mentioned above, which is "une plênitude de virtualités" (p. 34). Thus, while Barthes never tells us so, these "connotations" apparently contribute to the *anchoring* of pictorial meaning as well. Porcher's (1976:150) counter-proposal, that even "la photographie frontale de l'objet de la publicité", in this case a packet of Winston, is capable of anchoring pictorial meaning, is not far removed from Barthes' actual practice. But Porcher also seems to suggest, although he never returns to this point, that it is the pictorial *composition* which is doing the anchoring. But even if Barthes would include the pictorial connotations in that curious language he is talking about, it is not clear why he should want to call it language: his language, he admits, "n'est plus tout à fait celui des linguistes" and is made up of units more extended than the word — but Barthes certainly does not seem to be thinking about sentence structure. Marin (1971b) did argue for a parallelism between the sentences "Hora fugit — Mors imminenta — Marcescit honor" and the three objects found in a still-life from the XVIIth century: a watch, a death's head, and a faded rose but, in this essay, he does not claim any priority for the linguistic message. Barthes never gets down to such specifics in his analysis.

"Connotation" as culture and code

These observations lead directly on to the third issue raised by Floch: he notes that the strategy of Barthes' analysis presupposes the identity of a series of dichotomies taken over from psychology, sociology, and linguistics, namely *coded vs. non-coded, perceptual vs. cultural, literal* vs. *symbolic*, and *denoted vs. connoted*. Of course, nothing permits us to affirm that these properties must go together. A curious fact, which seems to have escaped Floch, is that Barthes apparently considers the connotation of verbal language to be relatively *less* coded than its denotation, whereas in the picture he takes the connotation to be relatively *more* coded, the denotation even being deprived of any coding. This is suggested by the order of the steps followed in Barthes's analysis: first the linguistic denotation, then the linguistic connotation, after that the

connotation of the picture, and lastly the pictorial denotation.

When Barthes (1964 b26) sets out to "'ecrémer' les différents messages", he begins, as Floch correctly observes, with the most obviously "coded" one (in the sense, I suppose, of the most conventional and the most systematic one at the same time), verbal language, and then advances to ever more dubious codings, to further layers of the picture, labouring under an ever-increasing resistance to extract from each layer its coded part, until at last only the pictorial denotation is left as a residue or, as Barthes (p. 34) himself tells us, "un message privatif". But if this is so, linguistic connotation is seen to "resist" more than linguistic denotation, and pictorial denotation, unlike pictorial connotation, never ceases to "resist"! This is certainly strange, but we must suspend judgment until we have considered in more detail what is meant by connotation in Barthes's work.

But there is a further paradox, pointed out by Floch: there is no way of having access to a pictorial connotation before having *identified* the object to which it should be assigned, and identification, according to Barthes (p. 34), takes place at the level of pictorial denotation. For instance, only when we have identified a shape in the picture as being a tomato can we assign to it the connotation of "Italianity". But this requirement amounts to a direct inversion of the procedure of exhaustion used by Barthes in the rest of the essay, which permits the denoted picture to emerge only after the signs of connotation have been cancelled out. According to Floch, this contradiction is unavoidable when one, as Barthes does, tries to construct the system of interpretation at the same time as he is making an inventory of the parts of the picture.

This judgment of Floch's, let alone the causal explanation which he adds, seems unjustified. In fact, Barthes (p.29, 33f) repeatedly tells us that, from the point of view of a "spontaneous" reading there is no distinction between the two signification layers of the picture. He also tells us that there could be no purely denotative picture, and that the signs of connotation can only be mentally, not physically, cancelled from the picture (p.33f). The first contention has been contested by Porcher (1976:128 f), who tells us that his experimental subjects have been unable to assign any connotation at all to some of the pictures used, but the argument is vitiated by the differences in the two conceptions of connotation and, besides that, on any interpretation of connotation, no experimental procedure could demonstrate its *absence,* and many convergent operations would be necessary to render its absence probable. Costa (1977:73 ff) seems to contest the second contention when he argues that only 4,8 % of a particular photograph is denotative, the rest having been cut away without hampering identification. However, apart from this particular picture being occupied by one big object, and being extremely blurred, the question of identification from partial evidence or from a fragmented view is not quite the same as the problem of denotation (Cf. Fig. 2 and the discussion of *resemanticization* in earlier lectures). Anyhow, since Barthes must undoubtedly have made a "spontaneous" reading before the "structural" one, he will have no problem identifying the tomato before finding its connotation. In fact, the tomato may even be recognized from

the global properties characteristic of its particular "tomatohood". Well considered, Floch's criticism is actually strange: the pictorial denotation, which is the layer most resistant to codification, is also quite naturally the one immediately seen.

A more serious problem is that, in spite of its "plénitude de virtualités", the denoted level of the picture is thought to permit the identification of the real-world objects represented. But identification requires the presence of some features distinguishing each object from the others, or each category of objects from other categories (Cf. Gibson 1969). Of course, these features are not necessarily conventional, if that is what coded means, but they must somehow be systematic. Thus, what Barthes calls the denoted picture cannot be as chaotic as he suggests. Here we recognize the problem of iconicity (cf. Lecture 3 and 4). It is difficult to understand how the possibility of identification should be reconciled with the repleteness of meaning of the denoted picture, though Barthes states that it can be (p. 34) .

There is however a hint at the solution on the same page: a member of any given society "dispose toujours d'un savoir supérieur au savoir anthropologique et perçoit plus que la lettre". Maybe, then, we are back to the problem of the "cultural meaning" of objects, as Gurwitsch called it, the question of the cube and the dice. However, Barthes's ultimate layer of signification, constituted, we are told (p. 28 f), "des objets nommables" known through "un savoir presque anthropologique", contains tomatoes, a string bag, a packet of spaghetti, and so on, and undoubtedly, Husserl's hypothetical Bantu would be unable to identify the string bag, the tin can, and the packets of grated cheese and spaghetti, while even a European before the discovery of Mexico would be at a loss to give any name to the tomato. Even at the denoted level, therefore, there is cultural meaning, and it is not clear how it differs from that of the connoted level. That is, if Barthes means to say that the denoted level is determinate as to the perceptual identification of the object, but replete with virtual cultural meanings, he is mistaken. It might be suggested that the cultural meanings of denotation are those of the Lifeworld, while those of connotation are added by the picture, but as we shall see, and as was already observed by Lindekens (1971:231 ff), the pictorial rhetoric of Barthes's is a rhetoric *of* the *referent,* "une rhétorique de l'information"!

So far, we have seen that the purpose of publicity is, at least to a certain extent, *public* and *institutionalized,* so that it may be used as the invariant of a pictorial *commutation,* but it could not constrain the content, so as to specify all details of the expression plane; and we have discovered that the part of language in the anchoring of pictorial meaning is negligible, at least in the *Panzani* publicity. But we are left with some very strange, seemingly contradictory results, with regard to the question of the layers of pictorial meaning. Consequently, we will have to acquaint ourselves with the notion — or, as it will turn out, the notions — of *connotation*. But first, it will be useful to have a look at what Barthes writes about connotation elsewhere.

Barthesean rhetoric and ideology

Long before Hjelmslev's concept of connotation is introduced and defined at

the end of *Éléments de sémiologie* (1964a: 163ff), Barthes has been using the term a number of times (pp. 92, 102, 114, 141f, l44, 159f, and maybe others), sometimes invoking Hjelmslev's examples of dialect variants, e.g. the different R's of the persons from Paris and Bourgogne, but also in relation to the phenomenon which he calls the "fonction-signe" (p. 113 f, 141 f), i.e. the function which is also a sign.[3] In his *Eléments de sémiologie*, Barthes called the expression plane of the connotational language, which is identical with the denotational language, a *rhetoric,* whereas he termed the content plane of this same connotational language an *ideology.* It is reasonable to suppose that, in so doing, Barthes wanted to claim that the expression and the content of the Hjelmslevian connotational language were, at least in a few typical or particularly interesting instances, similar to what is commonly called a rhetoric and an ideology, respectively. In the case of rhetoric, Barthes actually offers a more specific argument in the article on pictorial rhetoric, suggesting that the "figures" of classical rhetoric can be found in publicity pictures. Indeed, he even claims that the tomato is a "metonymy" of Italy! In the semiotics of publicity this idea has been further developed, notably by Durand and Péninou, and lately, this tradition has been admirably discussed and criticized by Pérez Tornero (1982:119ff). In a more explicit relation to connotations language, Genette (1964; 1965) adopts Barthesean rhetoric in literary criticism.

Both Floch (1978) and the Danish semiotician Peter Larsen (1976) have independently pointed out the similarities between the Hjelmslevian connotational language, as used by Barthes in the article on pictorial semiotics, and Panofsky's "iconological" model of analysis: as with the *pre-iconographical level,* the non-coded iconical message of Barthes' is directly perceived, without any cognitive operations being necessary, and *the iconographical level,* which requires knowledge derived from literary sources for its interpretation, is reminiscent of the coded iconical message, i.e. the rhetoric, and, lastly, *the iconological level,* which is to Panofsky the conception of the world behind the work, will easily bring to mind what Barthes calls ideology. Nevertheless, I will claim in the following that these similarities are largely illusory and that, in the end, these models for pictorial analysis hardly have more in common than being something as unusual as models for pictorial analysis! The one ultimately responsible for having suggested the identification incriminated is no doubt Eco (1968:230) who, in discussing one of Panofsky's iconographical cases, calls it a connotation, although he does not refer explicitly to Barthes' work in this context.

In fact, Barthes's pictorial denotation and Panofsky's pre-iconographical level probably correspond to the same phenomenon: here the same kind of knowledge is required, according to Panofsky (1955:26f), as that needed to recognize a hat-lifting gentleman, and Barthes (1964 b:29) claims all that is necessary to interpret this level is "un savoir presque anthropologique", i.e. almost (?) common to humankind, which is anyhow implicit in ordinary perception. The reason why Barthes and Panofsky may really

3 Since "le fonction-signe" has to do with similarities and differences between signs and tools, I will reserve the discussion of this conception for Lecture 10.



a b

Fig. 2. Picture of a ballet dancer: a) with a small, but, as it happens, important part, left out; b) the picture intact and easily recognizable (From Costa 1977)

be talking about the same thing here is, I believe, that the phenomenon in question is a *residue concept* of both models, i.e. it is that *about which the model has nothing to say*. That both models stop at this point is perhaps due to the resistance being here at its greatest; there is what Bachelard is wont to call an epistemological obstacle, in this case an incapacity to see the picture in place of the depicted, which has been shown to exist in small children (Gardner 1982:105; cf. Winner 1982:113ff), and which may also persist to some extent in adults. Of course, it is not at all impossible that Barthes has been influenced to some extent by Panofsky, as suggested by his observation that beyond the denoted level, "le lecteur ne percevrait que des lignes, des formes et des couleurs" (1964b:34; cf. Panofsky 1955:28, 33), but the essential influence no doubt comes from "common sense", an important ideological factor, as Geertz (1983) rightly observes.

But what about the second level? According to Larsen (1976) and Fausing & Larsen (1980, 1:43), Panofsky's examples, for instance the difference between a Salome iconography and a Judith iconography, may be better accounted for using Barthes's concepts (Cf. Panofsky 1955:36f; also Eco 1968:230 uses this example). Corresponding to the content "Judith", there is "young girl + sword + charger with the head of a beheaded man (+ maid)", and corresponding to the content "Salome", we have "young girl + charger with the head of a beheaded man (+ parents)" (Cf. Fig. 3.). Thus, in Larsen's opinion, shapes and colours *denote* contents like "young girl", "charger", and so on, but then they are transformed into expressions on another level, in order to signify, i.e. *connote* "Judith" or "Salome". If instead of the terms he uses, we consider the procedure which he applies to Panofsky's material, we will see that what Larsen is doing is really making a *feature analysis*, similar in this respect to the way words may be resolved into phonemes, and phonemes into phonological features. "Judith" and "Salome" are in fact shown to share certain features and to differ in others. Unlike the features of a phoneme, those of these iconographies are themselves signs, but it does not follow that they constitute a connotational language. Also the feature "young girl" or that of "parent" may be analysed further, and "Salome" could be a part of a more complete iconography,

but these are not reasons for thinking that there are infinite layers of connotational languages.

The words of verbal language combine into compounds and into sentences, the meanings of which are something beyond the mere sum of their parts, and the same thing is true of pictorial signs. Entire signs, complete with expression and content, are put together to form new, composite expressions and contents, instead of using one sign, as in the case of connotational language, to build up the very expression plane of a new sign. Actually, "Salome" and "Judith" are simply *composite signs*. However, a composite pictorial sign is not exactly like a verbal one: the same expression plane may, in a new context, be read at a new *intensional level* (Cf. Lecture 4). In fact, the present case appears to be closer to an *implication,* as Eco, and maybe Todorov and Sperber would argue (Cf. part 5:2. of this Lecture below): we need a particular rule stating that the combination of certain signs *signifies* "Salome" or "Judith". Yet if it had been sufficient to scrutinize further details of the picture, as when one has recognized a shape on a photograph as being a man and now wants to identify him by name, we would have a pure case of deriving new meanings from the same expression, with a shift of intensional level, instead of going from content to content, as in implication.[4]

So far, Larsen's analysis is undoubtedly truer to Panofsky than to Barthes and Hjelmslev. On the other hand, Larsen also neglects some aspects which are of fundamental importance to Panofsky: that the subject matter of the iconographical level is formed by stories and allegories, and that the sources of interpretation, the knowledge required of the interpreters must be literary (Panofsky 1955:40f; Cf. Kaemmerling 1979:485-501). Another indication that the two models cannot be identified is Panofsky's placing the "history of styles" on the first level, whereas its near equivalent, or so it seems, the rhetorical figures which may be expressed also in "pictorial substance", are found on the secondary level, that of rhetoric, in Barthes' conception.

As for the third level, ideology, it is conceived by Barthes to be an integrated part of connotational language, i.e. its content plane, whereas Panofsky, in particular in the first version, where he took his inspiration from Mannheim, thought of it as an interpretation based on a "Weltanschaung", which was to *explain* the work, in spite of being located outside it, from the basic attitude of a nation, a period, a class, a religious or philosophical persuasion, though in fact most of all from philosophy. If we take this seriously, the iconological level is not really a level of the work, but its *cause,* whereas ideology, in Barthes' meaning, is the content plane of the connotational language, that is, a relatum of an *appresentation*. Although it is possible that the same phenomenon could be the cause *and* the meaning of another phenomenon, this would only be a

4 As will be clear when we have discussed what is meant by connotation, there is no connotation in Hjelmslev's sense here. The connotation would have to result from the choice to express the content "Salome" with or without a parent in the picture, or the content "Judith", with or without a maid in the picture, or from taking any other possible option in the formation of the composite sign

Fig. 3. Salomé with "her parents" (by Lucas Caranach) and Judith with her maid (by Sandro Botticelli)

coincidence. Again, it seems that Panofsky was thinking of much better organized and more extensive systems of thinking than, for instance, the "Italianity" of the Panzani publicity.

To summarize the argument, we may say that Panofsky's second, iconographical level will remain on Barthes's first, denotational level, since iconographical symbols are composite signs; and also that Barthes's rhetoric, i.e. the expression plane of the connotational language, forms part of Panofsky's first, pre-iconographical level, because this is the place of the history of styles. And whereas the relation between the second and the third level is intrinsic and semantic to Barthes, it is a relation of causality to Panofsky, which is thought to explain the sign from factors outside of it.

What would come out of a Panofsky style analysis of Barthes's advertisement? Strictly speaking, it could not be done, because there is no literary theme in the

Panzani advertisement, but if we suppose other cultural sources to be comparable, we would have to contrast the packet of spaghetti, the tin can of tomato sauce, the packet of grated cheese, and the vegetables in the string bag, as a composite sign for the meaning "Panzani" with other, similar, constellations having contents corresponding to other spaghetti brands.

Like Larsen, Floch thinks Barthes's three levels are parallel to those of Panofsky but the former, he argues, has been able to relate the levels better, with the aid of the connotational language model. We have already seen that this cannot be true. More pertinently, Floch observes that Barthes's non-coded iconic message is the substance of expression of the denotational language, whereas the form of this same expression plane, which organizes all of "visual language", remains to be found. Thus, the real problem of visual semiotics, as conceived by Floch, is located *inside* the residue concept left by the models of both Barthes and Panofsky. In due course we will follow Floch in the exploration of this basic question of visual semiotics (Cf. Lecture 6.), but first we have to inquire into the interpretation actually given by Barthes to the Panzani picture and probe deeper into the reasons behind this analysis.

"Panzani" segmenting the world

In spite of its wealth of structuralist terms, the Panzani article presents itself essentially as an intuitive reading, with no apparent methodological consciousness informing the analysis. Nevertheless, if the terms "connotation" and "denotation" used in the article can be taken to correspond to those defined in the model introduced by Hjelmslev and vindicated by Barthes in *Eléments de sémiologie*, at least a minimal theoretical carcase must be recognized in the analysis. No doubt Barthes himself thinks he is using this model, but there are some serious counter-indications to this view, notably in the repeated identifications of denotation and connotation with "literal" and "symbolic" meaning, respectively (Cf. Pérez Tornero 1982:35 ff, 82, whose criticism is correct on the latter interpretation). And Molino (1971:24ff) argues that Barthes employs Hjelmslev's model quite illegitimately in the analysis of phenomena entirely foreign to Hjelmslev's intention, which are the same as those discussed by Barthes in earlier works using the terms "mythes" and "écriture'. Therefore, we now have to consider in detail the "connotations" which Barthes claims to discover in the Panzani publicity.

There can be no doubt about the authenticity of the linguistic example: the brand name "Panzani" really *connotes*, in Hjelmslev's sense, something like "Italianity", just as Hjelmslev's own speech, according to Hjelmslev's own example, goes on for ever connoting "Danishness". As Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1977b:16) observes, the signifier of connotation is here particularly the final /i/, and also the consonantal sequence /nz/, which is impossible in French; and she adds (p. 92) that, like other brand names in France, e. g. "Scansen", "Fjord", etc., "Panzani" also connotes exoticism, which is also something implied by Barthes' (1964: b27) remark that the Italianity of the name is only perceptible to a Frenchman or to another non-Italian.

Connotations result, in Hjelmselv's view,

because the sign, at the same time as it is an expression for a particular content, is an object having properties that may take on a meaning of their own. Hjelmslev (1943:103) makes a distinction, which so far, I think, has never been noticed, between connotations from the substance, and connotations from the form. When a particular semiotical system, having its peculiar way of segmenting reality, is chosen to express this reality, there is what we will call a *formal connotation*. But when, on the other hand, features of the sign that are not pertinent for the expression of the content of the denotational sign are used to convey a secondary content, the connotation is *substantial*.

However, "Panzani" is not really a French word; it is a term in the system of brand names. As such, it segments reality differently from other systems, for instance French or English, because it puts spaghetti, tomato sauce, grated cheese, and maybe other things not shown on the picture, into *one category* for which there is no name in English and French. This is the denotative content of the term "Panzani". It will be noted that we here accept Searle's (1969:169 ff) and Eco's (1976:162 ff) arguments for considering proper names to have denotation, against a persistent tradition in philosophy and logic at least since the time of Mill. The particular association of objects found in the term "Panzani" has no equivalent in Italian either, but it certainly corresponds to something in Italian culinary practices, at least as these are conceived in the ideology of non-Italians: the complete spaghetti dish. Thus, there is a formal connotation of Italianity. A brand-name may however be expressed in any way which is sufficient to distinguish it from other brand names: phonological combinations reminiscent of the Italian language, which are not pertinent for assuring its identity as a brand name, permit "Panzani" to connote Italianity a second time, now as a substantial connotation. In addition, "Panzani" would also seem to connote its own appartenance to the class of family names, maybe because of the end syllable -ni, and the simple syllabic structure found in such well-known names as Bernini, Paganini, Puccini, Pasolini, and so on.

But it is not true that the brand-name "Panzani" *connotes* the Italianity of the spaghetti, as Barthes (1964 b27) seems to think, and as Kerbrat-Orecchioni explicitly states: it can only *connote* its own Italianity, and therefore this property must be transferred by some other means to the products, and what Barthes (p. 39) calls "l'essence condensée de tout ce qui peut être italien, des spaghetti à la peinture" must be specified by different ideological systems, in the cases of the spaghetti and the painting. The transference of the connotation from the brand name to the product must depend on the *contiguity* of the product and the label, which is once again transfigured into similarity. Of course, there is a conventional relation between the label and the product, but this is normally thought to exist only on the level of denotation. As for specification, it is not quite clear how language and spaghetti differ in their Italianity, so let us consider instead the family name connotation mentioned above: here something more than specification is needed. It is rather common to use family names as brand-names for industrial products, no doubt because they are ideologically associated

with small family enterprises which may be thought to have existed for a long time, to be more reliable, and to function in a manner more reminiscent of handicraft than of large-scale production. Thus, it is not the family name itself, but common ideas about the relationship of family names to business enterprises that are important here. Therefore, we must conclude that something more than just connotation is required, both on the level of expression and on the level of content, to make the Panzani products appear Italian, and to transform this property into a value.

But what about the formal connotation, which Barthes seems to be unaware of? It derives, it will be remembered, from the particular way the denotation segments the world, or maybe the micro-world of the picture. The problem is how we get acquainted with the content of the new sign "Panzani". In fact we have everything an ethnolinguist could ask for to determine the meaning of this supposedly unknown sign: linguistic contexts in the syntagms "Pâtes Panzani", and "Parmesan Panzani", and ostensive definitions, thanks to the label convention. Thus, at the level of denotation, it is, at least to some extent, the picture that determines the content of the linguistic sign, rather than the reverse. Again, the formal connotation of Italianity will only ensue because our world-knowledge, or our ideological system, tells us the particular combination of objects classified together by the term "Panzani" have in common, among other traits, that of being peculiarly associated with Italian culinary culture. So, even in this case, connotation is not enough.

Italianity as a rhetoric of the real world

We now have to investigate whether the meanings that Barthes finds in the picture are connotations, in the limited sense in which those emanating from the brand name may be so termed. To begin with, these pictorial meanings differ from the linguistic ones in being derived from constellations of real-world things rather than signs. Lindekens (1971b: 281ff) observes that, instead of a pictorial rhetoric, what Barthes describes is a rhetoric of *things*. A real pictorial rhetoric, in Lindekens' view, would be concerned with the way the *topological* relations of the referents are changed when projected onto the flat surface of the photograph, for instance giving rise to contiguities between objects not found together in reality, or to inclusions, etc. Lindekens even thinks these relationships may be perceived as such, according to *Gestalt* laws, before the flat surface is translated back, on a higher level of awareness, to the three-dimensional scene of the real world.

We will return later to these interesting ideas, but they are clearly unacceptable to Barthes: if the denotation of a photograph (but not of a drawing or a movie) is *identical* with the things photographed, and if the relation between the expression and the content is "quasi tautologique" (p. 28) then, in spite of Barthes's own timid suggestion to the contrary (in 1961 and 1964b:35), there can be no pictorial rhetoric distinct from the rhetoric of things. In fact, according to the definition, connotational language depends for its existence on the presence of a denotational *language* which may serve as its plane of expression, and a language is a semiotical system whose expression and content are distinguished by

being differently organized (Cf. Hjelmslev 1943:94ff). However, if the signified of the picture is the objects themselves, and if the equivalence of content and expression is a tautology (cf. 1964b:28f), then referent, content, and expression are all identical, and there is no language!

It still remains to investigate whether Barthes' connotations are real, if we admit that reality itself is a language, in such a way that the tomato, besides being a tomato, also signifies "tomato", in the sense in which Barthes tells us in *Eléments de sémiologie*, that all things in a culture are immediately transmuted into signs of their use, the chair for sitting, and so on. It is convenient to start with the connotation of Italianity present also in the picture, according to Barthes: its expression is "la réunion de la tomate, du poivron et de la teinte tricolore (jaune, vert, rouge) de l'affiche" (p.27). Does this mean that the meaning of Italianity is conveyed by the *combination* ("la réunion") of all these things, or by each one of them separately? The latter interpretation is supported by Barthes' talking about "l'italianité de la tomate" (p. 27), as if this were a meaning in its own right, and also by the later statement that "la tomate signifie l'italianité par métonymie" (p. 40). Metonymy is here undoubtedly used in Jakobson's sense, to stand for both *contiguity* and *factorality,* in this particular case for factorality: the tomato is part of what Italy means.

But this is of course not a factorality which is present in the picture itself, but a meaning based on an abduction derived from an ideological system, and thus perhaps not so different from what Eco calls a "connotation" and what Todorov and Sperber count as "symbols" (Cf. 5.2.). One may wonder why this originally Mexican fruit, now cultivated the whole world over, should stand for Italy. On the most favourable interpretation, the tomato stands for Italy in some ideological system predominant in France (or predominating in France around 1964). But if the tomato implies Italy in some ideological system, this is certainly not the same thing as its usage becoming a sign, which is what Barthes' interpretation of the connotational language model requires. The usage-as-sign, therefore, would be an alternative explanation, if it had not been for the obvious difficulty in finding out what kind of usage Italianity is. However, in both cases we also encounter a more trivial problem:

So perhaps, then, it is the *constellation* of the three colours, repeated to some extent in the vegetables, which gives rise to the connotation of Italianity, in that case because, as suggested by the word "tricolore", they are the colours of the Italian flag. In fact, there is no yellow colour in the Italian flag, so this colour, present in different shades in the spaghetti, on the tin can and in the grated cheese, remains unaccounted for, but, on the other hand, the real third colour of Italy, white, is also found on the tin can, in the string bag, the mushroom, and the letters of the accompanying text. Returning, then, to our isolated tomato, suppose we take the colour to be the connotative layer. This is in accordance with Barthes's idea that denotation serves the identification of things (1964b:34). But such a conception presupposes that there are necessary and sufficient features for the identification of the tomato, and that these do not include its red colour. In this case, the colour would

be variable, a "substance" in Hjelmslev's sense, and could thus be used to convey the connotative content of Italianity. At the level of the single tomato, this will not do. To be sure, there are green tomatoes, and it is possible to identify the tomato, with some plausibility, even from a black-and-white photograph, but the ordinary, prototypical tomato is red, and is expected to look red.

Even in the case of the chameleonlike paprika, there are certain limits to the variability of colours, and some colours seem more characteristic also of this vegetable. And it there is no free choice of colours, the minimal requirement for substantial connotation is not fulfilled. But those of us who know that there is also formal connotation resulting from the very choice of a particular semiotical system to convey a given meaning, are nevertheless able to suggest that a connotation arises from choosing the tomato to express — the tomato! Even though the tomato may indeed be expressed in other ways — by a word, for instance, and by a drawing, and so on, even accepting Barthes' contention that a photograph is the same as the real thing -, using the tomato undoubtedly seems the normal, unmarked choice, so that we would think that only other options do carry connotations. In the second place, the tomato will express tomatohood integrally, and we only need the colour for the conveyance of the Italianity connotation. Obviously some principle of relevance is needed both to get us to attend to the choice of the tomato, and to pick out the property of the content form which could serve as a signifier of Italianity.

The constellation of colours – the green-white-red of the advertisement layout – is that principle of relevance, at the same time as it gives us the full expression plane (almost, as we shall see) of the Italianity content. The second function is trivial: not red alone, but the combination green-white-red, can carry the meaning of Italianity. The principle of relevance is needed in order to isolate the colours from the objects whose surfaces they cover, and to isolate them from other colours, which is the double function of *pertinence/relevance,* which has been pinpointed many times already. Somehow, the yellow colour must appear to be irrelevant, for otherwise we should have more reason to think of Ethiopia, Bolivia, Mali, or some other country. The green-white-red of the advertisement is, in our terms, a *triple,* regulative opposition in *praesentia* (Cf. Lecture 4), but it will only come to stand for Italianity when its similarity to the Italian flag is noted, and the Italian flag gets its meaning from the system of international flags, so that in a "metaphorical" sense, the picture will participate in the oppositions of the flag system, in its constitutive oppositions *in absentia* between the Italian flag and other flags.

But not even this will be enough: Mexico, Bulgaria, and a few other countries have the same colours. In fact, there is even the flag of Surinam, which has all the four colours of the advertisement: green, white, red, and yellow. Of course, the limited flag-interpreting competence of most Europeans will help reducing the ambiguity of the colour scheme, but even so, the colours could only function to confirm some more definitive indication of Italianity: the spaghetti perhaps, the grated cheese, and the tomato sauce. And there are also the linguistic connotations of the

brand name, and of part of the text on the labels, and of course the direct denotation of Italianity in the legend and on the labels. We will return to this in a moment, when discussing the connotation of the "service culinaire total" (p. 27).

To accept that the *constellation of* objects, which according to Barthes are signs of themselves, results in a connotation, is not to go along with the parallelism between Panofsky and Barthes, suggested by Eco, Larsen, and Floch. No doubt the tomatoes, paprikas, mushrooms, etc. form a composite sign, which on another extensional level may be redescribed as a heap of vegetables, which, with a shift of intensional level, becomes the purchase of the day. This is rather similar to the way "young girl" results in "Judith", but it is not the connotation. Consider a linguistic example: 'We know not" is a composite sign, because it is constituted of the elementary signs "me", "know", and "not", but it connotes "pidgin English". In this sense, Barthes (p. 37) is quite right in suggesting that connotation is "supra-segmentale", like intonation in verbal language.

So far, there really is an analogy to connotation in the example considered, but we still have to discuss whether the treatment of reality as a language can be justified. In any case, this is not a substantial connotation, and it is not a formal connotation from any isolated object, but it results from the *combination* of objects in the picture, and even so, the relevant features will only emerge from the totality of the content form, to the extent that we are aware of the flag scheme to which the constellation is similar; that is, the content form itself has to be re-analysed, so that the contribution of the connotation as such, if indeed there is one, is rather limited.

The Panzani still-life

Other connotations of Barthes' that immediately seem more plausible are "still-life" and "advertisement". It is true that Barthes (p. 27f) himself rejects the latter content, but for erroneous reasons: to utter something is not necessarily to say that one does so, as an overtly reflexive system like literature will do. But if this were a requirement of connotation, Hjelmslev's own celebrated example of a connotation, "I speak Danish", would not be one. Barthes is in fact confusing connotation with meta-language. Also, when Barthes argues that the information about the picture's being an advertisement "est extensive à la scène" (ibid.), this is contradicted by his own earlier observation that the place of the picture in the review and the abundant labels with the brand-name designate its genre. The whole picture is publicity, but not all parts of it are the signifiers of this fact: somewhat modified, the same picture may carry other functions. As in the case of the still-life, it is not clear which features define this genre, or this archi-text, as Genette (1982:12 ff) calls it: Barthes's understanding of it seems purely intuitive, and even Gombrich (1963:95 ff) who, in discussing the still-life, insists on the importance of the genre, does not tell us anything about what defines it. It seems probable that only certain categories of objects, and possibly also certain types of relations between the objects, may appear in a still-life: one of the categories, I think, is food, and one of the possible relations is a certain fortuitous disorder. Both are found in the Panzani picture.

Fig. 4. An example of an "enigmatic inscription" from the "Fliegende Blätter". The text should be read: "Di/Ana /is/da /un/ da /Saep Iste d/ a/t roma/ ver/e r/ sit/ si/ne T' = "DIze Anna is'da und der Sepei steht a' d'rob'n ' aber er sieht sie net", i. e. "Ann is there, and Sepei also stands up there, but he does not see her".

But the connotations "still-life" and "advertisement" differ from each other in at least two interesting ways. In the first place, the advertisement quite properly connotes "advertisement", because that is what it is, but it is not really a still life, at least not a genuine one. In other words, it refers to other advertisements as to its genre, its archi-text, but it refers to still-lifes as to the model it imitates or, in Genette's terminology, as to its hypo-text. As Genette observes, the "Ulysses" of Joyce relates to the one of Homer as the hyper-text to the hypo-text, and the pictures of Mel Ramos relate in the same way to certain paintings by Ingres, Manet, and Velazquez. There is a "pratique hypertextuelle dans la publicité moderne", which amounts to something in between parody and travesty, Genette goes on to tell us, but we may note that there is nothing satirical about the Panzani picture. Also, the Panzani case is different in that it seems to refer to a genre, not a particular work, i.e. it has as its hypo-text an archi-text different from its own, which is a possibility not considered by Genette (Cf. Genette 1982:12 ff, 436, etc.). This is not like the connotation of Danish emanating from the Danish language; it is more like the suggestion of speaking another language which a skilled imitator may produce without abandoning his mother tongue, or like the "Rätselhafte Inschrift" from the German comic paper "Fliegende Blätter", which so fascinated Freud, where a text written in German dialect is made to suggest a Roman inscription, by means of the simple artifice of moving the word limits, so that initial consonant groups reminiscent of Latin result (see Fig. 4. Also cf. Lyotard 1971:263 ff). Of course, these parallels suppose a strict definition of the still life: given a looser one, we may prefer to say that the still-life archi-text is used to realize the purpose of the publicity archi-text.

In the second place, the connotation "advertisement" really seems to derive from pictorial rhetoric proper, at least if it is really expressed by the abundant labels and the place of the picture in the review, as Barthes tells us, but the connotation "still-life" could easily be expressed through a constellation of referents, as has indeed been done in some show-cases of the Lund museum of popular traditions, "Kulturen". And yet the distinction is not a clear-cut as that, for the common form of a still life is undoubtedly a painting. Therefore, the museum showcases, as well as the publicity

photograph, might be said to refer to a hypo-textual archi-text, which is a kind of painting. It will be observed, however, that what is simulated is not the expression plane of the painting, but only its accustomed subject matter. On the other hand, an arrangement similar to the advertisement could be on display in a shop window but, to the extent that an advertisement must be expressed pictorially and/or verbally, that would be enough to change the genre. Here we discover that our second point is really related to our first: it is because the picture is, and does not only express the connotation "advertisement", that it must do so in pictorial rhetoric, and it is because it is not a still-life that is has to express this meaning by means of the referents. Thus we end up thinking that "advertisement", though rejected by Barthes, is the only unambiguous pictorial connotation of the Panzani picture.

Description of the Panzani world

Another alleged connotation, which Barthes (1964b:27, 38f) calls "abundance", really seems to correspond to two different contents: first the "service culinaire total", the idea that Panzani offers all that is needed for a complete meal; and then the suggested identity of the vegetables, commodities in their natural state, and the industrial products, as instanced by the tin can. Both, according to Barthes (ibid.), are expressed by "le rassemblement serré d'objets différents", "la profusion et la condensation des produits", i.e. the conjunction of numerous (types of?) objects in a small space. However, when we look at the picture, we observe no notable abundance of different objects, and it is anyhow not understood how such abundance should express the complete culinary service and the identity of the natural wares and the industrial products. Let us, then, have another look at each one of these contents.

The notion of a "complete meal" may be taken to correspond to what Barthes (1964a: 34 ff) has elsewhere described as the menu, which has its syntagm, i.e. the linear sequence of first course, principal course, and sweet dish, each one with its paradigm of possible choices. But the Panzani meal is not as complete as that: it remains at the level of the course, or of its components. Fortunately, Halliday (cited by Douglas 1972:62ff) has pushed the analysis much further, segmenting the principal course into *joint*, *staple*, and *adjunct*, normally corresponding to meat, cereal, and vegetable. To an Italian, and also a Mexican, the spaghetti, the tomato sauce, and the grated cheese would normally constitute an entire first course, but to most Europeans, they would only complete the staple slot of the principal course. It will be noted that there is organization even further down than the course, for the spaghetti, the tomato sauce, and the grated cheese are units of a combination that cannot be freely exchanged, and our particular choice follows an Italian contextual rule.

One may wonder to what extent this meaning is present in the picture. We have seen above that the brand name "Panzani" resegments reality by means of a category comprising spaghetti, grated cheese, and tomato sauce, but we do not know if the category contains more elements, and so cannot know if it corresponds to a complete meal. It is also possible to say that the choice of commodities found in the string-bag, rather than corresponding to the real

purchase of the day, is determined by the requirements of the dinner scheme, which is somehow projected onto the string-bag, but even this will be visible only for those who are familiar with this particular, Italian-inspired, fragment of our culinary practices. Besides, a rule of relevance is needed in order to discover the elements of the complete meal, for the mushroom seems to fall outside it, and the tomato, the paprikas, and the onions are all redundant, given the tomato sauce. We must therefore conclude that this meaning is rather contained in the interpretational schemes of the reader than in the picture itself. For an informed observer, there are clues to be discovered, as we saw above, but these will never tell us the meal is complete. It is on the intuition of the native eater we must rely for our principle of relevance.

Given the dinner scheme, we can account for the presence of the packets of spaghetti, the grated cheese, and the tomato sauce. We now need to account also for the vegetables present in the picture. We have noted in earlier lectures that there is a common advertisement practice that consists in using the *contiguity of expressions* to signify a *similarity of contents or referents*. Nöth (1975:19f) called this transference of features due to indexical signs and I have myself remarked elsewhere (Sonesson 1979) on the "pratique métonymique" of placing a naked girl on the stereo one wants to sell. Williamson (1978:19ff) argues more generally that, in advertisements, things are correlated, not by an argument, but by the formal organization of the picture. In my reanalysis of her examples, I found factorality and partial similarity of expressions to be used, alongside contiguity, to make the same statement about the similarity of contents and/or referents. In the case under review, there are contiguities between the vegetables and all the Panzani products, and there is a particularly close contiguity between the vegetables and the tin can containing the tomato sauce. Of course, we also know that the content of the tin can is similar to the vegetables present, but this is not manifested on the expression plane of the picture. There is also a factorality, because nearly all the wares are contained in the string-bag and form part of the purchase, but we will return to this aspect later.

No doubt the Panzani publicity participates in the "ideology of the natural", so convincingly demonstrated to be present in other advertisements by Williamson (1978: 103ff): the contiguity of the raw materials and the finished industrial product is to be exchanged for their identity or similarity. The contiguity is in the picture, but it only acquires meaning because of the ideological system outside it. Thus, an analysis of the ideological system, not the picture, will permit us to affirm that an antitype is created here between *Nature* and *Culture*, giving to the Panzani products the natural values of authenticity, soundness, purity, and so on, while retaining the cultural values of convenience, facility, etc. (Cf. Fig. 5). But only the ideological system can tell us in what sense we are to transfer the values.

In Williamson's jetty-and-tyre example (Fig. 6), and in Groupe μ's cat-and-coffee-pot example, the similarities are really effects of the pictorial expression plane, and not present in the referents. But the *contiguity* that is operative in the Panzani picture seems to be present in the referents, in the arrangement of the objects themselves. What then, about the



Fig. 5. The separaton of Nature and Culture in the Panzani publicity

factorality we noted above? In order to grasp its precise import in the picture, it will be necessary to consider first the last of Barthes' alleged connotations, which is the first taken up in the article: the return from the market. Barthes (1964 b:27) himself notes that this *implies* two positive values; first, that the vegetables have been freshly harvested, and second, that they are intended for domestic use. Thus, once again, Nature is opposed to Culture.

But there is also another aspect to this observation: it suggests that the Panzani picture shows us one scene from the complete scenario of Life-close-to-Nature, so that earlier moments, like the harvesting, and later moments, like the preparing of the food, may be deduced. Of course, somewhere between the harvesting and the return home, there will also be the moment of purchasing at the market place. But nothing of this is seen in the picture: it is a culturally-bound interpretational scheme. And in fact, not even the return from the market is actually there. All we have is an *indexicality* for this return: it is the position of the string-bag on a surface that might be a table, partly opened, so that a few of the commodities have fallen out, maybe together with other details, which retains the purchase at the market and the homecoming and protains the unpacking of the food and its preparation. The clues to all this are of course present in the picture, but they can be read only by a person with the adequate cultural experience. But to the extent that they are present, these clues are invariants to be picked up from experience, in the same way as those defining the string-bag, the packet of spaghetti, and the tomato, only at a higher intensional level, defined by the market going scheme. There is therefore no reason to call this a connotation.

The position of the string-bag in the picture is however not completely determined by the requirements of the indexical relationship. For instance, the Panzani products must be so placed in the bag and relative to the camera that the

Fig. 6. Jetty similar to tyre - from Williamson 1978

labels can be read, for otherwise, the new category "Panzani", which we mentioned at the beginning of this section, cannot be defined. And there may be many other determining factors. But one of them is probably the necessity of having the Panzani products included in the string-bag, which stands for a return from the market, rather than from the supermarket, so that the natural values will dominate the artificial ones. Therefore, the *inclusion* of the Panzani products in the string-bag must be made conspicuous, and this is brought about by means of suspending the bag rather unnaturally from one of the handles outside the picture frame, so that the packets of spaghetti appear in the roundish opening of the bag. Of course, a particular camera angle is also needed to obtain this effect. Does this make it a connotative meaning?

To Barthes it would be one, no doubt, if only because it requires a particular choice of photographic angle. Indeed, Barthes (1964b:35) tells us that "les interventions de l'homme sur la photographie (cadrage, distance, lumière, flou, filé, etc.) appartiennent toutes en effet au plan de connotation". In an earlier text, Barthes (1961:14ff) distinguishes two categories of photographic connotation: those that modify the denotation, and the others. Taken literally, the first category is of course an impossibility, but we could try to make sense of it, suggesting that it is the denotation of some pre-pictorial semiotical system which is modified by a connotation, the latter forming together the pictorial denotation.

In the case of one of the three subtypes, the pose, it is easy to think of the system of body-motion, the "kinesic" system, as Birdwhistell calls it, overlayered with "metacommunicative" messages, to use Scheflen's term, which are all seen in the photograph. Another subtype, the "objects", including "la pose des objets" (p. 16), to which the Panzani connotations would seem to belong, may perhaps be taken to function in the same way. As for the third subtype, the "truquage", which, to judge from the example, corresponds to the photomontage, its position is more difficult to determine. Barthes' second category comprises three subtypes, which are more easy to accept as connotations: the "photogénie", which corresponds to the technical effects having a signification, as the blur used to signify the space-time; the "esthétisme", i.e. the connotations of art; and "syntaxe", which is the particular effects, comic ones for instance, resulting from the combination of pictures. We have already observed that none of these connotations should really be possible, if the referent, the content, and the expression

are identical, as Barthes argues; at the very most, we would have a language whose expression plane was a "symbol system", in Hjelmslev's sense. That resolves the terminological question, but without the different relata of the sign, which may vary in relation to each other, connotation becomes completely mystical.

If we now return to the *inclusion* of the Panzani products in the string bag, there is perhaps another, more correct sense in which this could be a connotation. No doubt the commodities are really inside the string-bag, which is an object of the world, but it is only because of the angle of vision *and* the *projection of the three-dimensional opening of the bag on the expression plane of the picture* that the topological form of inclusion is clearly brought out on the pictorial surface. The roundish shape, we may suppose, is the prototypical form of inclusion, and as such it is only visible as an *intra-iconic* Gestalt, in the sense of Lindekens, i.e. a shape that dis- appears once the picture is translated back to three-dimensional space. Now, all the clues present on the pictorial surface may perhaps be read as indications of the real-world invariants specifying the identity and the position of the string bag, but it is possible that the position of the string-bag was itself chosen, so as to obtain a particular effect on the two-dimensional surface of the picture. That would be a genuine connotative sign. But from denotation, from the interpretational schemes of the Lifeworld, we know that the string-bag stands for Life-close-to-nature; and from denotation we are also able to identify the packets of spaghetti, the tin can, and the packet of grated cheese. Therefore, we need to apply the connotative sign of inclusion to the denotative signs of the string-bag and the Panzani products to seize the meaning of the message: that Panzani is included in the realm of Nature.

For the moment, we are able to conclude that Barthes puts many different things into what he calls "connotation": a few, like the linguistic connotation, the connotation "advertisement", the "photogénie" and the "esthétisme", are genuine connotations while others, like the Italianity of the display, could perhaps be connotations in an extended sense. In other cases, it is clearly interpretational schemes of the Lifeworld, and more generally cultural values, which are brought to bear on the reading of the picture, as in the case of the return from the market and the complete meal. Sometimes, it is also a question of changing intensional or extensional level, so we have to admit in the end that, in the case of some of Barthes' examples, though not in the definition of the concept, there really are similarities (though no identity) between Barthes' and Panofsky's interpretations.

This wealth of meanings given to the notion of connotation leaves us wondering if there is anything left to denotation. What would be the residue of meaning, once the "semiological reduction" has been accomplished? There is no denying the utter confusion that characterizes Barthes' employment of the concept of connotation; and yet, it is only because of Barthes's article that we begin to discover the immense tasks awaiting us in the semiotics of pictures.

Summary

The present chapter was entirely concerned with a critical analysis of Barthes' article on pictorial rhetoric, particularly directed



Fig. 7. The four concepts of connotation vs denotation (as first distinguished in Sonesson 1989)

to gaining a deeper understanding of the concept of connotation as applied to the analysis of pictures. First, we investigated some of Barthes's general presuppositions in the light of the criticism levelled at the article by later commentators. We saw that there were excellent reasons for invoking the public and institutionalized purposes of publicity in the interpretation of an advertisement, but that verbal language was of doubtful importance in the "anchoring" of pictorial meanings; and we had a first look a the paradoxes of Barthes's different layers of pictorial organization

We therefore went on to show that Hjelmslev's model of connotation as applied to pictures gives rise to different distinctions from those resulting from Panofsky's analysis, contrary to what has often been suggested. But when thereafter, we studied the examples adduced by Barthes in the Panzani analysis, we had to admit that some of these were really rather similar to the composite signs we had recognized in Panofsky's iconography. In fact, it seems that the only authentic connotations among those claimed by Barthes are the linguistic ones and the "advertisement" connotation rejected by Barthes. Nevertheless, we left as a task to solve in the following the possible existence of a "language" of the perceptual world, capable of taking on its own connotations, which is what Barthes sometimes seems to suggest. Finally, we also argued for the presence of other, authentic connotations in the Panzani picture, but again, we left the development of this idea for later on.

5.2. On the heterogeneity of semiotic resources

We will start out by contrasting the notion of connotation, as defined by Hjelmslev, which Barthes claims to take over, with three other completely distinct notions christened in the same way: the stylistic and the logical notion, and the conception introduced by Eco. The latter two are useful, but they have other, common, names, and the stylistic notion is so utterly confused that it can be of no use to us. We will then leave behind the close reading of Barthes' article on pictorial rhetoric. Instead, will return to the problems concerning the existence of connotations in the "natural world" and in pictures, but without the limitations set by the Panzani framework.

Conceptual sundries. Four notions of connotation

When Barthes, in his article on the rhetoric of pictures uses the term "connotation", it is reasonable to suppose that he wants it to be understood in the sense of Hielmslev's definition of *connotational language,* on which he comments at great length in *Éléments de sémiologie*, first published the same year in the same volume of the same review. Hjelmslev's definition is also hinted at in the article itself (p. 29 f), and there is an explicit reference to the relevant passage in *Eléments de sémiologie*. In addition, most of the other terms used in the article, like those of *Eléments de sémiologie*, have in fact been taken from Hjelmslev. Nothing suggests however that Barthes is conscious of thereby using a term that has a problematical meaning.

Actually, as I have argued elsewhere (Sonesson 1983-84; 1989a); and Fig. 7), at least four extremely different notions of connotation, together with the corresponding notions of denotation, are found in the (more or less) scholarly literature, and if there is to be *any* sense in using the terms, we have to begin by distinguishing these notions (of which some may be concepts) from each other. The classification will be repeated here in an essentially identical fashion to that of the earlier publications, but some further clarifications and justifications will be added.[5]

In the cases which interest us,

5 Since my analysis was first made, I have become aware that there are at least three extant books on the subject (Garza Cuarón 1978; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1977b; Rössler 1979), and numerous articles (for instance, Molino 1971). Unfortunately, Rössler's book only serves to augment the reigning confusion in the field and even Kerbrat-Orecchioni, while giving some good specific analyses of the Hjelmslevian kind, comes up with a definition that is no less incoherent because its heterogeneity is explicitly affirmed. In fact, she joins connotation in what we shall call the stylistic sense with connotation similar to what we will call the semiotical sense, on the grounds that they may sometimes appear together (1977b:18), and though she claims Martinet and Eco confuse the latter notion of connotation with the logical one (p. 13), later examples seem to abandon this distinction. On the other hand, Garza Cuarón has lucidly diagnosed the conceptual confusion behind the term "connotation", describing at length its historical causes. Her extensive list of the varying senses given to the term throughout history might be useful for other purposes, but for the present we will be content to distinguish four notions, with a few subcategories. And even Garza Cuarón fails to note the peculiarities of the concept introduced by Hjelmslev

the notion of *connotation is* conceived in relation to another notion, that of *denotation*. Ignoring some marginal cases, these notions are defined on the *sign function,* in a somewhat loose sense. In fact, the four correlated notions of connotation and denotation may be viewed as different *ways of segmenting* a particular semantic domain, constituted of the two relata of the sign function, i.e. *expression* and *content,* and of the portion of the Lifeworld corresponding to the content, viz. the *referent* (Cf. Lecture 2.). Of the two latter realms, the content is considered to be a mental unit, as Saussure and Hjelmslev have insisted, or more exactly an intersubjective entity; and the referent is thought of as something which may be encountered in the Lifeworld, in direct perception, or at least potentially so.

In the case of the *logical distinction*, the connotation is identical with the content, or with a particular feature analysis of the content, and the denotation is the same as the referent, or the relation connecting the content to the referent (or, in some conceptions, starting out directly from the expression).

In what we shall call the *stylistic* distinction, denotation is a *part* of the content, which is considered to be in one-to-one correspondence with the referent, and connotation is what is left of the content when denotation is deduced; but, as this is a particularly confused distinction, connotation and denotation are, at the same time, considered to be different *kinds* of contents, where the possible kinds of content are defined by psychological predicates. Also, in some versions of this distinction, the semantic domain to be segmented is extended to include the subjective mental content of the sender and/or receiver of the sign.

The *semiotical* distinction, so called because it is proper to semiotics, viz. to the Hjelmslev tradition, concerns a denotation, which is a relation between the *expression* and the *content,* and a connotation, which relates two signs (i.e. two units of expression and content) in a particular way. Finally what Eco calls connotation, when he is not concerned with the stylistic notion, is really what is elsewhere termed a *(contextual) implication,* so that the distinction is this time concerned with different levels of *indirectness* inside the content, the denotation being simply the less indirect one. As may be seen in Fig. 7., only Hjelmslev's distinction involves a relation between different signs, and thus different expression and content planes. Eco's distinction is internal to the content plane. The stylistic distinction may be completely explicated within the plane of content, but is often understood in relation to the referent. The logical distinction, finally, concerns a relation between the content and the referent.

In *logic, denotation* carries the same meaning as *extension,* i.e. the object or class of objects subsumed by a concept, and *connotation* is another term for *intension* or *comprehension,* i.e. the list of properties characterizing the concept, often just those properties which are necessary and/or sufficient to definite it; and/or permitting to pick out the objects falling under the concept. This distinction, using the last-mentioned terms, was first made in the Logic of Port-Royal, but the use of the terms "connotation" and "denotation" in this meaning probably derives from John Stuart Mill (Cf. Garza Cuarón 1978:57 ff; 69 ff). Henceforth, we will employ "intension" and

"extension" in this sense; in fact, the concepts of *extensional* and *intensional levels,* introduced earlier on (Cf. Lecture 4.), are clearly related to the logical distinction.

Intension and extension are sometimes identified with Frege's "Sinn" and "Bedeutung", permitting various intensions to correspond to one extension: for instance, "the Morning Star" and "the Evening Star", "equilateral triangle" and "equiangular triangle", the "vanquisher of Austerlitz" and "the vanquished of Waterloo", etc., have the same extensions but different intensions. If the intension is taken to contain all properties common to the objects in the extension, then, as Kubczak (1975:73) rightly observes, all terms having the same extension will have the same intension. For instance, both the Morning Star and the Evening Star could be described as "a certain star, which may be seen shortly before the rising and shortly before the setting of the sun". But if this is indeed the content of both terms, we cannot explain that in many contexts, the one cannot be exchanged for the other. Kubczak concludes that, in linguistic signs, intensions do not contain full information about the objects referred to.

But it is not only a person who is ignorant about astronomy, mathematics, history, and so on, who would find it impossible to exchange the first term for the second, or vice-versa, in the examples cited above, at least in numerous cases. According to the analysis suggested by Husserl in *Logische Untersuchungen,* and developed by Gurwitsch (1947; 1957:145ff), the conceptual noema, i.e. the intension, will in fact contain all elements found in the object, but now *organized in a particular thematic hierarchy.* Sonesson (1978) used this idea to argue that terms lacking substitutability in "opaque contexts" contain the same features, but in a different *thematic hierarchy.* Thus, to use Humboldt's example, cited by Kubczak (p. 140), the Elephant may be conceived of as "der zweimal Trinkende", "der Zweizahnige", or "der mit einer Hand Versehene", each time giving pre-eminence to one of the proper parts or attributes of the whole. However, if the whole has priority to its parts and attributes, as well as to its perceptual noemata, it is also possible that there may be different *segmentations* of the same whole, which are different ways of *intending* the same *extension:* thus, for instance, the human body may have one intension corresponding to our ordinary body scheme, another which corresponds to Le Bry's cannibalistic fashion, and so on (Cf. Lecture 4).

Ever since the Port Royal logic, intension and extension have also been supposed to vary inversely to each other, but some counter-evidence exists to this claim (Cf. Kubczak 1975:86ff). In such cases, the extension is considered to be a *class* of objects, but we applied the term to *one* given object when we introduced the concepts of intensional and extensional levels (Cf. Lecture 4.). This, it would seem, is more in keeping with the conception of the concept, or the category, as a *prototype*. If so, intension and extension may of course vary independently.

The logical distinction gives us, I think, a pair of real concepts, or rather, a twofold series of neighbouring concepts. The *stylistic* distinction, on the other hand, results in a rather clear notion of a denotation, and a series of confused notions of connotation. The stylistic distinction is taken up here mainly because it is so

often confused with the other distinctions, notably with the semiotical one, but while it is certainly conceptually useless, it is also interesting because of its very confusion. The origin of the notion is probably again in the Port Royal logic, where it is called "idées accessoires". However, it was Karl Otto Erdmann, who in 1900 distinguished "Hauptbedeutung", "Nebensinn", and "Gefühlswert". Thus, Erdmann thought that the core meaning, which he took to be conceptual ("Begriffsinhalt"), could be distinguished on the one hand from subsidiary meaning aspects, and on the other hand from the emotional values or atmospheres but, as the distinction is nowadays stated, these two terms are confused. Urban, Firth, and Ogden & Richards seem to be among those principally responsible for circulating these notions in the English-speaking world, translating the first by "denotation", and the latter two together by the term "connotation" (Cf. Garza Cuarón 1978:62 ff; 108 ff; Rössler 1979:1f).

The general idea seems to be the following: inside the content there is a *part,* which is thought to correspond *point by point* to an object in the world of perception, such as it would appear in a completely "objective" account; and there is another *part,* which has no equivalent in the real-world object, but is added by the sign and/or the sign user. The features of the first part are supposed to be *cognitive* or *conceptual,* thus permitting the *identification* of the real-world object; the features of the other part are said to be *emotive,* or *emotional,* and it is never very clear if they are part of the intersubjective content of the sign, if they are contributed by the sign producer, or result from the reaction of the sign receiver. In addition, the cognitive meaning is supposed to be the most important part of the meaning, but it is not clear if this is a further characteristic of the first part of the content, or whether this part is the most important by virtue of the postulate that cognition is more important than emotion.

Like the Roschian prototype, these notions suppose a number of properties to co-occur. Unfortunately, they do not. For instance, to take an extreme example, the most important features of the meaning of "darling", and those which permit an identification, are emotional, in the sense that they describe the emotional relationship between the speaker and the object referred to. Of course, it is an emotion that is a part of the intersubjective content of the term in the language system, not of the speaker's or the hearer's subjective mental content, and it is not, as in the semiotical concept, conveyed by the expression plane of the sign (Cf. Sonesson 1978). Straightforward variants of these confusions may be found in the work of Nida (1975a:28ff, 98f; 1975b: 17ff, 19, 31, 36), though at one point even Nida (1975a:36f) shows himself aware of the difference between "emotive meanings" and "associated cognitive features" not required for the identification of the referent.

Connotation in this case, is a *residue concept*: that is, denotation is introduced as a definition of meaning, and then, when it is realised that all of meaning has not been explained, connotation is added to take care of the rest, without any further definition, or only with awkward ones (Cf. Sonesson 1978). Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1977b), who does recognize the existence of different concepts of connotation, still in the end tries to define connotation by a sole trait, making

it emerge explicitly as a *residue* concept (without noting the problematic nature of such concepts): it is "surplus" (p. 18), that which is not useful for identification (p. 15), those traits that are not necessary and sufficient for pointing out the object, i.e. features not being in the denotation (p. 6), and even the conjunction of variable features, constant features which are not distinctive, features responsible for metaphorical transference, and other connotative (sic) traits (p. 181). However, if meaning, is *prototypical,* as we have every reason to believe, *denotation* cannot be distinguished by necessary and sufficient traits. On the other hand there may very well be a principle of *relevance* permitting the identification of *connotative meanings*. Thus, even as a residue concept, connotation as conceived by Kerbrat-Orecchioni is unacceptable. In the end, not even the residue concept is left untouched: we are told that even connotation may denote (p. 226)!

What I shall call the *semiotical distinction* derives from Hjelmslev's (1943:101) definitions of denotational and connotational language. A connotational language is a language, i.e. a system of signs, the expression plane of which is another language. It is thus, in Hjelmslev's opinion, the opposite of a meta-language. Contrary to both of them, denotational language is a language, none of whose planes form another language. We may take this to mean that the *denotation* serves to connect the *expression* and the *content* of a sign, whereas the *connotation* relates two separate *signs,* each with its expression and content. Hjelmslev also gives numerous examples of connotations: different styles, genres, dialects, national languages, voices, and so on. He suggests that all the while he is speaking in Danish, denoting different contents as he is telling us different things, he is connoting the Danish language. A foreigner, I suppose, would be connoting all the time "I am a foreigner", mainly because of his pronunciation. In many languages, the use of an /r/ produced with the tip of the tongue, or with the uvula, indicates different geographical origin. Thus, we may conclude that it is in the *choice of a particular expression to stand for a given content, or of a particular variant to realize the expression invariant,* that the semiotic connotation resides; it is from this choice that an additional meaning effect results.[6]

Hjelmslev's connotations have often been related to some of those mentioned by Bloomfield: they depend on the social and geographical origin of the speaker, or they are associated with improper or intensified versions of more normal signs (Cf. Rössler 1979:31, 39 ff; Garza Cuarón 1978:168ff, 180). In spite of the similarities in the *kind of contents* invoked, it is a mistake to identify Hjelmslev's conception with that of Bloomfield. As Hjelmslev himself observes in the passage quoted below, what is important to connotation *is not the particular contents, or kinds of contents* conveyed, but the *formal relationships* which they presuppose:

> Konnotatoreme vil være at analysere paa grundlag af deres indbyrdes funktioner, ikke paa grundlag af den inholdsmening der er tilordnat dem eller kan tilordnas dem /The connotators are to be analysed on the basis of their mutual functions, not on the basis of the contents which are assigned to them or could be assigned to them/. (Hjelmslev 1943:105)

The study of the "social and sacral"

6 This formulation will do for the moment, but later on we will have to modify it somewhat.

values usually conveyed by the languages of connotation is assigned by Hjelmslev (1943:105) to the theory of "substance". This explains that, as Greimas (1970:96) observes, Hjelmslev's list forms "un inventaire, approximatif et allusif", and Greimas' own essay would rather seem to be a contribution to such a theory of "substance" as envisaged by Hjelmslev. But this supposes that particular *kinds* of content are associated with connotational organization.

And that brings us to our second point. There is no suggestion whatsoever in Hjelmslev's text that emotion has anything to do with connotation, in his sense. Apart from the testimony of Hjelmslev's own writings, there is also the observation of Spang-Hanssen (1954:61), a disciple of his, according to which neither do only emotive signs contain connotations, nor do all emotive signs contain them. Some of Nida's (1975b17ff) examples would be connotations also in Hjelmslev's sense, for instance his "four-letter words", but not because of their emotional character. In order to justify his notion of connotation, Nida tells us that the emotional reactions to the expression of the sign, but not to its content, form part of the linguistic meaning, but this seems an arbitrary decision. In fact, each four-letter word will connote the property of being a four-letter word, no matter the reactions of the auditory, but the "uptake" of this connotation, to use Austin's term, may of course be the reason for an emotional reaction. Also, part of the meaning of a curse is to convey the anger of the speaker. From our present point of view, however, these are not central issues.

Nevertheless, the semiotical concept of connotation has often been wrongly identified with the stylistic one, in pictorial semiotics, for instance by Groupe μ (1979; 1980: 1992), Webster (1980:23), Laconte (1980:38), Gauthier (1979:53), Porcher (1976:55ff), to cite some clear examples. Metz (to some extent, as we shall see later), Calvet (1976:32f), and Burgin (1982:57) show more insight into the originality of the conception, though they fail to characterize it properly. Prieto, who affirms that the problem of connotation has failed to advance in any way since Hjelmslev's capital contribution (1975a:14), comes very near to Hjelmslev's own conception, as I understand it, in one of the earlier versions of his theory (1975b: 169 ff). Molino (1971:16 f) is right in saying that the Marseille dialect will connote the Marseille dialect, but he is mistaken when he concludes that Hjelmslevian connotation is tautologous, and therefore uninteresting. To return to Hjelmslev's own example, all parts of the Danish language will of course connote the Danish language, but some of them will do it better than others (as was the case of the brand name "Panzani") and, in the case of connotations which are not common to all units of a national language, the task of finding the signifiers for the signified is as interesting as in the case of ordinary linguistic signs. Again, as we shall see, a connotation may start a chain of contextual implications.

Although Eco (1976:111; 1984:32) himself claims to take over his notion of connotation from Hjelmslev, he actually seems to be concerned with something very different. When Eco (1968:98ff) first discusses our problem, he produces a long list of very heterogeneous phenomena, which include logical connotation, stylistic connotation, syntactic associations, rhetorical schemes, and

stylistic effects. Trying to find a common denominator for all this, Eco suggests the connotation is the sum of all the cultural entities brought up before the receiver's mind (p. 99). We thus return to the notion of association, in the vaguest sense of the term. Later, however, Eco (1976:111) defines connotation as "a signification conveyed by a precedent signification". Although it is immediately followed by a rendering of the Hjelmslevian model, this definition is rather suggestive of what the logicians call a (contextual) implication — not a purely logical one, certainly, because it will only be true given a particular "meaning postulate", whose postulation will be taken care of by the Lifeworld itself.

Eco asks us to imagine a dike provided with an alarm system in which, for instance, the sign AB denotes danger, the sign AD insufficiency, etc. In the context of the dike, we know that danger will result from the water-level rising too much, and that insufficiency is the same as the water-level being to low. In the first case, we know that it will be necessary to let some water out, in the latter to have some more water entering the system. Eco would thus say that the sign AB denotes danger and connotes evacuation (and perhaps also high water-level), and that the sign AD denotes insufficiency while connoting the water entering (and, I suppose, a low water-level). Given the "stock of knowledge" of the guardian, all these facts could be said to *imply* each other, in the context of the dike. Interestingly, Eco (1984:33) himself has lately suggested that what he calls the second level of the connotational system is based on "inference"! Moreover, Stuart Hall (1981b226), when commenting on the connotations of news photographs, tells us they transmit "other, implied meanings", though he makes no particular mention of Eco.

But this is something very different from Hjelmslev's connotational language. Implication being a very general kind of relation, we could of course take connotation to be an implication from expression and content together, or rather, *from the particular relation between expression and content* to a new content. But Eco's connotation is something that would follow from the *content* of the first sign *alone,* with no regard to the expression, i.e. a common implication. "Symbols", in the traditional European sense of the term are (not to be confused with the Peircean sense), are considered by Sperber (1974; 1979) and Todorov (1972a; 1974; 1977) to be implications from one content to another. Commenting on the example we cited from Eco above, and on another example of Todorov's, Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1977b:81ff) observes that in spite of their multiple layers of meaning, these cases do not confirm Hjelmslev's model, since it is only the content of denotation, not the whole sign, which is transformed into the expression of connotation. Thus, she adds, instead of fig. 8a, we will have fig. 8b. This in fact substantiates my observation that what Eco calls connotation is a relation from one content to another, because we can easily dispense with the "expressions" of the second and third signs of fig. 8b, for which there is no evidence whatsoever. Second, it should be noted that there is really no reason at all to expect that the studies of Todorov and Sperber should confirm Hjelmslev's model, since this kind of case is discussed by Hjelmslev (1943:100) under the quite different heading of "symbol systems'.



8a 8c

8b

Fig. 8. a) Hjelmslev's connotation, according to Kerbrat-Orecchioni; b) Eco's connotation, according to Kerbrat-Orecchioni; c) a truer model of Hjelmslev's connotation

Finally, Kerbrat-Orecchioni's rendering of Hjelmslev's model in fig. 8a is obviously wrong; fig. 8c would be more correct, and more similar to Barthes's rendering of the model (not, of course, to most of his examples). But this still does not tell us whether the arrow begins from the sign as a whole or from the particular relation between the relata of the sign. Later on, I will argue that the latter is the case.

Implication is also different from the *stylistic* notion of connotation: it presupposes the existence of at least two distinct entities, not just two parts inside the content, but it does not stipulate anything about the kinds of content required. Of course, some of the cases usually mentioned as cases of stylistic connotation may be redeemed by implication. There are also cases when the question as to the presence of one or two entities is undecidable.

Finally, it is important to note that connotation, in Hjelmslev's sense, cannot be identified with "plastic language" as the term is used (in opposition to "iconic language", and, more properly "pictorial language"), by Floch and Groupe μ (cf. Lecture 1 and 6). Such an identification is certainly suggested by some of Barthes's examples, by Genette's literary ones, and by many others. Its fundamental condition of possibility is of course that the expression plane of connotation, like that of plastic language, is taken to be identical with, or to overlap, that of denotational language. In fact, many of Hjelmslev's examples at first seem to lend themselves to such an analysis, and so do those of Kerbrat-Orecchioni's examples that are Hjelmslevian in spirit.

The escape out of this confusion leads into an ever deeper one. Sven Johansen (1949), in a Festschrift for Hjelmslev, affirms the existence of four kinds of connotation, having as their expression plane different parts of the denotational signs: the expression substance, the expression form, the content substance and the content form respectively. In addition, there are complex connotational signs, depending on more than one of these strata for their expression. Johansen's examples of the simple connotational signs are

rhyme, rhythm, semantical licence, and syntactical licence, in that order. Complex connotational signs are, for instance, Hjelmslev's connotation "Danish", and the difference between "cheval" and "coursier". According to Johansen, his simple connotational signs are what Hjelmslev himself calls "signals". This conception was developed in the early work of Trabant (1970). If it is correct, plastic language will only be one of the possible variants of connotational language, the one being expressed by the expression plane of the denotational sign, by its form or its substance. But then perhaps, one could surmise, the variant expressed by the content is our stylistic connotation, as suggested by Johansen's examples.

In her extremely confused study of connotation, Rössler (1979:29f) maintains that Hjelmslev has distinguished "indicators", which are connotations resulting from the denotational form of expression, and "linguistic indices", which depend on the denotational form of content. She cites as examples of the first type the /r/ phoneme pronounced with the tip of the tongue, as well as the lack of nasalized sounds in Provencal dialects, while the choice between "les mallons" and "les carreaux" is said to be an example of the second type. Substantial connotation is ignored in her book. However, the different pronunciations of the /r/ phoneme are in fact differences of substance, since they are not allo-functional in French, and so is the lack of nasal vowels in Provencal, if the latter is taken to be a dialect of French. But this is not the most serious error of this passage.

If I am not mistaken, both Rössler and Johansen use the terms "signal" and "indicator" wrongly, and Rössler's second term, "linguistic index", is unknown to Hjelmslev. An indicator is a part that

> "indgaar i funktiver saaledes at disse faar indbyrdes substitution naar disse dele fradrages, og som under givne betingelser genfindes i samtlige funktiver af en given grad /enters into functives in such a way that these have mutual substitution i.e. become equivalent, when these parts are removed, and which under given circumstances are found in all functives of a given degree/" (Hjelmslev 1943:104).

After this definition, Hjelmslev adds that there are two kinds of indicators: signals and connotators. A signal is an indicator that may be univocally assigned to only one plane of the language where it appears, whereas a connotator is always encountered on both planes of the language. Signals have been discussed much earlier in the text (p65f), where the example given is the different word order of the main clause and the subordinate clause. These can be treated as variants of the same invariant proposition, if the difference of word order is merely considered a signal of their identities.

To Hjelmslev, then, signals are not connotators, but merely phenomena having in common with connotators the property of impeding denotatively identical signs from being completely equivalent, i.e. the property of being indicators. Judging from the terms, a connotational language should thus be expected to contain connotators, not signals. More importantly, since connotational language is defined (p101) as a language having another language as its expression plane, signals, which are said to be univocally assignable to just one plane of the language (p104), are certainly not involved in connotation. In fact, "main clause" and "subordinate clause"

are neither expressions nor contents of denotational language, and the same thing is true of their differences of word order, or at least so it might be argued. Being a main clause is a property a series of words may have, considered as a part of a discourse, and having a particular word order is a property of the word constellation itself, but none of these properties are necessarily exemplified, just as a tomato may be Italian without exemplifying it. To the linguist, the word order may come to exemplify or, as Hjelmslev puts it, signal the main clause, but then this will be a primary sign! Or at least, in this way Hjelmslev's reasoning could be reconstructed.

Having thus avoided the conclusion that there are connotational signs based on either expression or content alone, we now realize that both planes of the denotational sign must be involved in each connotational sign. And that makes a lot of difference to plastic language, which, for its meanings (except perhaps for choosing among them), is independent of denotational language.

This leaves us with three authentic conceptual distinctions, and a third that is only a cognitive wastebasket. Henceforth, however, I will use *intension* and *extension* for the *logical* distinction, and I will call *(contextual) implication* that which Eco chooses to rechristen connotation. When I use merely the terms *connotation* and *denotation,* they should be understood to refer to the *semiotical* distinction; but each time I need to mention the *stylistic* distinction, it will be explicitly designated with that term.

Metz on Hjelmslev on connotation

In an early discussion of connotation, Metz (1970:404) tells us that cinematographic connotation must always be "symbolic", apparently in the sense of Romanticism: "le signifié motive le signifiant mais le dépasse". The kiss that ends the film stands for love and marriage, but there is more than kissing to love, just as the cross which signifies Christianity does not exhaust its meaning. Later on in the same article, Metz goes on to say (p 406f) that in a film denotation and connotation cannot be distinguished, being based on the same units, so that grammar and rhetoric are one. Connotation, he argues, is the form of denotation (here "form" should probably not be understood in the Hjelmslevian sense): in order to denote simultaneity, a film may employ a montage showing various happenings consecutively or alternatingly, and these will connote differently. The film maker has many more options in choosing the connotation than the speaker of a language, because he can construct the denotation for himself.

Unfortunately, these examples and considerations hardly appear to be compatible. The first example points in the direction of stylistic connotation; the second may possibly correspond to the semiotical concept. In another article, where he sets out to criticize not only the coherence of Hjelmslev's theory and Barthes's interpretation of it, but also his own earlier conception, Metz (1973:163ff) only appears to retract one of the affirmations reported above: that the same units are responsible for both denotation and connotation (in the cinema). Earlier, he now tells us, he thought the denotative content was the object which had been filmed and could be identified, while the way of filming it constituted the denotative expression, and

both these together formed the connotative expression, its content being a particular style, an atmosphere and so on (Cf. Metz 1968:83, 100). But to talk in this way about "la façon de filmer", Metz claims, is to beg the question: only because schemes of connotation have been integrated into the denotative expression beforehand will there be a connotative content, as is the case of the lighting having a particular symbolic value. Otherwise "l'objet sera identifié mais non connoté, il n'évoquera rien au-delà de lui-même" (p l65). Therefore, Metz concludes, the denotative sign is not enough to form the expression plane of connotation, but an autonomous connotative expression is needed.

The introduction of a particular term, "connotator", for the expression plane of the connotative sign, could be taken to suggest that Hjelmslev too would recognize the presence of an autonomous connotative expression, beyond the denotative sign. But in spite of this interpretation being very widespread (no doubt because of Barthes 1964a:165), Metz thinks he can show that the connotator is the content of the connotative sign, not its expression. This is unclear in Hjelmslev's original formulation, Metz thinks, but later passages dissipate any doubt. Thus, the presence of this term cannot be used to argue that Hjelmslev recognizes the autonomy of connotative signs.

And yet, according to Metz, there are justifications for two different interpretations of connotation in Hjelmslev's text. The first, which is traditional and uninteresting in Metz's opinion, could be based on examples like "Danish" as a connotation of Danish language (or "French", as the French translation and Metz would have it). Here, Metz affirms, as in Hjelmslev's list of examples (for instance dialects, sociolects, poetical style, and so on), it is really the denotative sign that is responsible for the connotation.

More interesting is, in Metz's view, the second possible interpretation, which takes its point of departure in Hjelmslev's affirmation that in the analysis of denotative language, "

> framtraeder de tegn, der kun er forskellige ved at vaere solidariske med hver sin konnotator, som varieteter /those signs, which only differ in being solidary with different connotators, appear as varieties/ (Hjelmslev 1943:104; cf. p73f)

- that is, as Metz (p 167) correctly notes, not as free variants, but as variants conditioned by the context of appearance. In this case, Metz maintains, the expression plane of connotational language is not constituted of the entire denotational language, but only of particular parts of it. Further justification for this interpretation Metz finds in the passage where Hjelmslev (p 104f) says that

> den solidaritet, der bestaar mellem givne tegnklasser og givne konnotatorer, er en tegnfunktion, idet tegnklasserna er udtryk for den paagœldenen konnotator som indhold /the solidarity, which exists between given sign classes and given connotators, is a sign function, in that the sign classes are the expression of the connotator in question as a content/.

Although the French translation quoted by Metz here renders correctly the Danish original, Metz in his subsequent argument talks about "certain signes" instead of "certaines classes de signes". In a moment, I will return to criticize this interpretation; for the present, however, it must be noted that Metz here claims the connotative expression is part of the denotative sign not, as seems to be required

in other parts of the article, something more than the denotative sign (see above)!

No matter what Hjelmslev wants to say, Metz claims, it is the second interpretation that is of interest. Connotation is somehow doing a second analyses of the "text" of denotational language, choosing certain segments and combinations of segments for its expression. It is not true, as he had argued before (see above), Metz now recognizes, that connotation is the form of denotation, for connotation has a form of its own. Only the matter of the two signs will coincide, and this "coincidence matérielle" (p168) is the cause of the many confusions criticized here by Metz. What denotation offers connotation is not a basis for its expression but for its content, but because of the correlation between the two relata of the sign, also expression will be affected (p 169). In a film, therefore, a cinematographic style is a bifacial unit, a language of connotation having contents of its own (evocative force, different resonances, ideological implications, and so on) and expressions of its own: the choice of film quality and objective, the angles of vision, the movements of the camera, the montage schemes, etc. The connotation is always the connotation of something: if the film is said to "baigne/r/ dans un climat de tristesse", this gloominess cannot be separated from a particular object reproduced in the film, as part of the story (p. 70). Only "texts" which are "figurative", i.e. which reproduce reality, can have a denotation distinct from connotation, for the first level must exist, at least as a theoretical possibility, if the second level should come into being.

Metz has admirably analyzed Hjelmslev's conception, confronting it with examples of pictorial signs but, unfortunately, his many deep insights are stained with serious confusions. Metz is probably not sufficiently familiar with Hjelmslev's concepts, introduced in earlier chapters of Hjelmslev's book and employed here, for he obviously misses some essential points. He does not seem to use the term "form" in Hjelmslev's sense, and the distinction between "form" and "substance", essential in the section on connotation, as in Hjelmslev's whole work, is not given its due. It will be remembered that, to Hjelmslev, form is that part of the expression plane which cannot be exchanged for another without bringing about a complete change of the content plane, and vice versa; and substance is all the rest of the sign, that which is not relevant or pertinent (Cf. Lecture 4.). Another way of expressing the same thing is to say that the form is the invariant, and that the substances are the different variants in which the form may appear. Therefore, the semiotic function is made up of a solidarity, i.e. a relation of mutual presupposition between the form of expression and the form of content, excluding their respective substances. Between each one of the forms and the class of substances corresponding to each one of them, there is only what Hjelmslev calls selection, which means that the form is a necessary condition of the substance, but not the reverse (Cf. Hjelmslev 1943:21 ff; 1959:44ff.).

Suppose that there are two ways of denoting simultaneity in a film, as Metz tells us: a montage showing various happenings alternately and a montage which shows the actions following each other. In ordinary language, this could well be described as two "forms" of the sign, but in Hjelmslevian

terminology it will be just the reverse, two substances! For if they both signify the same thing, as Metz supposes, these montage types are simply two variants of the same sign, having identical pertinent (or relevant) features, i.e. the same form. Hence Metz's later criticism of this phrase, where he seems to take the term "form" in Hjelmslev's sense, is beside the point.

In the light of what has been said so far, Hjelmslev's introduction of the term "connotator" is not as unclear as Metz maintains. After giving a list of different connotative signs, such as styles, genres, idioms, slang, national languages, dialects, and physiognomies, Hjelmslev says that

> de enkelte led i hver af disse klasser og deras kombinationsenheder vil vi benœvne konnotatorer. Af disse konnotatorer kan nogle vaere solidariske med givne sprogbygningssystemer, andra med givne sprogbrukssystemer, andra igen med begge dele /the individual terms of these classes and their combinatory units will be termed connotators. Among these connotators, some will be solidary with given systems of language construction, others with given systems of language use, yet others with both of them/ (1943:103).

We have already been told that the expression plane of connotative language is the denotative language, and that which is solidary with an expression is, according to the definition of the sign function, a content. Thus, not only in the passage cited by Metz, but in this introductory paragraph and in a number of contexts where the phrase "solidary with" appears, we are explicitly told that the connotator is a content. So far, then, it seems that Metz's interpretation should have been obvious all the time. And yet, there is a passage that does not accord with this analysis: as observed in the introduction to this chapter, Hjelmslev tells us that the connotators, in contradistinction to the signals, appear on both planes of the language. It is certainly clear from the context that the two planes of which Hjelmslev is talking here are the planes of denotative language, but once we realize that, to Hjelmslev at least, denotative language is the expression plane of connotative language, this amounts to saying that also connotative expression is (or contains) connotators! But perhaps this is not a confusion on the part of Hjelmslev: rather, a connotator may be any of the relata of connotational language, just like a "functive" is any one of the units participating in a function (Cf. 1943:31f). Further justifications for this interpretation can be gained from the passage quoted above, in which Hjelmslev (p105) states that the connotators have to be analyzed on the basis of their "mutual functions".

In the passage introducing the term "connotator", there is also another affirmation, which is fundamental for the understanding of Hjelmslev's theory: the expression plane of connotative language may be "the system of language construction" or "the system of language use", which is another way of saying that it may be based on the form or the substance of the denotative sign. Elsewhere, Hjelmslev (1943:61 ff; 1959:55ff) claims that the distinction of *form* and *substance* is valid not only in the case of language, but is a consequence of any scientific analysis, which has to decide on certain criteria of definition, a particular level of abstraction. Hence, specific terms are required for the case of a language, and Hjelmslev decides to call linguistic form "language construction", reserving the term "language use" for the substance that is related to a language. Therefore, the

sentence quoted above means that certain connotators are solidary with the denotative form and others with the substance of the denotative sign.

Now, if the point of view of linguistics, and semiotics, is the point of view of the user (Cf. Lecture 1.) then, it might be expected, the distinction between form and substance will not depend on an arbitrary, "scientific" criterion, but on the correlation of content and expression, as conceived by the user of the semiotic system concerned. But this is only partly true: given an expression, we will be able to find the content with this principle and vice versa, but it does not permit us to delimit the expression, or the content, to begin with. In this sense, Hjelmslev (1943:72ff; 1959:56) is right in saying that something which is form from one point of view may be substance from another point of view; that substance as such cannot be known; and that it is the network of dependences which transforms something into form, so that only a new point of view, defining another network of dependences, is required in order to characterize a new form. At the beginning of the section on connotational language, Hjelmslev (1943:101) tells us that, contrary to the fiction he has employed so far, all real "texts" are *heterogeneous*. If so, it is not only scientific analysis which is able to adopt different points of view, but the user of the semiotic system himself is apparently employing different "networks of dependences" at the same time.

These observations will help us to elucidate one of the passages (1943:104) which Metz adduces as proof of his second interpretation: two phenomena, which are equivalent from one point of view, here the denotative one, may constitute two different forms from another point of view, the connotative one. But if many different points of view may be applied to one and the same thing, perhaps a particular relationship between two points of view is implied, when one of them is called denotative, and the other one connotative. Metz thinks, as we have seen, that there are two possible interpretations of what Hjelmslev claims in this respect, but probably it would be more correct to recognize two kinds of connotational language, one stemming from the *form* of the denotative sign, i.e. those features being pertinent or relevant for denotation, and the other one stemming from denotative *substance*, that is features which tend to accompany the denotative sign (the norm), or features that are sometimes combined with it (alternative variants). In the case of *formal connotations*, it will then be true, as Metz said in his first article, that the units of denotation and connotation are the same; but in the case of *substantial connotations*, it is as obviously true, as Metz said in his second article, that connotation and denotation must divide up the materia in different ways, for connotation will come into being only if a substance is transformed into the form of another sign.[7]

In some as yet unclear sense, connotational language is secondary to denotational language. Two languages will be distinct, only to the extent that the expressions, contents and/or their interrelations are different in an essential

7 As for the suggestion that connotation is something more than the denotative sign, it is of course true that substantial connotation introduces a new organization, but Metz's examples indicate another meaning, to which we will turn later.



Fig. 9. Crown made up of fruits and vegetables (old advertisment for the defunct Swedish supermarket chain B&W

way; perhaps we could say: to the extent that they embody different principles of relevance. Let us suppose, following Metz (1973:170), that the denotational language of pictures and films is what we have previously called pictorial language. In that case, according to Metz, its content is "l'objet en tant que reconnu", and the expression will be those features of the picture that are required for this identification. Consider, then, what this means. In a picture representing a dog, only those features of the pictorial surface that permit us to identify the content of the picture as being "a dog" constitute the form of expression of the pictorial sign. But suppose it is a gloomy dog. In a picture representing a gloomy dog, only those features of the pictorial surface that permit us to identify the content of the picture as being "a gloomy dog" constitute the form of expression of the pictorial sign. That is, there are, often enough in the same picture, criteria for identifying the content as being "a dog", "a gloomy dog", "a gloomy beagle", "Snoopy in a melancholy mood" and so on. These are what we have earlier called different *intensional levels* of the picture (Cf. Lecture 4.). But they are all states of the world, at different levels of description, so they can all be identified, in exactly the same way and according to the same principle of relevance. The melancholy atmosphere is in the picture, integrated into the appearance of the dog, just as Metz observes, but then it is because it is no connotation, at least not in Hjelmslev's sense. Metz wrongly takes emotional contents to be connotations in the semiotical sense, but this is, as we have seen, a confusion with stylistic connotation.

On the other hand, the picture of the dog could also have been made employing colours and shapes that by themselves suggest melancholy, either by convention or because of the "laws" of synaesthesia. This is what the Greimas school and Groupe μ have called plastic language (Cf. Lecture 6). Here, a new principle of relevance has been applied, for the expression plane consists

Fig. 10. Magritte's "Le Viol"

of shapes and colours as such, in their two-dimensional reality, and the content plane is made up of attributes, not of things existing in the perceptual world or things that, like unicorns and golden mountains, are of the same general type as perceptual things. In a case like this, it is true that pictorial language and plastic language share at least part of their expression planes. This case should however be distinguished from another one, which we have met already (and which we will study more in detail in Lecture 7), in which the overlapping expression planes both belong to pictorial signs: for instance, the crown which is also an arrangement of fruits and vegetables, the trunk which is also a face, and the Roman inscription, which should really be read as a text in German dialect (Cf. Fig. 9, 10 and 4). Thus, there are two ways, at least, in which the expression planes of different signs may coincide, wholly or only in part. If we take Hjelmslev's definition and his examples seriously, which I think we should, the expression plane of connotational language must partially overlap that of the corresponding denotational language, because it includes the latter, complete with expression and content and, probably most important of all, the relation between the two. But this is clearly a third way in which to "languages" may partly coincide with each other.

Metz is perhaps the only one to have realized the difficulties of applying the concept of connotation to pictures but, unfortunately, not even his close reading of Hjelmslev's text has prevented him from coming up with some rather strange ideas about connotation and some very dubious examples indeed (some of which will be discussed later). The two possible interpretations of connotation that Metz suggests are actually the two kinds of connotation distinguished by Hjelmslev: those stemming from the form, and those that are due to the substance. Not all secondary languages, and not all languages whose expression planes overlap others, are connotational languages. Before we can proceed, it will be necessary to reconstruct a model of the intuitive foundations on which Hjelmslev's theory is erected – which is clearly the heterogeneity of the world of our experiences. Only then will the specificity of connotation become apparent.

The intuitive foundations of Hjelmslev's theory in the heterogeneity of the Lifeworld

In spite of Hjelmslev's positivist pretensions, the basic assumptions behind his reasoning, which are never clearly stated, seem intuitively acceptable (Cf. Lecture 4.). Let us now try to render these assumptions more explicit, and to complement them with observations taken from other sources. To begin with, we should recognize with Hjelmslev that, from the point of view of the system, it is true that the substance presupposes the form, since many different substances may manifest the same form; but I would add that, on the other hand, from the point of view of the "text" and its perception, it is also true that the form presupposes the disjunctive class of all its corresponding substances because, without at least one substance, the form could never be manifested and would then have a purely metaphysical existence! Fortunately, since the form cannot presuppose any particular substance, the relation from substance

to form is still distinct from the relation from form to substance, and thus these two relations may still be used to define the terms.

And yet there is something more to form and substance than these definitions suggest. First of all, form is only form relative to substance, and vice versa. This becomes clear when Hjelmslev points out that no real "texts" – no real phenomena in the world of our experience – are homogeneous, deriving from only one system of interpretation:

> Denne forudsaetning /at den forelagte text udviser strukturel homogeneitet/ holder imidlertid ikke stik i praxis; det er tvaertimod saaledes, at enhver text der ikke er af saa ringe udstraekning at den ikke afgiver tllstraekkeligt grundlag for en til andre texter generaliserbar systemdeduktion, saedvanligtvis indbefatter derivater der beror paa indbyrdes forskellige systemer. /This assumption /that the text at hand shows structural homogeneity/ cannot be maintained in practice; on the contrary, the fact is that each text, which is not of so small an extension, as not to afford a sufficient basis for a generalizable deduction of a system, usually comprises derivates depending on mutually distinct systems/. (Hjelmslev 1943:101f).

However, it does not follow that every time more than one system is manifested in the same "text", one of the systems is manifested as denotation and the other as connotation. A particular relationship between the two sign functions must be required. Nor are denotation and connotation purely relative: that which is connotation in relation to a denotation does not form the denotation of another connotation. For the same reason, in Hjelmslev's sense of the term, denotation is certainly not simply the last of the connotations, as Barthes suggested.

A long philosophical tradition, from at least the Port Royal grammar to the ideological school, was aware that the sign, or rather its expression, was also a thing and as such had properties which it did not possess as a sign, i.e. as related to a particular content. The logical paradoxes concerning self-referential terms, rediscovered by Frege and Quine, are essentially due to this double nature of the sign (Cf. Récanati 1979). This "opacity" of the sign, which block the way to the referent, must be of the same nature as the poetical function, which, according to Jakobson (1963:218ff), emphasizes "le côté palpable des signes". Mukařovský (1974) says the same thing more generally about the aesthetic function: it makes necessary a detour via the expression before reaching the content, the import of which is thereby changed. The thing character of the sign is particularly stressed by Mukařovský: the work of art thereby acquires a layer of purposelessness, which resists the totalization of the receiver (p 40, 45ff); which is a natural, rather than a cultural, fact (p 45); and which speaks to our common humanity, rather than to that which is socially specific, as is usually the case with signs (p64).

According to the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz (1967:49f), each act of interpretation supposes an *apperceptual scheme*, which conveys the category of which the sign is a member as a "self", a thing, and an *appresentational scheme*, which gives the category to which the expression belongs, considered in its relation to a given content, i.e. to another "thing" of which it is the expression. There are also two other schemes, which we shall ignore for the present. Something which apperceptually appears to be mere strokes on the paper will perhaps turn out to be letters, from the point of view

of appresentation. To Hjelmslev in 1943, the strokes would be substance and the letters probably form. But later, Hjelmslev (1959:58f) insists that the substance must be "sémiotiquement formée", and uses the term "matière" for the matter as yet unorganized by the form. The strokes as strokes would then be matter, and only when they take on the characteristic shape of letters will they partake of substance; as for form, it is merely the fact of there being a distinction! Like Mukařovský's layer of purposelessness, matter seems to be a natural fact, whose meaning, if there is any, must be the business of our common humanity. Anyhow, it is unrelated to the content, and thus would normally form no connotations.

Perhaps, then, we can take the appresentational scheme, or the form, to pick out those properties of the thing that are relevant, or pertinent, for the purposes they serve. In this case, part of the properties of the thing would also be properties of the sign, and no others. But consider the two forms that "Barbara" may take on, if it is considered as an item of our common name system, or as a sign labelling one variant of the Aristotelian syllogistic figures (cf. fig. 11.).

In the terms of Alfred Schütz (1967), the apperceptual scheme "Barbara" corresponds to a least two different interpretational schemes: a rather common girl's name and the designation of one of the "figures" of Aristotelian syllogistics. Developing Schütz's example, we will find that the internal organization of the apperceptual scheme, i.e. the expression plane, will itself change when we pass from one of the interpretations to the other: the first is a language system, the second a symbolic system (Cf. fig. 11b and 11b respectively). For the sake of the argument, we will have to take the controversial, but by no means new, standpoint of considering proper names to have meaning: any "Barbara" will be human and a woman (Cf. Lévi-Strauss' 1962:245ff discussion of the proper names of dogs!). But, at least from the point of view of verbal language, neither the humanity nor the femininity resides in any particular phonemes of the expression plane, so this is a nonconformous system, a language system. On the other hand, if "Barbara" is interpreted as a designation for one of the Aristotelian figures, it will turn out to be a supersign, made up of seven smaller signs, not including the meanings of the syntactical positions: "B" is an abductive index for the group of figures having names beginning with a B; "r", "b", and "r" are rules of reduction from one figure to another; "a" signifies a universal proposition; and the syntactic positions are icons for the sequence of premisses and conclusion in the argument (Cf. fig. 11a; the example has been somewhat changed for the convenience of the exposition). Since the decomposition of the two planes is completely conformous, we have this time a symbolic system, Hjelmslev's (1943:99f) sense, i.e. essentially a system where the effort to proceed to the second segmentation fails, resulting in smaller signs rather than in figurae: every division on one of the planes will reflect one on the other.

The same example could even yield a third version, which is a semisymbolic system, in one possible interpretation of this term: the vowel /a/, which is often



Fig. 11a

thought to express "femininity", i.e. no doubt, to exemplify it metaphorically, is repeated three times in the name, and femininity is also one of the components of the content. Of course this is a fact quite separate from its being a proper name for women in our culture, for many women's names do not contain the vowel /a/, and there are names containing it that are men's names (Cf. fig. 11c.).[8]

Here matter is identical, and so is the form at the level of letters, and yet at the sign level, the two substances, understood as conjunctions of form and matter, clearly have different properties.

8 On symbolic systems and the semi-symbolic ones, cf. Lecture 6.

Fig. 11b



Fig. 11c



Fig. 11. a) symbolic system; b) language; c) "semi-symbolic system"; E = expressio, C = content; fg = figurae. Whether "Barbara" (or any other proper name) sounds like the name of an aunt or a daughter-in-law depends where you are in the circle of circulation of proper names, which seems to become ever faster. We who are no in our fifties may be the first generation for whom a name is known to designate either an old aunt or a now-born child, but certainly none in between.

Therefore, it seems, form may also add something, not magically of course, but because the sign user comes prepared with certain presuppositions, protensions and retentions, and because the context also suggests how the sign is to be taken. This only partial overlapping of form and matter is also expressed in Bühler's (1934:28) Organon model of language (see Lecture 2, Fig. 15). The concrete sound phenomenon, depicted as a circle, is intersected by a triangle, the expression plane of the sign, which is thus both more and less than the sound: less, because not everything in the sound wave is pertinent for the sign (the principle of *abstractive relevance*) and more, because the listener, by means of his linguistic knowledge, is able to supply what is lacking from the signal (*apperceptive supplementation*). Hjelmslev (1973:226) himself observes that Bühler's principle of abstractive relevance is necessary for the derivation of form, but he ignores the second principle, that of apperceptive supplementation.

The sign is here characterized as a triangle because it is related to three units outside it: the object or state for which it stands ("Symbolfunktion"), the sender, to which it gives expression ("Symptomfunktion"), and the receiver, to which it appeals ("Signalfunktion"). The second function manifests the inner man, Bühler adds, and the third function directs the behaviour of others (p 28f). Mukařovský hastened to add a fourth function, the aesthetic one, emphasizing the thing character of the sign, and then Jakobson (1963:209ff) proposed two further ones, the phatic and the metalinguistic functions. Unfortunately, neither Bühler, nor Mukařovský or Jakobson seem to distinguish the cases in which the speaker or his emotions, or the listener, are the referent of the semiotical act (Bühler's "Symbolfunktion"), and thus the content of the sign in the ordinary sense, from the cases in which other features of the sign, irrelevant for conveying the denotation, carry information about the participants of the communication process. As for emotion, numerous linguists and semioticians always assign it to the "Symptomfunktion", whether it is conveyed by the features of the sign content themselves, by an implication from its use, or whether it depends on some further properties of the expression



Fig. 12. Visualizations of connotational language as opposed to meta-language.

plane of the sign. Conceived in this way, the distinction seems pointless: it would permit an arbitrary multiplication of the number of functions.

Baldinger (1980:230ff), however, seems to combine Bühler's terms with Hjelmslev's sense of connotation, when he argues synonymous words may have different "symptomatic and signaletic connotations". He then lists words having the same content but differing in being employed by different geographical, social, professional, political, generational, sexual, and other groups. This brings us back to Hjelmslev's heterogeneous "text", in which various systems are manifested. A given expression is *allo-functionally* conditioned, not only by the content for which it stands, but also by certain characteristics of the sign user and of his public, though it is not ordinarily a sign for these characteristics, but it probably only becomes one when used outside its normal group. In a way, these are properties the expression has but does not always exemplify in Goodman's sense (Cf. Lecture 4.). But only in a way: the properties in question can only be pseudo-exemplified, because they have to be supplied from the system - not, strictly speaking, the sign system, but the system of social groups. Supposing "father" and "daddy" to mean the same thing, a further condition on the use of "daddy" is perhaps that the user is a child (Cf. Baldinger 1980:233 f). In many cases, the requirements for the sign user and his public are identical, but in the case of child language, the restrictions only apply to the speaker, and in other cases, for instance "four-letter words", the restrictions are imposed on the public only: they are supposedly not to be used in front of children.[9] Also Mukařovský's aesthetic function could easily be conceived in this way: of two synonymous signs, one is chosen because the conditions require something "aesthetic". This interpretation could even be extended to Jakobson's "phatic function", at least if it serves to evoke an atmosphere, not, as Jakobson also suggests, to establish contact. As for the metalinguistic function, it is, most of the time, only the referential function applied to a referent of semiotical nature. However, if there is metalinguistic intonation, as Récanati surmises (cf. below), there must also be a particular metalinguistic principle of relevance.

Hence, the expression plane of a sign is manifested by things, and these things have, in addition to the properties required for their function as expressions of particular contents, other properties which are conditioned by other systems, and which may come to connote these systems. In this sense, Hjelmslev pointed out that combinatory variants, not free variants, were responsible for connotational languages. Corresponding to every form, there are different substances that convey different connotations. Therefore, Hjelmslev said that "certain classes of signs", not, as Metz renders the phrase, "certain signs", were solidary with certain connotators. In the class of possible expressions for a given content, connotation will delimit a smaller class also having the same connotational content. *Thus, connotation is possible because there is a further choice when denotation is already determined* (Cf. Fig. 12).

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9 This restriction of the public would probably not exhaust the specificity of their meaning, however.

As with his theory of denotational language, Hjelmslev's theory of connotational language was to be concerned with form, not substance (Cf. 1943:105). If there is any place for Barthes' ideological analysis in Hjelmslev's conception, it is in the study of substance. When the connotators have been analyzed on the basis of their mutual functions, the theory of substance can be erected on these foundations, which it must presuppose. Here, then, we will at last learn something about those "ideas of a social or sacral nature, which are usually associated with concepts like national language, dialect, sociolect, style, etc." (ibid.). But much work remains to be done before the theory of connotational form can be developed. Hjelmslev's list of six types and four subtypes of connotators is, he tells us (p 102f), not exhaustive, but only meant to show the existence and the multifariousness of the phenomenon. If we take the different titles here to be substances, it would be a mistake to suggest further categories of the list on the basis of their meaning: literature, advertisements, etc. as extensions of Hjelmslev's genres. Instead, we have to determine if there is any peculiar relationship between the two relata of the sign function, which is common to all the examples given.

Hjelmslev's list is a list of contents, not of expressions: for instance, the Danish language, Hjelmslev (p105) tells us, is an expression for the content "Danish". When he then goes on to say that a national language may be a "symbol" for the nation, he must be thinking about a further meaning relation, for symbol systems in Hjelmslev's sense, as we know, are not languages. It must be a relation between the content of the connotational language and another content, i.e., in the sense characterized above, a contextual implication. In that case, Barthes' (1964a:164f) "véritable anthropologie historique" would remain outside connotational language proper. Thus, we are concerned with a language whose expression plane is another language, as the definition reads. The listed contents, on the other hand, could very well be conveyed by other means, for instance by the use of ordinary linguistic denotational language, as in Hjelmslev's book.

But the listed connotators, as the contents of expressions made up of other expressions and contents, possess further properties in common. They all seem to characterize classes of signs having many members, of which the sign serving as connotational expression is one. Combinations of signs, if these can be considered further signs forming classes, are also included. The classes in question seem to be subclasses of the entire sign repertory found in a given semiotical system, dividing it up in a new way. An obvious exception to this is subtype 6b, national language, which is co-extensive with a semiotical system, and also the genres "speech, writing, gestures, flag code", type 4, if these are considered to differ as to form, not only as to substances. As for type 1, styles, i.e. poetry or prose, they would seem to form classes more extended than ordinary semiotical systems. While the properties singled out are always directly properties of the signs, they take their principle of relevance from social phenomena with which they are associated: thus, the sign classes 1-3, perhaps also 4 and 5, are correlated with different classes of social purposes or situations; and the sign classes 6 a-d are correlated with different

social groups, 6d, physiognomy, with a one person group; and 2 and 3, perhaps also 4 and 5, may also be so correlated. In the case of poetry and prose, the social purpose seems less immediately obvious. In view of all this, it is not surprising that Hjelmslev (p110) should want to include sociological linguistics in the theory of connotational languages.

But none of these restrictions are mentioned in Hjelmslev's definition of connotational language, and it seems much more interesting in this case to go by the definition. In his text, Hjelmslev repeatedly insists that the expression plane of connotational language is made up of another language, complete with expression and content, each having its form and its substance. Following this definition, it may be suggested that, for instance, the distortion of graffiti, as well as the mere difference of handwriting that this supposes are cases of connotation. The handwriting, like Hjelmslev's type 6d, the "physiognomy" of the voice, is a substance, in this case a graphic substance, whose exchange leaves the form of expression and the whole of content intact. Since we are not familiar with the writers, the content will not be "the real physiognomy So-and-so", as Hjelmslev (p 105) says, but the mere difference of the handwriting and thus of the writers.

Calvet (1976:32f) uses the Barthes/ Hjelmslev model of connotational language to spell out the significations of political graffiti. A supporter of the FEN, a political movement on the extreme right, well-known for its defence of French colonialism in Algeria, has inscribed the initials of their name on a wall. An adversary of the movement later changes the meaning of the inscription, simply adding a few strokes to the initial F, so that the result is  EN, which Calvet analyses according to Barthes' understanding of the Hjelmslevean connotational language. Unfortunately, Calvet does not explain in any detail how he believes such a connotation may come into being, but perhaps it is because the different semiotical systems implied, the alphabet and the swastika, have been executed in different "handwriting" (which is a kind of "physiognomy") that the message of "distortion" is transmitted. The primary condition for the emergence of this connotation would in that case be that the different parts of the inscription are clearly seen to have been executed by distinct hands.[10] Generalizing, in Hjelmslev's spirit, from phonetic to graphic facts, we must admit that handwriting carries connotation, for Hjelmslev (1943:102) himself tells us the "physiognomy" of the voice or the "organ" engenders connotations. But this still does not account for the meaning "distortion", which is higher-level, depending on the apprehension of the difference between the two ways of writing. And this difference of handwriting is itself of interest only because it appears in the same inscription, in contiguity, or perhaps better factorality because, relative to the swastika and relative to the whole group of initials, we are concerned with parts of the same whole.

But we should have started from the other end. Why does Calvet think that FEN is a denotative sign? Actually, FEN is an

10 Arguing from content, we would say that no supporter of FEN could have made the whole inscription, but his adversary could, in which case there is no distortion.

abbreviation, which denotes a name, which in turn stands for a political movement; and the swastika has a number of meanings in traditional symbolic lore, only one of which, Nazism, is today commonly known. But there is no syntactic rule, common to these very different semiotic systems, which permits us as a matter of course to derive the complex meaning "FEN is Nazi". Instead, we find a contiguity, and in fact a partial overlapping, of the expression planes of both signs, of their respective "substances" to be precise. This is a case we have already encountered in our discussion of indexicality (Cf. Lecture 2 and 7.): the cat which is a coffee pot, and the fruits which form a crown (cf. fig. 9), as well as Magritte's picture of a face which is also a female trunk (Fig. 10). Two expressions, together with their contiguity or their reunion in one whole, will often stand for the identity, or the similarity, of the corresponding contents or referents, we observed; and we added that the comparison was usually directed from one of the contents to the other. From our present point of view, this must be a connotation, not from one of the signs, but from their combination, for if connotation results from the way in which denotation is expressed, here someone has chosen to express two signs with the help of partially the same substance. In this particular case, then, factorality will be the condition of possibility of connotation. The difference of handwriting is not relevant on this level because, in the context of the whole 卐EN, we can trace the F, and the swastika immediately stands out as a whole from the following letters. It is sufficient to see that there are two messages, although their expressions partially overlap. At this level, the swastiska and the letters simply connote different systems of signification. However, in order to reach the higher-order connotation "détournement", we do not only need to know what FEN stands for, and what the swastika means, but we must also be able to ascribe them to different subjects, the swastiska-writing coming after the other.

This is certainly a less classical, but perhaps more common, case of connotation: here, besides the two signs and their respective substances, the partial overlapping of the latter is required, in order to bring about the connotation. The resulting content is not the label of a class of signs, or even of sign contexts, but rather the unique context of two particular signs. It does not transfer to any social group or situation associated with it. And yet, it is clearly a result of the particular disposition of the two substances as used in the expression of two given signs. More or less of the substance of a message may be taken in charge for the production of the connotation, thus, for instance, in Fig. 13., the fact of the amalgation of a T and a cross is relevant for the connotation, but, contrary to what happens in Calvet's example, the difference of "physiognomy" (handwriting, font, etc.), is not.

Thus, Metz is right in arguing that the expression plane of a connotative sign may require more than the denotative sign, though not, it seems, in the way he intended it. The content "distortion" will only result, if the two signs are in different handwriting and partially overlap - features of the substance, or rather the matter, of the denotative signs, which become part of the form of the connotative sign! The same is true of pictorial metaphors, at least of those

we have analyzed so far: both a partial similarity of the substances (and sometimes the forms) and a factorality or a contiguity is needed to produce the connotation "metaphor", with the ensuing suggestion of further and deeper similarities. But "metaphor" is not a label for a class of signs, but for the class of sign couples defined by a particular type of relation. Metaphors do not transfer to any social group or situation, but the implications following upon them may, in some cases, carry over to the referents corresponding to the contents involved. This later relationship is merely a suggestion not, as in the cases in Hjelmslev's list, the result of a real contiguity, a "perceptual context", which is capable of defining indices; instead, there is iconicity (Cf. Lecture 4.). Contrary to the social groups and situations, the referents do not furnish the principles of relevance characterizing the connotational language. Nevertheless, it is the particular expression used for a content which brings about the meaning "metaphor", and that makes it a connotation, according to the definition.

Wittgenstein, rediscovering the old idea of the sign being also a thing, pointed out that there are certain facts that the sign may show, apart from what it signifies (Cf. Récanati 1979). Not everything a sign can show has to do with connotation. It is as substance, not as matter, as this-sign-being-also-a-thing, that it will bring about connotations. For instance, horizontal

Fig. 13. A more transparent combination of letters and other sign systems

parallelism could possibly exemplify order as matter, because of its intrinsic properties: this is the level of plastic language (Cf. Lecture 6). But because of the particular disposition given to this horizontal parallelism on the packet of cigarettes "News", it also helps identify the packet of cigarettes as such, while at the same time suggesting another identification with the first page of a newspaper. In this respect, the horizontal parallelism contributes to the connotation "metaphor", which contextually implies further similarities between the cigarettes and the newspaper, which are the relata of the metaphorical relation. Thus, the same property or configuration may be involved both in plastic language and in connotation.

In this section, we have seen that the basic thing character of the sign, recognized in many philosophical traditions, is a prerequisite of the distinctions between form, substance, and matter. The theory of connotational language is first and foremost a study of its form, Hjelmslev observed, but of course connotational form may be identical to denotational substance. Even if considered at the level of formal relations, Hjelmslev's list of cases suggests that a much more restricted range of phenomena are connotations than the definition would permit. We opted for the definition, and then discovered that it is not the mere thing character of the sign, which Hjelmslev calls "matter", but the more complex property of the sign being at the same time a thing, which is responsible for connotation. But the most wide-ranging conclusion of this section is no doubt the rediscovery of the heterogeneity of the lifeworld in relation to the system character of semiotic system – not the kind of presupposition that would

be expected of a classical structuralist such as Hjelmslev.

Formal and substantial connotations

The whole denotational sign forms the expression plane of the connotational sign; but so far, it seems that only expression substance is susceptible to variation, expression form and the whole of content serving merely as the constant background of this variation. We have already intimated that the case may be different with metaphors, but how this is possible remains to be explained. Let us once more take our point of departure in Metz' criticism of Hjelmslev: Metz, it will be remembered, thought the example of Danish language connoting "Danish" was incompatible with the definition. This is understandable. It is easy to think of two words which are identical except for the first being pronounced by a man and the second by a woman; or a number of signs having exactly the same organization, but one being spoken, another written, a third indicated in a flag code and the fourth expressed in Braille; and maybe even words being identical, apart from connoting "archaism", "slang", and so on. But it seems impossible for a Danish word and a Turkish word to have the same content (and expression form), differing only in that they convey different connotations, in particular since Hjelmslev himself insists that different languages cut up the world of experience in different ways.

It seems natural to suppose that Hjelmslev's type 6b, national language, must be a *formal connotation*. Directly after introducing the distinction between connotations stemming from the form and from the substance, Hjelmslev (1943:103) says it is impossible to know beforehand if, for example, national language and physiognomy, "to mention possibilities that will perhaps appear extreme", are connotations from the language construction system or from the language use system (that is, from form and substance, respectively). These examples are extreme, I suppose, because one would expect a national language connotation to be due to form, but a physiognomy connotation to be brought about by substance. Only if all those features of expression and content which are pertinent at the denotative level are identical, will it be necessary to have recourse to substance in order to obtain the national language connotation, and that is probably never the case. Nevertheless, a given fragment of a language may well connote the corresponding language system because of its substance (Cf. the Italianity connotation in the Panzani analysis).

The interesting case is the one in which "Danish" is a formal connotation. Until now, it has been possible to vary the substance in relation to the form held constant, in order to discover the features responsible for a connotation, but in this case, form itself must be varied, so what will now be the invariant serving as background to the variation? Nowhere does Hjelmslev propose any direct answer to this intriguing question, but well before the discussion of connotation, a short passage borders on our problem (p46ff): the comparison of different languages shows us that there is something which Hjelmslev calls "purport" - but which we shall call content matter -, which these languages have in common, although they will normally organize it differently. The examples quoted by Hjelmslev are:

Eng. “I do not know”, Danish “Jeg ved det ikke”, Fr. “Je ne sais pas”, Finnish “En tiedä”, and Eskimo “naluvara”. There is a number of content elements, such as “first person, grammatical subject, present tense, verb, knowledge, negation, third person, and grammatical object”, which reappear here, though in some cases part of them are left out, and they are always differently combined and ordered. English: 1 p+subj/ pres+verb/neg/knowledge+verb. Danish: 1 p+subj/pres+verb+knowledge/3p+obj/ neg. French: lp+subj/neg first part/ lp+pres+verb+knowledge/neg second part. Finnish: 1p+subj+verb+ neg/ knowledge+verb. Eskimo: neg +knowledge/1 p+ subj/3p+obj. This is the way in which the “same” content matter is divided up by a number of languages, and the formal connotations ensuing are those which have been marked before the examples: English, Danish, etc.

In other words, the invariant when form is varied is the referent, the real world situation, or perhaps our thinking about it. But this “masse amorphe”, in Saussure’s phrase, is as such unknowable, Hjelmslev tells us, and can thus only be attained through the comparison of languages. Such a conception is of course untenable after the work of Rosch, which demonstrates that the world of our experience has an organization of its own. Nonetheless, it is probable that other kinds of semiotic systems than verbal languages, as for instance pictures, would pick out somewhat different elements as relevant. But pictures, it has been said, cannot express negation (Cf. Worth 1981 :174 ff; Bucher 1977:42f), so Hjelmslev’s example will be unhelpful in such a comparison. In any case, the form in its relation to the referent appears to illustrate Humboldt’s famous “Weltansicht” of a language: a peculiar perspective on the common world of the human race.

Interestingly, what has here been varied in relation to the referent is apparently the forms of expression and content together. This should not be surprising, since these forms are united by a solidarity, i.e. a mutual implication, with the result of the units on the two planes being conformous: by definition, if a language has one content joining for example first person, subject, verb and negation, it will also have just one expression for all this. By definition of the sign, that is to say, for on the level of the “second articulation” this is no longer true (Cf. Lecture 4.). For instance, words having an identical content, but differing in connoting “slang”, “archaism”, and the like (Hjelmslev’s type 2 above), must have the same form of expression on the sign level, but in most cases it is not just a difference of expression substance that separates them, but also different expression forms on the level of figurae. Suppose, to use Johansen’s examples quoted above, that both “cheval” and “coursier” simply mean “horse”, but that while the first term is normal speech, the second connotes “poetry”, nowadays no doubt “cliché poetry”. Then the referent is identical, and so are the forms of content and expression, the latter, however, only on the level of signs. On the figurae level, on the other hand, the expression forms are widely divergent: not even the number of units coincides!

We have already rejected Johansen’s idea that each of the strata of the sign has its proper connotations, because this is contradicted by the definition of connotational language. And yet, it seems, there is a sense in which Johansen is

Fig. 14. Indication of ladies' toilettes, during the Olympiad in Tokyo (1964), ICAO, ADV, and the Olympiads in Munich (1972), Mexico (1968), and Sapporo (1972).

From from Aicher & Krampen 1977:122.

right: even if all strata of the denotational sign must be involved in the expression of connotation, *different strata can be variable*, while the rest of the sign is constant. We may look upon the sign as the result of a series of consecutive choices: with the referent held constant, different content forms may be chosen, with the result that the expression form, on the sign level, is also determined. With the form of the sign invariant, different combinations of figurae can be selected, perhaps on the content plane as well as the expression plane. And given an invariant expression form, there is still a choice of numerous expression substances compatible with it. It will be noted that this conception implies a fundamental asymmetry of the sign: from the referent to the expression substance, we go from relatively more to relatively less invariant strata. Not even the point of view of the receiver will reverse this for, while the latter must choose between alternative interpretations, it is only by reconstructing the choices of the sender that he is able to capture the connotations.

In prototypical pictures, this is very difficult to exemplify, since the principles of relevance or not very clear (cf. Lecture 4, section 2). As an example of a simple quasi-pictorial sign, where connotation may be illustrated, consider the ordinary logotypes indicating the toilet of men and women respectively (many variants in Aicher & Krampen 1977:119ff). What is directly signified here is a man and a woman, respectively, or rather, if we also take account of some more curious variants (the pipe and the fan, etc.), masculinity and femininity. These then serve as *abductive indices* for the corresponding lavatories, but they should certainly have been very difficult to interpret, had it not been for the convention fortifying this relationship in most cultures. Because of their location, these abductive indices then serve as *performative indices* for the location of the lavatories. Thus, the task left for the picture itself is to convey the difference between masculinity and femininity. That means mankind is our domain. However, the individuals composing mankind differ in many ways, so to distribute them between two content forms, men and women, implies a choice, albeit a very natural one, at least in this case - but Husserl's hypothetical Bantu would perhaps have thought otherwise, and so would we, if the signs were used to maintain a generalized sexual apartheid instead of just indicating toilets. This choice of content form, therefore, engenders a *formal connotation*, which at least suggests that such a distinction between human beings is important (and of course it is). On the sign level of the expression plane, nothing new happens.

As yet, we do not know if the secondary articulation of the pictorial sign

is conformous for the two planes, as perhaps Hjelmslev and most certainly his disciple Spang-Hanssen (1954:85) would maintain. If that is the case, the forms of expression and content on the figurae level cannot be chosen independently of each other, but they are still only partially determined by the forms of the sign. Given the two domains of masculinity and femininity, different features may be picked out for use in the signs. Here we should expect such differences as are ascertained and particularly prominent to be chosen, viz. those that are called primary and secondary sexual characteristics in biology. When instead a pipe or a top hat and a fan or a lady's shoe are employed, this choice engenders a connotation, which has obvious ideological implications. The same is true in the case of the more common version, of the way the man and the woman are depicted. The lavatory lady always wears a skirt, although this is no longer particularly common among real-world women. If we compare the pictograms created for a number of international encounters (Fig 14: reproduced from Aicher & Krampen 1977:122), we will find that, from Tokyo 1964, via, among others, Mexico 1968, to Munich and Sapparo 1972, the skirt of the woman becomes continually shorter - a feature which, at least in the early seventies, still conveyed the idea of modernity. Hence, the particular composition of the sign form is certainly not indifferent.

In their most common version, the lavatory pictograms directly depict a man and a woman, not masculinity and femininity. Thus, the features of expression permitting us to identify the man and the woman as such are the expression form of pictorial language. From this point of view, all the rest is substance (or matter). All these signs have expressions that are highly symmetrical; most of the time they are made up of straight lines, interrupted by smaller and always regularly round elements. Perhaps this is sufficient to produce the connotation "pictogram", which would then be a substantial connotation. But even such a simple picture as the lavatory pictogram contains a plastic language. In many cases, in particular in the versions from Mexico, Munich, and Sapporto, the man's body has been deformed, in a way which is not at all functional in helping us identify it as such: the trunk forms a perfect square or a vertically directed rectangle. The woman's skirt is curved outwards, in a way which has probably not been used since the 19th century: in the Tokyo version, it comprises three quarters of a circle; in the Munich version, the skirt is only a circle section, but the trunk and the arms build up a complete circle; and in all cases, the global property of roundishness is most persuasively conveyed. In other cases, the skirt of the woman forms a triangle pointing upwards.

For or more recent example (cf. Fig. 15), one may consult the men and woman logotypes proposed by the designer Juan Pablo de Gregorio Santiago (2006), who himself comments the alternatives in the following way:

> En la lámina vemos el abanico de posibilidades que nos ofrece la misma abstracción (mujer vista frontal, con falda y figura llena). En el primer ejemplo [Fig, 15-1] podemos ver a la mujer representada con tres rectángulos y un círculo, el mínimo de elementos necesario. En el segundo [Fig, 15-2], la búsqueda de diferentes grosores verticales, y la geometrización de los hombros hace tal vez más fácil reconocer el signo. En el tercero [Fig, 15-3], se incorpora un nuevo elemento, la diagonal. En el cuarto [Fig, 15-4], la búsqueda de geometrizar la figura de manera que parezca más real. En el

quinto ejemplo [Fig, 15-5], se obviaron los brazos, pero el simple hecho de modificar el eje le da una carga adicional de información: es mujer, tiene falda (y no es cualquier falda), y además tiene una personalidad. En el sexto [Fig, 15-6], nos alejamos un poco de la geometría regular, y aparte de darle la personalidad, le damos características físicas (ahora tiene cintura, y tiene grosor de piernas, ya no son una representación). En el séptimo [Fig, 15-7], las curvas se toman a nuestra modelo y ya podemos hablar de contextura, de actitud, de tipo de curvas físicas y hasta del tipo de vestido que está ocupando. Finalmente, el octavo [Fig, 15-8] es una representación de la realidad.

One may not agree with the details of these interpretations (and in particular the identification of Fig. 15-8 with reality), but it difficult to deny that, on the one hand, more features particular to the woman prototype are rendered, going from the first example to the last, and also, since the task remains the one of conveying the meaning "woman" (as opposed to "man"), the *selection* of different ways of getting this meaning through is highly significant – that is, it is a connotation.

In here study of the history of dress, Lurie (1981:215 f) observes that clothes tend to create the appearance of "rectangular men and rounded women", but clearly, even the prototypical bodies of males and females, considered as divergences from a common body scheme, are characterized by the global properties of angularity and roundishness, respectively. From this prototype, culture tend to make an *idealtype*, exaggerating the roundish traits found in reality, and even combining roundishnesses which are never found together in nature, culminating, according to whether other tendencies counteract the process, in Venus von Willendorf or Marilyn Monroe. And the same thing happens with the male body (or, at least it did, in Ancient Greece, though nowadays, a real male idealtype may be confined to subcultures such as those of homosexual men or bodybuilders).[11]

From this point of view, it is interesting to find that female roundedness and male angularity in (quasi)-pictures may not only serve to render the visual appearances of female and male bodies, but could also, in themselves (at least at the present state of,

11 Of course, it is obvious from conversations with women and men, and from the study of the kind of journals, movies, and web pages they use, that there is a different idealtype of women for women and for men – so that is no doubt also the case with the idealtype of men. But, as far as I know, no serious study has been made of difference between the idealtypes men and woman have of each other, since this question is too ideologically loaded.



Fig. 15. Women logotypes suggested on the blog of Juan Pablo de Gregorio Santiago

not only human, but homian, history), serve to convey more general ideas of what is male and female. Jessen (1983) found that not only German, but also East African, children, whose female clothes are different from that of Europeans, considered that the circle as well as a triangle pointing upwards signified a woman, and that a square or a triangle pointing downwards stood for a man. This result was obtained with children aged 7–17, but not younger ones. It may not be surprising that the global traits of man and woman tend to express themselves as "best forms", i.e. as configurations of maximal prototypicality. As for the different orientations of the triangle, they may reflect the predominance of the hips in the prototypical female body, and of the shoulders in the prototypical male body. The feel of angularity is rough, and that of rounded forms is smooth, and this is redundantly translated in the use of soft materials for woman, rough ones for man. If there are panhuman tendencies to correlate the physical and the mental, as is perhaps suggested by the use of metaphor (Cf. Winner at al. 1979; 1980), soft feelings will also be seen as redundantly characterizing the female. Of course, all this is speculation: it may give an inkling of how metaphorical iconicity works, but the exact facts can only be ascertained by experiment.

In any case, Jessen found that even East African children, who are not familiar with our kind of clothing, thought that a circle or a triangle pointing upwards must signify a woman, and that a square or a triangle pointing downwards must signify a man. That is to say, femininity and masculinity are also communicated at the level of plastic language (See Lecture 6). That this particular plastic language has been couched in the substance of this particular pictorial language itself produces a connotation: primary, perhaps, of "naturalness" which, from a more critical stance, is reinterpreted as traditionalism. That this choice does carry a meaning, which may engender a connotation, is perhaps more evident, when it is compared to its (almost) unseen alternative: when the distinction between men and women is conveyed by the visual rendition of (close to) primary sexual characteristics: men's toilet being indicated by a schematic rendering of the male sex organ, and women's toilet being indicated by a schematic rendition of the triangle of hair normally (though, at the time of writing, not very common, as far as I understand) covering the female sex organ. The cinema of my home town using these logotypes (Fig. 16) soon had to add linguistic labels to enforce the distinction, because nobody knew where to go – not only, I suppose, because the abstract (and indexical) representation of masculinity was unknown, at least in the relevant context, but also because the abstract pictorial rendering of femininity happened to contradict the plastic prototype of masculinity, discussed above. However, from the point of view of connotation, what is significant is not that masculinity and femininity may by conveyed in different

Fig. 16. Toilette logotypes of the Cinema "Spegeln", in Malmö, Sweden, as current until spring 2008.

ways – but the choice of conveying this difference in one way or another.

After having admitted so many different kinds of connotation, we run the risk of a new kind of confusion. Or, in a sense, a very ancient confusion: is not the connotation from the content substance our good old stylistic connotation? At the end of his previously cited article, Metz (1973:171 ff) proposes an analogy, which is worthwhile discussing. There are different ways of filming the same, recognizable object, Metz says: first make it appear sad, then absurd, simply by changing the lighting, the angle of vision, etc. Here, then, denotation and connotation are inextricably mixed up with each other. The same thing happens in verbal language, Metz continues: "violon" and "crin-crin" have the same denotative content, i.e. a well-known musical instrument, but their connotative content is distinct, for there is a pejorative shade, a slang nuance in "crin-crin", which is not present in "violon". This is not a difference of denotation, Metz affirms, so the two terms must also be connotational expressions: "crin-crin" connotes the bad state of the instrument, or the speaker's familiarity with it, while "violon" connotes its normal condition. This is Metz's analogy. Let us now first consider the linguistic example.

"Denotation", as used here, must mean referent, i.e. the object in the world of our experience. In discussing both the filmic and the linguistic example, Metz takes emotional and value-laden contents to be connotations, so apparently the referent is supposed to be mirrored in consciousness through purely cognitive factors. This is of course the stylistic distinction between denotation and connotation. But to Hjelmslev, denotation simply means the content plane of the semiotic system, i.e. a part of the sign: those features that imply and are implied by the expression plane. When Metz says that "crin-crin" connotes slang and "violon" standard language, he is using the terms like Hjelmslev; but when, a few lines later, he tells us that "crin-crin" connotes a bad instrument, he has suddenly shifted to the stylistic notion of connotation. In fact, there are two possibilities:

• There are two signs in French, "crin-crin" and "violon", which have different denotative contents, which only differ as to the values they take on the semantic axis "bad vs. normal". Thus, there is one semantic feature, "bad", which may take the place of the feature "normal" in the constellation of semantic features defining the expression "violon", with the result that a new constellation of features is produced, to which a different expression corresponds in the language, viz. "crin-crin". This is commutation. And it is precisely the possibility of establishing such oppositions between contents that have their own expressions in the semiotic system concerned which defines the denotation as something distinct from the connotation. From a psychological point of view, the relevant features may be cognitive, emotive, and the like.

• Or else, "crin-crin" and "violon" have exactly the same meaning, the same denotative content, but their forms of expression, at the figurae level, and of course their substances of expression are distinct. Because of this latter fact, they will have different connotations: "crin-crin", for instance, connotes "slang". Now this is a connotation exactly in the spirit of Hjelmslev: it includes the word "crin-crin"

in a class of other words, and the principle of relevance delimiting this class is derived from the social group or the social situations with which it is associated.

Both these cases may certainly occur, but not in the same use of these words. In a similar vein, Baldinger (1980:237) cites the case of "bagnole" which to a French middle class speaker means an old, broken-down car, but which, on lower social levels, is simply a more common synonym for "voiture". In the same way, different people, or the same person in different situations, could use "crin-crin" for a bad violin and then for a normal violin, but with the intention of connoting "slang".

Metz's pictorial example is very different from this. In one case, the pictorial language denotes, say, a dog viewed from an angle and with lighting which makes it appear sad; in the other case, the same dog, in a different lighting and angle of vision, appears absurd, both the dog and the absurdity being denoted by ordinary iconical means. Thus, the two signs (or sign combinations) have different denotative contents, and from a classical point of view, there is simply no connotation, or no way of finding it!

However, in our effort to understand how formal connotations are possible, we introduced the referent as an invariant for which the sign content itself is a variant. If this is correct, there will indeed be a choice of denotations or sign contents for a given referent, which will engender connotations. To see what this can mean, let us once again return to Hjelmslev.

The substance of content, as Hjelmslev (1943:72f, 91) calls it, comprises the extralinguistic referent, and also the psychological notion, to the extent that it includes features which are not found in the linguistic content, i.e. such properties whose exchange does not lead to a switch of expression plane in the language. Later, Hjelmslev (1959:59 ff) distinguishes three levels in the content substance: the physical level, the sociobiological level and the level of collective evaluation. Here, inside the substance, there could perhaps be a place for Metz' distinction between the violin as such and as it is evaluated. At the level of collective evaluation, Hjelmslev says, the dog is something different to the Eskimo, for whom it is a draught-animal, to the Parthians, who considered it holy, to the Hindu, who classes it as a pariah and to the Westerner, who sees it as a hunter and company - and also, I would like to add, to the Aztec, for whom it was a kind of foodstuff! But since the level of collective evaluation forms part of the substance, Hjelmslev must apparently think that all this is of no avail to content form: it will be identical in all these languages. The physical identity of the dog, even when crossing language borders (as Benveniste 1966:49 ff says about the horse, when criticising what he takes to be Saussure's sense of arbitrarity), is largely irrelevant to all human affairs outside zoology; and in relation to the level of collective evaluation, "la seule substance /... /qui du point de vue sémiotique soit immédiatement pertinente" (1959:62), the content form appears to be less variable between languages, not more so, as we have supposed. Thus, taking our referent to be culturally interpreted, as seems reasonable, the first step in the constitution of the sign will lead from the variant to the invariant, not the reverse.

But consider how the content form is determined. In French, "violon" and "crin-

crin" have different content forms because, when the feature "bad state", or something of the sort, is taken away from the feature constellation defining "crin-crin", a new feature constellation, corresponding to the expression "violon" in the language, will result (the first case above). But there could be another culture, in which all violins were thought to sound bad (which many language communities may traditionally have thought about the bagpipe), so that, in the corresponding language, to say that something is a violin (or a bagpipe), is to say that it emits a terrible sound. In this case, the same feature that is part of the content form in French would belong to the level of collective evaluation. This is so because a person disagreeing with the opinion that all violins sound terrible, or having found the sole violin which is not a bad instrument, would still have to use the same expression as before. On the other hand, those features that are present in the collective evaluation of dogs in different cultures could well appear elsewhere as the difference between two content forms. In contemporary Mexican Spanish, the word "escuincle", derived from Nahuatl, is still used to designate that dog breed eaten by the Aztecs, but for other dogs the common Spanish word "perro" is used. The "escuincles" are no longer eaten; indeed, there are very few left. But since Indian languages borrowed Spanish words very early on, there may well have been a moment when, in Mexican Spanish and/or in Nahuatl, the content forms of the two words "perro" and "escuincle" were distinguished by the latter having the additional trait "edible". Features sometimes found in collective evaluation may at other times be the building blocks of content form.

With the exception of some simple cases, like the lavatory pictograms, pictures are seldom distinguished by taking different values on a single semantic dimension, so it is not clear how we are to find their content form. Even in the case of verbal language, the account so far derived form our reading of Hjelmslev seems to me to be misleading. If meaning is prototypical, there will be features that are more or less relevant, rather than some features that are relevant and others that are not. In the Lifeworld, many properties are expected to co-occur; if they don't, there must be a semantic hierarchy, which decides which one of them is most important. Properties which are simply taken for granted like, in our fictive example, the bad quality of the violin as a musical instrument, are not necessarily unimportant, though they can of course not be at the thematic apex, in which case the newly found unique good-sounding violin would be called a concertina, if these instruments were supposed to sound good in the normal case. However, if forced to use the term "violin", with its implication of bad instrument, the discoverer of the first good instrument of that kind would certainly add a number of "adjuster words" or "hedges" (cf. Lakoff 1972) when reporting about his finding, so as to show his awareness of the inadequacy of the term employed: thus, for instance, "technically speaking, it is a violin." In order to discover the feature hierarchies present in particular semiotic systems, it will no doubt be necessary to use other indirect semantical operations besides oppositions. What this suggests is that there is no clear limit between the level of collective evaluation and the

content form: the latter would merely be the pinnacle formed of the most relevant traits emerging from the lower regions of collective evaluation.

But in that case, what remains of the referent? The real dog, if that is taken to mean zoology's description of it, is, from the point of view of meaning, just one among a number of variants. As for the level of collective evaluation, we have just argued that it cannot be neatly separated from the content form. But, if we are to justify the model developed so far, there must be something that can serve as an invariant, in relation to which the different content forms are the variants. In Husserl's view, we would no doubt have to go beyond all cultural meanings, with which the dog is imbued, to arrive at the "pristinely pure" perceptual experience of that dear creature. But, as Gurwitsch (1974b:22ff, 92ff, 145ff) observes, since every Lifeworld is the cultural world of a particular sociocultural group, it is the mere thing world that must be founded on these cultural worlds, rather than the reverse: the dice precedes the cube, not the opposite. Taking a curiously structuralist stance, Gurwitsch even suggests that the thing world is arrived at through a comparison of the different cultural worlds. But this is exactly how Hjelmslev, in an analysis previously cited, arrived at the "content substance" common to "I do not know" and a number of sentences in other languages. What is discovered in this way is perhaps, in part, some very general categories of the Lifeworld, of which the labels proposed by Hjelmslev could be some instances, but also, and above all, a multiplicity of open possibilities. It is to the extent that this "thing world" contains everything as implicit potentialities, that it can be the invariant, of which all content forms are variations.

In this sense then, there can be what Baldinger (1980:232f), using Bühler's sense of the term, calls "symbolic connotations": signs with different contents being chosen for stylistic reasons, or, as we would say, producing also stylistic effects. Thus, in the face of a particular invariant fact, one may choose to talk about it as a "crin-crin" rather than a "violon", and this will not only change the meaning of what is said, but in choosing to convey this content rather than another, one also produces a secondary meaning which is a connotation. Consider the "photographic synonyms" of the photographer Andreas Feininger (1973:131): just like "woman, lady, madam, matron, missus, female, dame, broad, Jane, etc." convey different contents within the same general concept, so different photographs of the same motive, using different tools and techniques, will produce "more or less but not the same results"; in addition, some of the photographs will be "memorable" and others "ordinary". This means the photographs will denote somewhat different things, organizing the same stuff into different content forms; but beyond this, they will also connote differently, for some of them will have a difficult to describe property, which makes them "memorable". The lighting will likewise change the meaning of the dog, or whatever, making it appear sad or absurd, but the decision to make it appear sad rather than absurd may connote something. The essential point here, however, is that the additional meaning and the connotation are two different things: the peculiar way in which lighting was used in expressionist

films meant the world was frightening, full of dangers and anguish and so on, but this same lighting connotes expressionism. Nowadays, the connotation is more visible than the meaning.

It was observed earlier that Prieto seems to come very close to our present interpretation of Hjelmslev's concept of connotation. This is only partially true. Connotation is said to be the way in which denotation is conceived. In his first approach to the problem Prieto (1975 b:143ff) distinguishes two "dimensions" of connotation. First, connotation may result from the different ways in which a sentence is pronounced (p 156f): thus, "il est revenu" could be pronounced / il#ɛ#ravany/ or /il#ɛ#ɹavny/. In the second place, the message according to which the brother of the listener has returned may, depending on the information which is available, be phrased "Il est revenu", "Ton frère est revenu", "Le tien", and so on, and these are also considered to be connotations (p.58f). Later, however, we are told that it is dangerous, or at least uninteresting, to say that a particular pronunciation of the French /r/ connotes the rural origin of the speaker (p259) (a typically Hjelmslevian example), and now all of Prieto's examples seem to be of the second type: the Italian sentence "Arriva oggi", with no explicit subject, has the same denotation as the French sentence "Il arrive aujourd'hui", but a different connotation (p 244f). The linguistic meanings constitute a secondary classification, and thus a connotation, in relation to the general system of intercomprehension (1975a:102ff). In this way, Prieto finishes by calling connotation exactly what others call denotation and by rejecting those examples that Hjelmslev would certainly include.

This revision of terminology is, if not dangerous, at least uninteresting. What is interesting, however, is that Prieto shows how in one and the same language, not only between languages, as in Hjelmslev's "I do not know"-case, different content forms correspond to one referent, as we have termed it so far, or to one state of things, as it should perhaps more properly be called. In relation to an invariant state of things, "Arriva oggi" and "Il arrive aujourd'hui" have different meanings or denotations, in Hjelmslev's sense of the term: in the Italian version, the subject is not singled out as a component of the situation. No one has analyzed more thoroughly than Prieto (1966:118ff; 1975b:85 ff) the way in which the same state of affairs can be transformed into different content forms, leaving out those aspects of the situation which are either already known or indifferent to the message. As Prieto as shown, "Il est revenu", "Ton frère est revenu", "Le tien", and a number of other sentences may describe the same state of things, taking into account different pieces of knowledge pre-existing to the act of speech. At the same time, these signs have different connotations, because of choosing different views on the same state of things: and the simplest difference of connotation is of course, that one of the sentences connotes "Italian", and the other "French". When all the sentences are in one single language, no connotation may be perceptible, because the variations are pre-determined by the stock of knowledge at hand – or some idea of parsimony or profusion may result. It is essential, in cases like this, to distinguish the connotation from the additional meaning, the denotation.

Quite independently of Prieto, Halliday (1967-68;1973;1978) has pointed to other factors, for instance emphatic stress and word order, which have a similar effect. Just as it was suggested above, Halliday (1973:25) looks upon the constitution of the sign as a process leading through "a set of alternatives /---/ which is what the speaker/hearer can (what he can mean, if you like), not what he knows". The resulting chart, the "meaning potential", has also been used in the analysis of the game "pontoon" (Halliday 1973:80 ff), and of the organization of the English meal (Douglas 1972). I have myself used it to analyse the difference between Western clothing and that of Mesoamerican culture (See Lecture 10). In the example we are goingto consider, the meaning potential could be used to illustrate the choices in a simple situation: we see somebody riding a horse over a field. There is a set of choices pertaining to the form and substance of the message, and each decision will, according to our supposition, engender a connotation. Of course, the choices do not take place in "real time", as the psychologists say.

In the present example, we will consider the sole case of the horse having been chosen for attention. On the formal level, we have to decide on which semiotical system, and which subtype of it, we want to use: here, it is verbal language, and Swedish the subtype. From the point of view of collective (and/or individual) evaluation, the horse may now be qualified in different ways, but only a few of these qualities distinguish signs in the semiotic system employed: if the horse is very bad, or if the speaker has a very friendly, intimate relationship with the horse, the adequate term is "kuse" (close to the English "hack"); in all other cases, it seems, the only possible term is "häst". From these three choices of verbal language, Swedish, and "häst" or "kuse", formal connotation on the sign level will result. Without changing the denotative content, we can also choose between at least three variants of the expression form at the figurae level: the standard level "häst", the childish "pålle" (like English "horsey"), and the poetical "springare" (like French "coursier"; English "courser" has a different denotative content, according to the dictionaries consulted). Finally, modifications of the substance will produce substantial connotations, for instance, indications of particular dialects and sociolects. If instead, a picture or a gesture, or something else, had been chosen as a means of expression, the whole process would of course have been different, and so would the resulting connotations.

In this section, I have suggested that as soon as there is a choice between alternatives, a passage from an invariant to its variants, the constitution of the sign gives rise to connotations, which may be of different kinds: formal connotations on the sign level, which depend on expression and content together *chosen for a particular referent*; connotations from the expression form separately on the figurae level, again *picked in relation to the content form held constant* (and perhaps the content form separately); and substantial connotations, which always stem from the expression substance, *given the whole of the sign as form*. Thus, the sign is asymmetrical, oriented from the referent, via the forms to the expression substance. Furthermore, formal connotations on the sign level, though arising from the variant

organizations of the invariant referent, are something quite distinct from the shades of a given meaning (which is one of the things that the stylistic notion of connotation confusingly seeks to formulate), in spite of being contemporaneous with them. Each time a new content, i.e. another denotation, is proposed for the same referent, or state of affairs, additional features are thus added to the primary meaning, and the choice of that particular alternative engenders, on the secondary level, a connotation!

Beyond the classical theory of connotation

So far, I have essentially been concerned with the interpretation of Hjelmslev's "classical" theory of connotation, trying to save it from confusion and incoherence. Such as it emerges from this interpretation, the theory still raises a number of serious questions, which we shall have to discuss, however briefly, in this section. Here, we shall touch on three, related questions; there are no doubt many others. First, is there a clear limit between connotative expression and content? Second, is every denotational language also the carrier of a connotational language, or, are there particular conditions for the emergence of the latter? And third, is the connotational language really the exact inversion of metalanguage, as Hjelmslev surmises? In addressing these questions, I will go beyond the "intuitive foundations" of Hjelmslev's work, employing concepts derived from the researches of earlier lectures. Nonetheless, I will insist on Hjelmslev's (1943:105) contention that the theory of connotation should be a formal theory, treating of the mutual functions of the connotators, i.e. the relations between the relata of the connotative sign.

As a background to the treatment of the first two issues, it will be necessary to consider the way in which Hjelmslev introduces the concept of connotational language. The task at hand is to analyze a "text", and Hjelmslev observes that the assumption of its structural homogeneity cannot be upheld in practice; instead, different systems must be posited in order to explain the units completely.[12] Directly after these considerations, there follows the list of 6 types and 4 sub-types of systems or "connotators" (p 102), as they are subsequently designed (p 103). After the list, Hjelmslev goes on to say that the different types are "mutually solidary", so that each denotational language will have to be determined in relation to each one of them: thus, every denotational sign will connote a particular style, stylistic level, genre, national language, dialect, and so on - infinitely, perhaps, because the list is not meant to be exhaustive (p103). If we were right in taking the definition, rather than the examples, seriously, each denotational sign must form the basis of innumerable (potential) connotative signs. This is hardly feasible, if most of them do not remain potential.

The notion of "heterogeneity" was given a prominent part in semiotics by the work of Garroni (1972:317 if), who used this notion to throw some doubts on the specificity of the cinema as a semiotic system. Metz (1973:164) refers to Garroni, when he argues for the autonomy of the connotative signifier, and so does Kjørup (1977), when conceiving the film as "a meeting-place of multiple codes". In the sole passage where Hjelmslev refers to

12 On this notion of text, now see Sonesson 1998c.

such a heterogeneity, it clearly applies to the given "text", whereas each one of the systems must be supposed to be "specific", or else there could be no connotational languages identifying the systems as such. It is not our task in the present context to determine whether, in the case of the cinema or some other semiotic system, none of the systems present are sufficiently predominant to define the text (Cf. Metz 1977:109ff). However, Hjelmslev's concept of connotation clearly supposes there to be, in the case of a verbal text, one central system, the linguistic one, which constitutes the text, and a potentially infinite number of other systems, which work on the text established by the first system. It is arguable that the choice of first system depends on Hjelmslev's particular research interest, but this choice is certainly not unrelated to what is taken to be essential in the ordinary Lifeworld. The same thing could be said about pictures (and the cinema).

The problem of connotation arises in the business of telling apart the different systems involved in the same "text": thus, the signs present in this "text" stand for the systems to which they belong, the systems themselves being the contents of these sign functions. At least in this concrete task, what is important is to distinguish the content "Danish" from the content "Swedish", not to separate the national stereotypes, which these meanings in their turn suggest. Yet, in another context, Hjelmslev does refer to the latter issues:

> To every existing linguistic usage there are finally attached certain notions, as a rule of hallowed character, which consist in the fact that a given linguistic usage (or a given set of linguistic usages) is an expression for a content consisting of factors outside language: home, people, nation, etc./--- / Here again, we find the content/expression function and are once again confronted with sign systems which must be described functionally by application of the exchange test. (Hjelmslev 1973:115)

If the Danish language is a "symbol" for the nation, for home and people (1973:116; cf. 1943:105), and if "symbol" is to be taken in Hjelmslev's own sense (cf. 1943:100), then this can only mean that other meanings are parasitic on the content plane of connotational language itself: they are contextual implications. This is not very clear in Hjelmslev's writings. The fact is that we have no separate terms for describing the content plane and the expression plane of connotational language: "metaphor" usually designates both, and so does "national language", "poetry", and so on. This does not apply to the nation, or the social groups and situations generally, which are mere implications, lying outside the connotative sign.

If this is so, perhaps Molino is right in saying that connotational language, in Hjelmslev's sense, is tautologous, and thus uninteresting. Or maybe it can retain its interest, while still being tautologous, if we can identify connotation with what Goodman (1968) calls exemplification (Cf. Lecture 4). Our first issue becomes inextricably mixed up here with the second one. We have observed that a denotative sign can be the basis of an innumerable series of connotations. Therefore, it seems more reasonable to suppose that only one of these potential connotations, or just a few of them, will be chosen to function as the connotational language of a given denotative sign in a particular context. In the case of the heterogeneous "text", from which Hjelmslev takes his point of departure, the signs are expressions of the systems to which they belong, because the

task is that of identifying these systems. But in a more ordinary interpretational context, a particular structure will be needed in order to isolate the relevant properties chosen for connotation. Thus, connotation would be a particular case of exemplification: the exemplification of sign properties!

However, the first requirement for this description to be valid is that the connotative contents are properties possessed by the denotative sign. This would be trivially so, if Molino were right in thinking that the Hjelmslevian connotational language must be tautologous. But it seems to me that Molino is mistaken: when he (1971:16f) suggests that the Marseille dialect simply will connote the Marseille dialect, the two occurrences of the same term do not stand proxy for the same phenomenon. In the first case, we are concerned with some particular feature, or features, of the utterance; in the second case, with the whole system of Marseillean particularities. In traditional, articulatory terms, the Parisian /r/-phoneme is a dorso-velar fricative, but its equivalent in Southern France is often an apical vibrant. If these articulatory characteristics can be taken to correspond to auditive ones, the Southern variant of the /r/ certainly exemplifies apicality and vibration, at least if used in Paris: these are properties the phoneme possesses and refers to (analogous to plastic language). But being Marseillean and being French are not properties of the same immediate character. At least the former is a relative property: it is only once we know, for other reasons, that the language in question is French, that an /r/ realized as an apical vibrant will point to the Marseille dialect. More importantly, while apicality and vibration are entirely contained in the apical vibrant, Frenchness, and Southern-Frenchness, are only partially so contained. That is, the connotative content by far exceeds its expression (at least in this case).

Much, of course, hinges on how far we are willing to extend the notion of possessing a property. Goodman (1968:54) says that Socrates exemplifies the property of being rational, but Janlert (1985:231) observes that this property is not "intrinsic" to Socrates, so that, from another point of view, he could as well be taken to exemplify the property of being a "henpecked husband". Since intrinsicness, in Janlert's (1985:134 if) book has already been made a relative concept, the import of this claim is not clear. However, if Socrates had been a personal friend of ours, or our neighbour, none of these properties would perhaps have been "intrinsic", if this means constitutive of the person as such: his looks would have been more essential than his rationality, or his property of being a henpecked husband, for our identifying him as being the same. But this is not the case. Searle (1969) has observed that if, one after the other, all the works of Aristotle were shown to have been written by other people, there would be some point where the proper name "Aristotle" would change its meaning to us. In the same way, an irrational Socrates, which is in contradiction to the whole Socrates legend, is hardly acceptable, but our legendary Socrates could fairly easily dispense with his particular relationship to Xanthippe, who is only known from anecdotes dating from the Roman period. Given the present state of the Socrates legend, both above-mentioned properties are relatively salient, and Socrates could easily be taken to exemplify them. And yet, our neighbour

Socrates seems to exemplify the properties of his looks in a more immediate sense.

There are also less immediately exemplified properties. In the syllogistic exercises of the Middle Ages, many other properties were attributed to Socrates, some of which he must possess in common with all human beings: that of being mortal, for instance. But since Socrates shares the latter property with so many others, there must be a precise structure defining the context in which he is to be taken to exemplify mortality. Because of their particular histories, others may be more susceptible to exemplifying this property. All this is also true of personal characteristics that are not specified by the tradition. For instance, while it is not implausible that Socrates made love to Xanthippe before going to the famous Symposium, though Plato would never have mentioned such a fact, Socrates could never exemplify this property, if it had not been explicitly introduced beforehand. Hence, in these two cases, exemplification could only take place inside particular relevance systems, which specify as relevant properties that are not constitutive of the exemplifying object.

But the case of connotation is different again. To begin with, properties which are more or less constitutive are involved in the sign function: not just any property possessed by the Marseille dialect will do, but only those in which it differs from other French dialects, and those which are easily identified as such, i.e. which are typical of it (cf. the brand mark "Panzani", as discussed above). Thus, we are concerned with relatively salient properties only, though a principle of relevance is still needed in order to determine which one of the salient properties carries reference in each particular case. But unlike the cases considered above, what is exemplified in a connotational language is not a property made perceptible inside a system of relevance, but the system itself. The apical vibrant realizing the phoneme /r/ indicates the Marseille dialect of the French language, but it is only a small proper part of that dialect, and the dialect itself is a network of relations spanning from this part to many others. It therefore refers to a property of which it only possesses a part, or, more exactly: one relata in the network of relations that defines the property. This is quite different from Socrates exemplifying the property of being mortal, along with all human beings, for each one of them will possess this property entirely.

It remains to be considered whether this description applies to all cases of connotation. Since there is no exhaustive list of such cases, we cannot answer this question, but the description seems to be true of Hjelmslev's examples, except perhaps the distinction of poetry and prose (case 1), and physiognomy (case 6d). If we take poetry to be a system of poetical procedures, it will answer to our description, too, but the equivalent suggestion in the case of physiognomy is scarcely convincing. As for the connotations I have suggested, for instance "still-life", "advertisement", "distortion", "metaphor", etc., they are different, insofar as it is the conjunction of many signs, or perhaps rather the relations between them, that is doing the exemplifying. Although there is no independent system defining the property exemplified, it is still true that this property cannot be found in its entirety in any of the signs that serve as exemplifying

objects. While it is possible that some connotations may be simple cases of exemplification (where sign properties are exemplified), it has been shown that many connotations involve more complex operations, the particular nature of which we must refrain from investigating further.

In Hjelmslev's (1943:105 if) study of connotation, and then in Barthes' (1964 a:163ff) presentation, this peculiar language type is contrasted with a more well-known one, metalanguage, which is said to be a language, the content of which is another language. However, if we take seriously the interchangeability of expression and content for which Hjelmslev argues, connotational language and metalanguage will prove to be the same according to Hjelmslev's definitions. In the sign function, the latter claims, expression and content are joined by a solidarity, i.e. they mutually presuppose each other (Cf. Hjelmslev 1943:33ff; 44ff). To be more precise, Hjelmslev thinks that solidarity obtains between the *form* of the expression and the *form* of the content, i.e. those parts of the expression and the content that cannot be changed without the sign being transformed into another; however, the corresponding substances may vary freely. Both expression and content may be conceived of as bundles of features, i.e. as the union of a number of poles of binary oppositions. The sign would thus be a constellation of features on the plane of content that is implied by and implies a constellation of features on the plane of expression (Cf. also Prieto 1975 a, b).

But what is the status of "expression" and "content" in this characterization? According to Hjelmslev (p44;52f), these terms are used only for convenience, and should not be understood to mean more than their mutual relatedness. But there is something very strange about Hjelmslev's definition: the employment of two different terms, "expression" and "content", seems to indicate a distinction, but the relation which Hjelmslev take to define them is symmetrical, thus making the terms interchangeable. If all that defines the terms is their mutual presupposition, they should be identical. So much for external relations; if we also take account of the internal relations, we shall find once again that, in Hjelmslev's theory, expression and content will receive the same characterization, since both can be further analysed in the same manner. To be sure, while the further segmentation of expression and content uses the same principle, the resulting segments are not in a one–to–one–correspondence, and this is the fact used by Hjelmslev (p 99 f) to distinguish signs from symbol systems.

However, this only means that in a given sign, the inner holarchy of the expression will not be the same as that of the content; it does not tell us why the sign function may not be said to join two expressions or two contents, instead of one expression and one content. More importantly, the fundamental distinction between two kinds of secondary sign systems, metalanguage, whose plane of content is another language, and connotational language, whose plane of expression is another language (p 105), will collapse if expression and content cannot be properly held apart. While "expression" and "content" are distinguished by so many words in the text, the formal definitions do not take any account of the distinction, and yet it is presupposed in the later definitions of metalanguage and connotational

language. If we make the formal reading of Hjelmslev that he wants us to make, metalanguage and connotational language will be one and the same!

It will be remembered that earlier, following Husserl, Schütz, and Luckmann, I suggested that of the two relata of a sign, the expression is the one directly presented to consciousness, and content is the one which is thematized, and that this particular combination of presence and thematization is what defines the sign. Again, elaborating on Piaget's notion of a differentiation of the relata in the sign function, I claimed that a typical sign should be differentiated in a double sense: firstly, that the relata should be seen as discontinuous, and secondly, that they should be apprehended as being of distinct nature (Cf. Lecture 2.). Thus, in the prototypical sign, there is one item which is directly present and not thematized, which is called the expression, and another item, called the content, which is indirectly present and thematized; in addition, the two items are discontinuous to each other, and are felt to be of different nature. In the following, I will try to probe a little deeper into the consequences of this, for the comparison of metalanguage and connotational language.

If connotational language is a language, the expression of which is another language, then this other language is directly given, but it is the connotational content that is thematized. In a parallel fashion, if metalanguage is a language, the content of which is another language, then it is the second language that is thematized, but denotational language is directly given. So far, it should be noted that at least the way in which Barthes (1964a:164) has illustrated the two double language systems is misleading, for the perceiving subject will have access to connotational language through denotational language, i.e. the "primary" system, but his only possible access to metalanguage is through metalanguage itself, that is through the "secondary" system! Differently put, in the case of connotational language, denotational language is still the only thing there is to be perceived, but what metalanguage offers to perception is something quite distinct from denotational language. This is important: there can be hierarchies of metalanguages, because we can use the signs of the directly given metalanguage to define the next one and so on, but there can scarcely be any connotational hierarchy, since all that putative series of connotational signs would be indirectly given, and so could not be separated into different signs: what has often been taken to be hierarchies of connotational languages, in the tradition stemming from Barthes, are really signs having somewhat different expression planes, perhaps depending on partially overlapping sign properties of the denotational signs.

Translated into the terms of appresentation, Hjelmslev's definition of metalanguage still seems valid, at least for some of those cases that are often so termed, for instance definition and translation. The definition of connotational language is, on the contrary, hardly acceptable: true enough, it is denotational language which is directly given, but we would not normally want to say that in the examples so far considered, it is only the connotative content which is thematized. Consider a person who hears something said in Danish, without understanding that language, although he is able to identify it as being Danish. Then

only one layer of meaning is accessible to him, but if he is aware of the fact that the intended denotation is something different from "Danish" we may still want to say that he is interpreting a connotation. If he takes all Danish words and sentences to be just a redundant way of affirming "I am speaking Danish", it would be more proper to say that "Danish" is to him a denotation. Thus, it seems essential for a connotational language, that some other language layer should be felt to carry the primary thematization.

So far, I have ignored the inner organization of the relata in the two kinds of double language systems. Since the expression plane of the connotational sign is made up of another sign, it should contain one part that is directly given but not thematized, and another part that is indirectly given but thematized. And the content plane of a metalanguage should be composed of one part that is directly given but not thematized, and another part that is indirectly given but thematized. In order to make sense of this, we must suppose there to be different degrees of indirectness and of thematization, which, in the simplest case, would form two parallel, but inverse scales, so that a higher degree of directness implies a lesser degree of thematization. This is of course not true generally, but perhaps it will turn out to be valid in the case of Hjelmslev's two double systems. Thus, we should expect the denotational expression to be the most directly presented and the less thematized relatum of the connotational sign, with the connotational content being the less directly presented and the most thematized relatum, while the denotational content, and perhaps the connotational expression, considered as a whole, occupy intermediate positions on both scales. Also, in the case of metalanguage, there should be a series of decreasing directness and increasing thematization from the metalinguistic expression over the metalinguistic content as a whole and the denotative expression to the denotative content. But very little of this seems to be true, considering the usual examples.

Since the expression plane of the connotational sign is a denotational sign, it will no doubt contain one part, which is at the same time the most directly given and the less thematized of the two relata; but while the connotational expression plane, considered as a whole, is more indirectly given, it is also less thematized; and the connotational content, which is the relatum least directly given, must be less thematized than the denotational content, though more so than the connotational expression (cf. the expected connotational language of fig. 17a with the real one in fig. 17c). But one might object that just as the aesthetic function thematizes plastic language, it is capable of thematizing the connotational part of the sign, so that it gets more semantic weight than the denotational part. It is arguable that the fact of "News" being printed in "Times" is more salient, in the "News" advertisement, than the content of the word "News" (Cf. Lecture 6.). The answer to this is perhaps (as Prieto would have argued) that this is really a picture of a verbal sign realized in graphic substance, not the latter sign itself, so that the modification of theme will happen inside the content of another sign (which is not a metalanguage, as we shall see in a moment). But perhaps there are cases in which the connotational part of the sign is more thematized than



Fig. 17a. Expected model of connotational language



Fig. 17b. Expected model of meta-language



Fig. 17c. Real connotational language



Fig. 17d Real meta-languages

the rest. However, if we consider the kind of examples encountered so far, it seems clear that this can only appear as a kind of deviation from what is felt to be the normal state of the connotational sign.

Let us suppose, with the logicians, that a metalanguage is a language used for the introduction and the definition of terms used in another language; to this model may be assimilated the explication of difficult words employed in ordinary language, and the translation from one language to another (Cf. Jakobson 1963:217f). In all these cases, inside the content plane of the metalanguage, two terms are related as an expression to a content. They may be related by stipulation, as in logic and many sciences, or as a result of analysis, as in linguistics and semiotics, which is, by the way, what interests Hjelmslev (1943:106) in metalanguage. But here, denotational language is treated in exactly the same way as any other object referred to: its expression and its content, or, more exactly, those parts of it that serve as expression and content when it is used as a sign, are located at the same level of indirectness, and which part of the denotative sign which is thematized will depend on the thematic organization of the sentence, just as in an ordinary linguistic utterance. For instance, in the sentence "it is 'b-o-y' that means 'boy'", it is the graphic realization of the expression plane that is treated as thematic (Cf. fig. 17b and 17d). In these cases, there is at least the semantic relation between expression and content, or between whole signs, which makes for the particularity of metalanguage. Even more trivial becomes the sense of the term "metalanguage", when the word "word" is said to be metalinguistic, just because its referents are linguistic in

nature, or when, like Jakobson (1963:218), one wants to include sentences like "Do you understand what I said?" In spite of Russell's metaphysics, there is really no basis for distinguishing levels in cases like these.

More interesting are cases like Quine's (1953:159ff) "'Cicero' contains six letters", and Récanati's (1979: 78ff) "'Monsieur Auguste' est une expression servile". In fact, if these sentences can be said to relate any expression to its content, the expression and content must be those of connotational language. In Recanati's example "'Monsieur Auguste' est venu", where the quotation marks are supposed to correspond to some "metalinguistic" intonation, and where the employment of this particular title has already been criticized as being servile, the noun phrase must be taken to stand both for the person called Auguste and for the connotational content exemplified by the earlier use of the title. Here, then, there is really a connotational language, where the connotational content is found relatively high up in the thematic hierarchy.

Metz (1977:147ff), it will be remembered, distinguishes metalanguage, which is about another language, from transcoding, where two expressions have a content, perhaps only its substance, in Hjelmslev's sense, in common. While, according to Metz, transcoding must not be confused with metalanguage, we have already claimed that the reunion of plastic language and pictorial language, or even of many pictorial languages, in one expression, is something different from connotational language. But there is a further case: the expression plane of one sign could be the content plane of another. According to Buyssens (1943; 1967; cf. Prieto 1968), who called this phenomenon a *substitutive semiotical system* ("une sémie substitutive"), a case in point is writing, which is the expression of a content consisting of the phonemes, which themselves are the expression of the content of a linguistic sign. This is perhaps untrue, or not quite correct (Cf. Hjelmslev 1954; Prieto 1968), but there may still be other cases of a semiotical system having the expression of another system as its content. For instance, when a picture shows another semiotical system, perhaps a self-presentation or, let us suppose for simplicity's sake, one of those objects which themselves are signs or "symbols" of something, for example a cross, then this is not really a metalanguage, because nothing is said about the way an expression relates to a content, so perhaps it could be a case of a substitutive semiotical system.

Nevertheless, this parallel does not seem to be valid. For instance, in Buyssens' hypothesis, "b-o-y" will be the expression of /boi/, which is thus its content but also the expression of [+ human, -adult, -feminine, . . .], which is the content of this later sign function. Thus, there is a scale of decreasing directness, correlated with another scale of increasing thematization, from the letters to the linguistic meaning (like in 17b, if mC is simply identified with dE). But now consider a picture showing a cross, where the cross is known to stand for Christianity. First of all, the cross seems to remain the most thematized relatum, and we may attend to those features it has, which are of no importance for its signifying Christianity; it is difficult to attend in a similar way to "b-o-y", without going on to its content, passing over the

phonemic expression or not. In the second place, it is much less clear which one, if any, of the relata is the most directly given. But perhaps this is so, precisely because of the nature of pictorality, which means that the picture does not really substitute for the real thing, but somehow seems to bring it along with itself. This may explain why the pictorial rhetoric of Barthes' is really a rhetoric of the referent, whereas if would have been difficult to confuse the rhetorical figures created by the letters from those stemming from the meaning of the words they form.

In this section, I have tried to go beyond the mere interpretation of Hjelmslev's theory of connotation, to ask some more fundamental questions about connotation and its relation to metalanguage. We have seen that there are potentially infinite sign properties that may serve as a basis of connotational language, so that, in a given situation, certain of these properties must be picked out and transformed into signs on a secondary level. Connotational content was distinguished from the implications following from it, and it was also shown to be distinct from the properties of denotational language that it uses for its expression: often, I argued, the latter properties will only pseudo-exemplify the connotative content. Then we considered how Hjelmslev's definitions of metalanguage and connotational language will fare, if interpreted in terms of relative thematization and relative directness, and the result proved to be contradictory with the examples discussed above. Most notably, we concluded that the connotative content was not a content in the proper sense, because it was not the most thematized part of the sign. Different cases, which are usually considered to be metalinguistic, were discussed, and these were distinguished from, among other things, Buyssens' case of substitutive semiotics, as found in writing standing for phonemes.

Summary

When Metz said that the connotation was the form of the denotation, he was undoubtedly wrong, if he meant "form" to be taken in Hjelmslev's sense: the expression plane of a connotative sign, it is true, may be composed of the "form" or the "substance" of the denotative sign. At the end of this chapter, however, we can see that, in the vague, common sense meaning of the term, current in art history, connotation really depends on the "form" of the sign: its exterior trappings, whether that is taken to mean the thing character of the expression plane, or more generally the fluctuations of the variants in relation to the invariant.

Before turning to Metz' discussion of Hjelmslev, Johanson's idea of there being different connotations from different strata of the sign was shown to be in contradiction to the definition of connotational language. Metz' different approaches to Hjelmslev's theory of connotation were then discussed, including his criticism of Hjelmslev and Barthes, and of his own earlier interpretations. What Metz took to be two possible readings of Hjelmslev turned out to be two different kinds of connotation, explicitly so designated by Hjelmslev: *formal and substantial connotation*. Some residual confusion of the semiotic concept of connotation with the stylistic notion was apparent in Metz's reasoning, and his argument for an autonomous expression

plane of the connotational sign, which depended on that confusion, turned out to be erroneous, but at the same time his claim must of course be true in a different sense, if there are such things as substantial connotations.

I then probed deeper into the presuppositions of Hjelmslev's ideas about form, substance, and connotation, relating them to Bühler's model of the sign, to Schütz's different schemes and to the discussion about opaque contexts. In some cases, connotation seemed to have something to do with the thing character of the sign. However, not only can the form or the substance of the denotative sign serve as expression plane of the connotative sign; according to Hjelmslev, the connotative sign has its own form and substance, and the theory of connotation is primarily concerned with the former. Contrary to what Barthes thought, we discovered, ideology cannot be the form, but at most the substance of connotational language. Taking Hjelmslev's hint, I therefore analysed his list of connotators, not from the point of view of their meaning categories, but in their particular relationship to denotative language. Even so, the examples turned out to delimit a much smaller class of cases than the definition. I decided to follow the definition, and then discovered that, connotation depends on something which is a sign being seen also as a thing - or more generally, as later sections showed, as something beyond the sign invariant.

The dialectics of the invariant and its variants was explored in the next section. Formal connotation was explained by showing it to result from the choice of a variant content for an invariant Lifeworld situation, but the connotation was distinguished from the additional denotative meaning resulting from the organization of the situation in the sign. Formal connotations on the sign level turned out to depend on expression and content together, since these are inseparable, but on the figurae level expression and content give rise to separate connotations; as for the substantial connotations, they were shown to result from the expression plane. Thus, connotation depends on the sign being asymmetrically organized, oriented from the referent, by way of the forms, to the expression substance. For the same reason, as we saw later on, metalanguage cannot be the mirror-image of connotation, as Hjelmslev (and Barthes, on quite another interpretation) has maintained.

Hjelmslev's theory of connotation was criticized and developed, confronting it with Goodman's theory of exemplification (such as it has been discussed in Lecture 4), and with the phenomenological theory of appresentation (discussed in Lecture 2). We argued that connotational language must suppose some explicit reference to sign properties, for otherwise, a single denotative sign could give rise to innumerable connotational signs. At least some types of connotations were shown to pseudo-exemplify, rather than exemplify in the strict sense, the connotational contents. When we then proceeded to apply the phenomenological theory of appresentation to connotational language and metalanguage, we found that the content of the former cannot be a content in the strict sense, and that the latter, at least in its most typical examples, is not a double language structure in this sense. We also took up for consideration Buyssens' substitutive semiotical systems, often equally treated as a kind of metalanguage.

In distinguishing denotation and connotation, but also connotation and plastic language, we have in fact isolated different principles of relevance applying to one and the same object; thus, in this second section of lecture 5, we have reached the conclusion of the treatise of relevance. Yet relevance is of course also what is at stake in the interpretation of the perceptual world, the world taken for granted – the Lifeworld.

5. 3. From tropology to topics in the *Panzani* lifeworld

There are two ways, as we have seen, in which Barthes fails to attend to the picture as a picture. The first concerns the general sign character of the picture: it has an expression level, which is distinct from the content, and which thus may possess other properties than the content. This is what gives rise to *plastic* language (Cf. Lecture 6). The second aspect involves the specific picturehood of the picture: it always presents its objects from a particular point of view, first of all literally, in the sense of a certain angle of vision, but also emphasising different parts and properties (Cf. Lecture 4). Indeed, it also has to do with the temporal slice selected in the picture (Cf. Lecture 3 and 4 and below). In this sense, Lindekens is right is claiming that what Barthes has elaborated is *a rhetoric of the referent* – of the real-world object.

That is, if we can agree that it is a rhetoric at all. There is little in the Panzani article to suggest why Barthes has put rhetoric in the title. Barthes, it is true, suggests that the "figures" of classical rhetoric can be found in publicity pictures, but the sole example given is the tomato which is said to be a "metonymy" for Italy. Even if we were to agree that the tomato is really a rhetorical figure (but see Lecture 7), this does not go very far in suggesting that the Panzani article is a rhetorical analysis. In his *Eléments de sémiologie*, Barthes called the expression plane of the connotational language, which is identical with the denotational language, a rhetoric, whereas he termed the content plane of this same connotational language an ideology. We have seen that, in this sense, as well as in other, more ordinary senses, there is not much rhetoric, but perhaps a lot of ideology, in the Panzani analysis.

In fact, the most interesting claim for the Panzani picture (and in part also Barthes analysis of it) being rhetorical rests on a notion of rhetoric which goes beyond the tropes and the other rhetorical figures, and beyond *elocutio* in general: that fundamental part of *inventio* which is known as *topoi* or *loci communi*, which, together, may be identified, in one of its senses, with the Topics. As Barthes (1970:206ff) himself observes, in an articles about rhetoric which does not mention pictures, the notion of topics has taken on a number of meanings, since Aristotle first opposed the general topics of the possible, the existent, and the amount, together with their opposites, to the special topics, which are different for each subject matter. In one sense, the topics is a method for finding arguments. In another sense, it is a series of "places" you should go through in each argumentation (who, what, when, etc.). In a final sense, which has taken on ever more importance in the history of rhetoric, it is a repertory of stereotypical ideas, of ever repeated phrases. From this point of

view, the topics are a part of *doxa*, that which is taken for granted. In particular, it is part of that which is taken for granted in each particular socio-cultural lifeworld. The naturalization of culture, which is the basis for the argument in the Panzani advertisement, is certainly such a topos. It relies on an identification which is plausible in the contemporary lifeworld.

The Lifeworld as metalanguage

In the Panzani analysis itself, Barthes (1964b:34) seems to suggest another meaning in which real objects have denotation and connotation: there are the properties permitting their identification and all other properties. This must be a confusion with the stylistic notion of denotation, the "cognitive" part of meaning corresponding to the real-world object. In fact, identification may take place on any intensional level of the picture, corresponding to different cultural objects, more or less culturalised, from the tomato to the string-bag and further to the Panzani products. Nevertheless, we shall now try to make sense of Barthes's proposition. Suppose the world itself, the "natural world" in Greimas' sense, is itself a language, made up of expression and content. If this can be established, we may even be able to find the secondary language system, which is expressed with the help of the first one, i.e. the connotation. But what, then, would be the expression plane of the natural world?

According to Greimas (1970:45), the expression plane of the common sense world, as he also calls it, is identical with the content plane of verbal language. In this sense, there would be a conformity between the content plane of one system and the expression plane of the other, not (only?) at the level of words and things, but on the level of their defining features. For instance, the word "tête", in its most general sense, means "une extrémité pointue ou sphéroîde" (p. 46), that it to say, it contains the traits "extrémité + supérativité" (Greimas 1966:48). The content plane of the natural world, on the other hand, is what Greimas calls "la *forme scientifique":* for instance, chemical formulae will express themselves as particular smells, tastes, and so on. Thus, on seeing a head, we will pick out the traits "extremity" and "superativity", and take them to stand for chemical formulae, or maybe some other scientific constructs. This comes very close to being the reverse of Peirce's interpretation, when he considers ordinary perception to be an *abduction* made from sense data, thus implying that the "scientific form" is found on the expression plane!

In a long article on the relation of language to the visual world, Metz (1977:129ff) emphasizes the importance of Greimas' observations: in a picture too, he claims (p. 151), the object, a head, for instance, will be identified by means of the kind of features isolated by Greimas. But Metz also insists on the difference between a metacode, or metalanguage, and a simple transcoding. Metalanguage is understood in Hjelmslev's sense as a language having another language as its content plane. Transcoding, on the other hand, only supposes an overlapping of the two content planes, the two expression planes being independent. Between the codes, the substance of expression, or only its form, may differ, and even the form of content could be different, but of course not

the substance. A case in point is ordinary linguistic translation (p. 147f). Since Metz accepts Greimas' analysis, this would seem to make the relation between the visual world and language a case of transcoding. In fact, however, Metz (p. 149 ff) claims it is a *metacodic* relation. While admitting a deep correspondence between the linguistic content and the visual expression, Metz thinks that, because of language being a "commentatrice universelle" (p. 149), each linguistic act must be *about* the relationship of the visual expression to the visual content (p. 151). We recognize here the linguistic determinism encountered in Barthes' work. If I understand Metz correctly, the picture only transcodes reality, probably with the help of linguistic commentary (p. 149). However, the signified in the language of the natural world, as conceived by Metz, is the object itself (p. 144ff), that is the "objet reconnaissable" (p. 151). In fact, as Metz observes in the beginning of the essay (p. 131), his problem is a problem of *identification*.

Let us first consider the content plane of the natural world, as described by Greimas. It is true that for a scientist, while he is involved in an experiment, a smell or a taste may signify a chemical formula, but this is obviously a very particular case. If the qualities of the world were all the time appresenting their corresponding chemical and/or physical description, science would really have been born in the Garden of Eden. It seems more acceptable to say that the chemical formulae signify the smells and tastes (which would correspond to Husserl's critique of science as being an "Ideenkleid"). But even that lies outside the range of the "natural world". Peirce's inverse theory, involving sense data rather than chemical formulae directly, is also unacceptable on the common evidence of Husserlian phenomenology and contemporary psychology of perception: there is no experience of sense data, so these could never function as the expression plane of anything whatsoever.

On the other hand, Metz's interpretation appears to be in perfect accordance with the account of identification given by the Gibsons (Cf. in particular E. Gibson 1969; & Pick 2000): certain features of the object are picked up, thus permitting the recognition of the object as such. But this is not really a sign relation. Eleanor Gibson (1969:61 ff) takes great pains to show that it is the recognition of the object's own properties, not the association to it of independent labels, that permits discrimination and thus, I suppose, also identification. However, since Metz calls verbal language a metacode, he must obviously mean that the natural world itself, prior to its linguistic gloss, is a language, having its expression and content. But there is no appresentation between the properties and the object having them. In fact, Metz (p. 144) himself compares the relation between the properties of the object and the object itself to that between the semantic features and the semema, itself modelled on the relations between the phonological traits and the phoneme, the phonemes and the words, morphemes or monemes. These, of course, are relations of constituency, not of appresentation. Greimas (1970:54ff) actually suggests there may be a way of decomposing the objects of the natural world into a limited set of features; however, he thinks that the correspondence with linguistic units may take place at the level of features or

whole configurations (p. 45). This is not a sign relation, because the features are parts of the object they mean, i.e. they are not allo-functionally determined. There is certainly a principle of *relevance,* but no sign function.

Before we proceed to consider the possible resolution of this problem, we have to discuss the plane of expression of the natural world, as conceived by Greimas and Metz alike. It is, in a way, not surprising that Greimas finds a correspondence between the features of expression in the "natural world" and the features of content, which he has himself adduced in his description of verbal language. If we return to consider Greimas' analysis of the lexeme "tête", we will see that the features are not discovered by means of commutation, as confirmed structuralists like Hjelmslev, Geckeler, and Coseriu would have it, for in that case a pertinent difference on the expression plane would have been required in order to justify a change on the content plane (Cf. Lecture 2). Instead, Greimas studies a series of verbal contexts furnished by the Littré dictionary in order to discover the common denominator of these contexts. That means that we are at the level of discourse, and even a strict structuralist would probably admit that a correspondence with the perceptual world exists at that level. Also, Greimas is using his knowledge of the perceptual world to give a content to the distinctions he establishes between different uses of the word "tête", but it could reasonably be argued that, in practice, any linguist would have to do that. More to the point, we observe that Greimas postulates two features thought to be common to all the uses of the word "tête", but from a strictly linguistic point of view there should only be one, since Greimas has not shown his two traits to be capable of varying independently. But, of course, we all know from perceptual experience that not all extremities are "superative", i.e. either superior or anterior, in relation to the whole of which they are a part. We may conclude that Greimas is not a strict structuralist and that, I believe, is to his advantage.

In spite of all this, Greimas' features are probably not the features which are relevant for identifying a real-world head. Interestingly, the features proposed, at least in this analysis, are global traits, and thus good candidates for being "formal invariants", as Gibson would say, though perhaps not "mathematical" ones (though some of them seem topological), required for the identification of objects in perception. The problem is that Greimas (1966:42 ff), in his search for the common denominators of the word "tête", treats "metaphorical" uses like "head of a group", "head of a needle", and so on, as being on a par with the use of the same word for the head of a man or an animal, and the category thus obtained does not seem to correspond to any immediate object category. Consider a head in the most obvious sense: the head of a man. We will recognize it even it if is cut off with a knife or only by the picture frame, so neither "extremity", nor "superativity" are necessary features of this category. If we identify the head with the face as being its most prominent part, we know that, from around two or three months, the child will define the category from the eye pattern, including points appearing in the corresponding arrangement; later, the presence of the upper face section becomes important, and then the whole over-all oval contour; still

later, by five months, the mouth becomes a relevant trait (Cf. Gibson 1969:347 ff). In due course, invariants emerge, which permit the identification of faces even in deviant orientation. None of these traits, however, correspond to those mentioned by Greimas. In perception, we would be more certain to attend to the *differences* between a man's head, the head of a group and the head of a needle, the invariants for which are quite distinct. It is probable that the traits adduced by Greimas will tend to co-occur with those characterizing a prototypical head, but rather low down in the hierarchy of criterial features. In fact, it will be argued later (in Lecture 7) that metaphors are based on features low in the thematic hierarchy, or even resulting from a rival analysis of the content. That the metaphorical extensions considered by Greimas are "dead metaphors" only gives them a deeper anthropological interest (as was later recognized by Lakoff 1987; & Johnson 1980; 1999). We may conclude that it is not *even* in the case of a picture showing an unknown object, as Metz (1977:151) believes, but *precisely* in that case, that we could use Greimas' features to identity it as a head.

We have failed to find a language, with expression and content, in the natural world. Indeed, we have not raised Hjelmslev's question as to the conformity between the planes, because if there is no allo-functionality and no appresentation this question does not even arise (Cf. Lecture 2). If there is no denotation, there can be no connotation. Metz (1977:135f) notes that there are other codes, besides those serving identification, for instance the narrative ones; another text, considered above, hints that there are also connotative codes. However, it should be obvious that identification can take place in any code, if we only change intensional level: someone may be identified as the protagonist of a story, or as a melancholy appearance. As for Greimas (1966:57; 1970:54 ff), he treats Bachelard's "elements" as being sememes on the same level as "tête", which we considered above. Therefore, we appear to end up with a completely negative result in this section.

However, it seems plausible that the linguistic act can transform the relation of constituency into a sign relation, making the object stand for its properties, or vice versa. Since there is no prior language in the natural world, this will not be a metalanguage, nor a connotation, but simply a language. For the present, we want to know if something similar could be made to happen, using non-linguistic means. This is actually the case: a thing may be *displayed,* to stand for itself, as will happen with a painting at an exhibition, with the wares on sale in the show-window, with the historical remains in the museum's show-case and also, I submit, with the objects shown in a picture. Thus, we have found a sign relation which is not the same as that in the pictorial sign itself, because it is not only found in pictures. Of course, it seems strange to have an object signify itself. But I will argue that *self-identification,* as a sign relation, or *display,* is a limiting case of what Goodman terms *exemplification*. Therefore, it will be necessary to return to Goodman's work, now taking a more positive view of his contribution.

Identification as exemplification

To Thomas Sebeok (1976:43, 133), the

signifier of an index could be a *sample* of its signified. Commenting on the subdivision of the signs according to Peirce, Todorov (in Ducrot & Todorov 1972:115) affirmed that the icon is more like a synecdoche than a metaphor, giving as an example the black spot which could not properly be said to resemble the colour black. Commenting on Todorov's claim, Sebeok (1976:129) does not accept this general statement, but he does think that the black spot is a sample of the colour black and therefore a synecdoche, which he identifies with an index. According to Umberto Eco (1976:350f), the red spot in the picture is not similar to the red colour, it is identical to it, indeed, it is its "double". As anybody who has ever taken a colour photograph knows, the red spot in the picture (not to mention the black spot of a black-and-white photograph) is identical to the corresponding spot in reality, only given a principle of tolerance or relevance, which is embodied in the very term "red".[13] The factorality suggested by Todorov and Sebeok better fits in with this observation than the identity which Eco affirms. However, contrary to what happens in the real lifeworld, pictorial signs are no real identities, not even partial ones.

As the term is used by Sebeok, a sample could presumably be *any* part of a whole. Introducing his theory of "exemplification", which he takes to be important to art, Goodman (1968; 1977; 1984) discusses some typical, more ordinary life kind of samples, as the tailor's swatch and the cupcake on display in the bakery. In an amusing story, Goodman (1977) shows us that no sample can exemplify all the properties it has: for instance, the tailor's swatch does not exemplify its size nor its shape, whereas the cake does exemplify these properties but not the property of having been baked the day of the commission. According to Goodman's definition, exemplification, being the reverse of denotation, i.e. of the reference of the word or label to an object, is a reference back from the object to the labels for some of the properties it possesses. If we try to retranslate this from Goodman's nominalist metaphysics back to the Lifeworld intuition which seems to lurk behind it, we will find exemplification to be a sign function from a particular object to some of the attributes which characterize this object, i.e. from a token to a type.

This reference from the token to the type is not to be confused with simple instantiation, such a membership in a category. Against Eco, we could say that while the red-painted wall instantiates redness, the red colour in the picture refers to it. However, though Goodman's analysis seems adequate for some purposes, it does not do justice to the very samples from which he started. A sample does not signify just any attributes; it signifies a class of objects of which it forms a part and which have been brought together by virtue of having such and such attributes in common. The tin can of tomato sauce displayed in the shop window would seem to stand, not for the property of tomateoness, but for the class of tin cans on sale in the shop. In a derived sense, as shown by Goodman's own stories, the sample also signifies another member of the same whole: I may be shown the cupcake baked today, for example, in order to decide if I want

13 The colour correspondence is even worse in hand-made pictures, cf. Hochberg 1979. See Lecture 9.

to buy a cupcake baked tomorrow. As for the tailor's swatch, although it is a part of a primary level object, i.e. a piece of cloth, the latter is completely homogeneous in its properties over the whole of its extension, apart from the non-relevant attributes of size and shape, so any part of it will do as a sample.

In order to avoid Goodman's label metaphysics, then, we will say that *exemplification* is a sign relation from a particular object to one or a few of the attributes characterizing the object, which means treating the latter as a *categorical object* ("nominalise" it, Husserl would have said). This supposes a decomposition of the original object according to the *properties* mode. Therefore, we are concerned with a kind of indexicality. However, while the description of the process so far accords with what could possibly take place in the arts, which is what interests Goodman, it is insufficient to account for the examples he adduces to explain his new term: the tailor's swatch, and the cupcake displayed at the bakery, do not stand for any categorical object or any "label", they stand for a class of things having the attribute named by the categorical object, or the several attributes named by it, in common. This needs to be specified: the cupcake, being a complete object in its own right, stands for the class of identical cupcakes (in fact, for a subclass of these: the subclass of identical cupcakes made the day of the delivery), but the swatch, since it is an "improper" part of a kind of material — cloth — stands for something which to grammar is "uncountable", itself lacking completeness. Thus, there is a *double indexicality here,* one between the expression and the categorical object ("attribute-of-E") and one between the expression and the content ("part-of-E", that is, either attribute, perceptual part, proper part, or, as we have just seen, improper part). We could even say there is a triple indexicality, for the attribute-of-relation must of course obtain also between the categorical object and the content of the sign relation.

If the content of this extended exemplification could be some kind of material or a class, then it should also be capable of being a complete object, in which case the expression of the exemplification may be a proper part of this object, a property of it, a perceptual part, or even an improper part. It should be noted that this indexicality is, at least partly, independent of the first one: we could chose a proper part or a *noema of* an object, because it best visualizes a particular attribute. In the case of homogeneous materials and classes, as in Goodman's examples, the distinction collapses, but for classes and materials having more or less prototypical members and parts, it must be relevant, though we will not consider the question further. Also, we will suppose that the decomposition according to the properties mode is the only one that can appear between the expression of exemplification and the categorical object. In addition, it should be noted that exemplifications standing for classes or materials may in an even more extended sense be taken to stand for individual objects: when Goodman makes his command at the tailor's or the baker's, the swatch or the cake he is shown will stand for the suit he expects to be made, and for the cake he thinks he will receive on the day of delivery.

In the sequel, we intend to show that, besides these *exemplificational displays,*



Fig. 18. Some varieties of exemplificational displays

there are also identificational *displays*. Many objects, which are made to be used, such as most patently tools and instruments, may, as Barthes (1964a) submitted, become so closely associated with their function in a particular society, as to be become signs of this very use. This is not the kind use of things that must interest us here (Cf. Lecture 10). The use converted into meaning discussed by Barthes is socially evolved and tacit; but a thing may also be explicitly employed to stand for itself, for the class of things to which it belongs, or for some or other of its properties. Thus, a painting may stand for itself at an art exhibition; the wares on display in a show-window, or the car at the car exhibition, stand for objects of the same general class; the tailor's swatch may stand for more extended stretches of the same cloth having the same colour and pattern; the cupcake shown in the bakery may signify another cupcake, which is otherwise similar, except for being baked on the day of delivery; and the Stone Age axes in the museum may be signs of all Stone Age things, of all Stone Age axes, or of those from a particular site (Cf. Fig.18 and Sonesson 1989a,II.2.2. and 1992a).

When used in this way, to stand for themselves, objects are clearly *iconical:* they are signs consisting of an expression which stands for a content because of properties which each of them possess intrinsically. It could be said, and has often been claimed, that each object it is own best icon. Paradoxically, however, no object can ever become an iconical sign *of itself,* in the absence of a convention for defining its use as a sign. Without having access to a set of conventions and/or an array of stock situations, we have no possibility of knowing, neither *that* something is a sign, nor of what it as sign: of itself as an individual object, of a particular category (among several possible ones) of which it is a member, or of one or other of its properties. We have to know the show-case convention to understand that the tin can in the shop-window stands for many other objects of the same category; we need to be familiar with the art exhibition convention to realise that each object stands for itself; and only if we have learnt the convention associated with the tailor's swatch can we know that the swatch is a sign of its pattern and colour, but not of its shape. This is what has above been called a *secondary iconicity:* a relation between an expression and a content of the kind described by Peirce, which can however be perceived only once the sign function, and a particular variety of it, is known to obtain. In this sense, iconicity only prevails on the basis of symbolicity. On the other hand, the result of this iconicity instituted by symbolicity is a part-whole relationship, a factoriality, which is a type of indexicality: that which is similar (in fact identical) to a stone age is a part of the class of stone age things, which it represents to us. Exemplification thus clearly blends iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity together.

The spectacular function and other strategies for bringing something to attention

Umberto Eco (1975) long ago tried to characterize "the elementary theatrical situation" using the following story: an alcoholic is sleeping on a bank, and then members of the Salvation Army pass by to hang a banderol about the dangers of drinking alcohol over the bank. In fact, this situation appears to be more general than that of theatre, at least in a traditional sense. While theatre is normally made up of sequences of conduct, on the side of expression as well as content, what we are offered here really it is a "tableau vivant", not so different from a still photograph, or, to use Barthes' term, a still-life. On the other hand, this situation is already rather complex: it contains a frame (formed by the banderol itself, the two posts, and the terrestrial surface), as well as a label (the text "Alcohol destroys your life"). The frame serves to fixe the attention. The text tells us what to attend to. It makes that which is attended to, the drunkard, into a sign, an exemplificational display.

Olle Hildebrand and Lars Kleberg have made an interesting attempt to develop the Prague school model of the theatre, putting the latter in contrast with other phenomena which, in one way or another, appear to be similar to it. In one of his first texts, Hildebrand (1970) distinguishes the sport event, the ritual and the theatre by means of a cross-classification employing the dichotomies *stage* versus *audience* and

	Theatre	Ritual	Sport
Expression/Content (*semiotic function*)	+	+	–
Scene/Audience (*spectacular function*)	+	–	+

Fig. 19. A schematization of Hildebrand's analysis of the theatre, as opposed to ritual and the sport event

expression versus *content*, where the sport event realises the first dichotomy, the ritual the second and theatre both (Fig. 19). The first opposition is derived from Mukařovský, and the second from Saussure and, more specifically, Hjelmslev. Putting this into terms more congenial to the Prague school approach, I have suggest that we should talk about the *referential* and *spectacular* functions, respectively (Sonesson 2000 and Figure 20). The theatre, the sport event and the ritual are all sequences of conduct that are offered up for contemplation. In this they are different from the common art-work, which is not a piece of behaviour but a static thing, at least in its expression. The theatrical act is composed of conduct, as much in its expression as in its content; the sport event and the ritual are so, too, the first as far as its perceptual side is concerned (and it has no other, according to Hildebrand), and the second at least on its expression side.[14]

The spectacular function may be considered to be a thematic device, working in the visual field. The other important domain in which things are brought to our attention, in the human lifeworld, concerns audition. From the point of view of human beings, other senses, such as touch, smell and taste possibly do not possess any full thematic structure. Our concern, at present, in any case is the visual world.

Not only the banderol and the theatre stage constitute frames for attracting attention to something presented within them. The picture frame is similar in this respect, as is the show window, the exhibition case, and similar devices. From this point of view, taking a snapshot of the Panzani still-life produces more or less the same effect as placing such a collection of objects in a display case. Veltruský (1984), another representative of the Prague school, claims that everyday behaviour is

14 As shown by Sonesson (2000), the spectacular function have to be distinguished according to whether it is enduring or intermittent, and symmetrical or asymmetrical, in order to distinguish different kinds of phenomena offered up to contemplation. However, we may ignore these complications at present.

transformed into theatre when it becomes distinct, has its own consistency and is meant to be perceived. However, everyday objects which are meant to be perceived and which as disassociated from the continuous flow of perceptual experience similarly become singled out for attention. This applies to the Panzani products on the photograph as well as the tin can of tomatoes in the show window of a shop and the stone axe in the museum show-case.

The frame is not the only device serving to separate objects and stretches of behaviour from the continuous flow of percepts. An object placed on a pedestal or on a plinth is clearly meant to be observed. However, this may perhaps be considered a limiting case of a frame. Yet is seems necessary to make a distinction between displays which become such by appearing in a particular frame, whether the latter is understood in a literal sense or more widely, and displays recognized as such simply from properties of the objects displayed. Thus, the wax objects resembling food in employed in Japanese restaurants may be recognizable as signs of food even outside of restaurants, simply because they cannot comply with the essential function of real food, to be edible. The tailor's dummy is to some extent seen fro what it is even outside of the show window. The limiting case may actually be those persons who paint their cloths in some glittery paint and stand as still as possible (sometimes on a plinth), in order to represent statues. At the opposite extreme of the dummy, they are living being trying to give the impression of being inanimate.

So far we have been talking about thematic devices that have a certain character of permanence. However, the most common, or at least most commonly commented, device for attracting attention,



Fig. 20. The spectacular function as realised in the theatre.

reference, whether by the use of words, or simply by pointing, has a much more ephemeral character. In fact, together with cast shadows, weather-panes, mirror images, and the like, pointing fingers, and words considered in their situation of reference, are momentary signs: they only have a sign function in at a specific instance of time and/or space (Cf. Sonesson 2003 and Lecture 9). This is very different from the show-case, the theatre stage, and even the picture frame. In his discussion of reference, nevertheless, Herbert Clark (2003) has pointed to a device that is similar to reference in being restricted to an instant, while at the same time being reminiscent of the kind of attentional devices which have been mentioned here in being dependent on a convention which applies to a particular space. There are, in his view, "two techniques for indicating", which he characterizes as "directing-to" and "placing-for". The first is exemplified by ordinary pointing. An instance of "placing-for", however, would be to put some object on the shop counter, to indicate to the clerk that one wants to buy it. Here the shop counter works as the show-window or the showcase, but it's meaning is only valid for an instant. In fact, from this point of view, the stage might more properly be considered to be somewhere between the show-case and the shop counter.

The "placing-for" of the static picture is no doubt even more enduring that what can be expected of a show-case or a show-window. Even more so: it fixes within a frame, not an object, but a particular point of view taken on the object. What we see in not only the object placed in a particular way, but we also see it from a single angle of vision. It is not "placed-for" and individual, but for a gaze fixed to a single position. The shop clerk would normally observe the objects placed on the counter form behind the counter, but nothing would really change if he happened to be on the same side of the counter as the client. The stage (except, perhaps, to some degree, the circus stage) is directed to a series of gazes comprised within an extent which is minor to half a circle. Also the show-case is offered to a gaze having certain limitation of point of view. It is nonetheless only the static picture which is completely reduced to a single point of view. This is true also of a pre-renaissance painting, and a comic strip: it is not a question of the perceptual realism of depicted space, but of the possible variability of the standpoint of the observer.

It is therefore extremely important to observe the choice of point of view of the Panzani picture. This point of view is an element in the build up of at least two of the topics, or micro-ideologies, which we have observed above (in 5.1.): first, the position of the string-bag on a table, partly opened, so that a few of the commodities have fallen out, which, together with other details (notably the temporal aspects, which will be discussed below), retains the purchase at the market and the homecoming and protains the unpacking of the food and its preparation. And, in the second place, there is the advertisement topic, which is really a connotation, and which in fact accounts for more of the meaning of the situation depicted. The position of the string-bag derives mostly from the requirement that the Panzani products should be so placed in the bag and relative to the camera that the labels can be read. Moreover, the Panzani products must be included in the string-bag,

which stands for a return from the market-place, rather than from the supermarket, so that the natural values will dominate the artificial ones. Therefore, the *inclusion* of the Panzani products in the string-bag must be made conspicuous, and this is brought about by means of suspending the bag rather unnaturally from one of the handles outside the picture frame, so that the packets of spaghetti appear in the roundish opening of the bag. This only works together with a particular camera angle. These requirements in fact make the position of string-back slightly unnatural from the point of view of the homecoming-from-the-market story.

Temporality in the static picture

Barthes' idea, according to which the Panzani still-life refers back to the act if buying at the market place and also forward to the preparation of the meal, implicitly takes for granted something which ordinarily denied, that is, that picture somehow convey temporal determination. Yet Barthes is here on the side of another current of thinking which has been predominant for some time now. Let's start by spelling out the paradox: Neil Postman (1983) and other critics of television assert that, because of the central part played by television in our culture, pictures and narrativity now dominate over verbal discursivity. Although, contrary to MacLuhan, they take a critical view of this phenomenon, they reaffirm the latter's conviction that television is related to oral culture, which is also, traditionally, a culture of face-to-face interaction, in which narrative has a strong integrative function.

While Lessing associates narrativity with verbal signs, Postman sees it as implied by visual signs. In fact, we may really distinguish three positions: 1) narrativity is taken to be purely formal and capable of being manifested in any semiotic system (the position of structuralist narratology and of the followers of Piaget in genetic psychology, e.g. Leondar 1977); 2) narrativity is predominantly verbal (Lessing and, more recently, Genette); 3) narrativity is connected to pictorality (Postman).

It will be remembered that, to Lessing, theatre, contrary to pictures, is a form of visual semiosis which is also capable of conveying narrativity, and his latter-day follower, Bayer, has extended this description, for excellent reasons, to film. Television, however, is different. There is very little narrativity, at least in visual form, in the news. Soap operas, sit coms, "reality television", and so on, mostly show people talking, and music television only uses narrativity in subordinate passages, inverting the parts of descriptions and narrative found in classical Hollywood cinema. Although the expression plane here seems ideally suited to convey narrative structures, no narrativity is thus apparent on the content level.

The opposite case is illustrated by some instances of single, static pictures, as, most notably in recent art, the "Untitled Film Stills" created by Cindy Sherman (Cf. Fig. 21). I will argue that they are, in fact, highly saturated from a narrative point of view. But first we will have to face the paradoxical nature of such an affirmation.

In accordance with the summary of classical structuralist narratology due to Prince (1982), narrative supposes at least two events with a temporal link on the *content side*. Thus far, then, no particular

Fig. 21. One of Cindy Sherman's "Untitled Fill Stills" (#39)

requirement seems to be imposed on the expression side.

Let us now consider some familiar cases of temporal links, and the categories of pictorial texts resulting from them: first, there is what we will call the *temporal series,* i.e. the continuous sequence of moving pictures, as in a film, and, sometimes, on television. In this case, there are temporal links on the side of both expression and content, but these are not necessarily parallel (in flash-backs, and in most other kinds of montage).

Next, there is what we may call the *temporal set,* which consists in a number of static pictures united by a more or less common theme, as in comic strips, graphic novels and photo novels. Here, temporal links are partly mimicked by traditional reading order, and partly projected by the reader.

The only case normally discussed in art history is that which we will call the *multi-phase picture,* which is a single, static picture, containing persons and events which are known to represent various phases taken from the same event series, or *action scheme*. Thus, the temporal link is projected onto the picture, solely because of our knowledge of the story, the title,

or our recognition of logical of physical impossibility (as in the case of things you cannot do at the same time), etc.

Here we recognize the "simultaneous method" described by Carl Robert and Kurt Weitzmann: the picture shows several happenings at the same time, i.e. when Polyphemus is invited by Ulysses to drink wine, at the same time as the latter and his men are occupied with blinding him. The so-called "monoscenic method" would seem to be Lessing's frozen moment (our implied temporality), and the "cyclic method" may be a case of temporal sets.[15]

It should be noted that, according to the definition of narrative, the temporal link must be on the content side, and such a link may subsist without temporality on the expression side, which means that the simultaneous method and the continuous representation may be narratives. In these cases, however, it is difficult to establish the discreteness, necessary to separate at least two events inside the picture frame. Weitzmann's simultaneous method and monoscenic method (the frozen moment) are only distinguished by the recognition of a verbal narrative to which the pictures refer, or by the logical or physical impossibility of the co-occurrence of several actions. Then there is the case of *pictures with implied specific temporality:* a single, static picture, which lacks multi-phasicality, but is recognizable as picturing an event taken from a well-known or prototypical sequence of actions. The picture, in particular, may then show what Lessing has called the "pregnant moment" of an action (just before the climax). In modern semiotical terms, there would be a temporal link due to the indexical relationship between the depicted scene and a particular *action scheme*.

From this case should be distinguished what we will call a *picture with implied generic temporality:* i.e. a single, static picture, lacking multi-phasicality, but recognizable as a possible intermediary scene of whole classes of (usually trivial) *action schemes*. Here, there is a temporal link resulting from an indexical relationship between the depicted scene and whole classes of common-sense action schemes. Finally, there may of course be the case of a *totally static picture:* a single, static picture, for which every indication making it referable to a wider *action scheme* is conspicuously lacking.

It is easy to find objections to the classical narratological consensus formulated by, among others, Prince and Adam. The example given by the latter, "The child cried. Its mother picked it up" may well be a story, but it is not a particularly good story. In fact, others models of narrativity (like the idea, common to Lévi-Strauss and Greimas, that some values are inverted from the beginning to the end; or Todorov's conception, adopted in genetic psychology, of an equilibrium which is disturbed and then re-established; or Bremond's model of a continuous process

15 Of this kind are also two of the types distinguished by Franz Wickhoff: the "completing representation" (simultaneous) and the "continuous" one (consisting in a continuous scenery behind several scenes), to which is added the "distinguishing" (= monoscenic) representation. Sven Rosén separates two kinds of simultaneous succession: "content succession" which is like completing representation, and "formal succession", in which case different persons are involved in the several phases of what is known to be the same action sequence



Fig. 22. Factors determing degress of narrativity

going from amelioration to deterioration and back again) may be too specific, but at least they posit something more than a mere temporal link.

Indeed, a minimal implication of all these models is that a typical story tells something unexpected, something having a dramatic character, which constitutes a rupture of the structures of expectancy at some level. In this sense, narrativity corresponds to a particular fulfilment of the dialectics of time consciousness, the play of protentions and retentions, also expressed in the rhetoric of the norm and its transgression.

Panzani time: Generic retentions and protensions

Already is his early work, Prince (1982) observed that narrative events did not imply each other logically, that more improbable connections were more narrative, as were more crucial changes (from life to death), and the passage from one opposite to another, particularly in the form of conflicts (all of which rephrases the French structuralist models mentioned above). More recently, Coste (1989), Ryan (1991), and Prince (1994) himself have opposed narrativehood, understood as the mere presence of a narrative link, to, narrativity which accounts for our sense of a "good story". It seems to me that one series of criteria for narrativity tends to make pictures, in particular single ones, even less plausible vehicles of narration, while a second list would rather pinpoint the possibilities of visual narrativity (Cf. 22).

Among the factors determining higher degrees of narrativity, the following fit badly, or not at all, with pictures, in particular single ones: logically

unpredictable antecedents or consequences (Prince, Coste); deep causality (first and last events linked in significant ways; Coste); elements of conflict between different subjects (Prince); specificity instead of generality (the opposite of sequences fitting any or indefinitely many sets of circumstances; Coste); and singularity instead of banality (avoidance of repetitiveness; Coste).

On the contrary, the following are often, and some always, realised by pictures: transactiveness (actions as opposed to happenings; Coste); transitiveness (events involving agent and patient; Coste); external events rather than internal ones (actions changing the world rather than thoughts; Ryan and Prince) with verbal acts found somewhere in-between (our observation); presence of disnarrated elements, i.e. virtuality (what could have happened but did not — alternative courses of action; Prince and Coste).

Here, I would like to dwell on the case of disnarrated elements, because I think that they are, contrary to Prince's claim, characteristic of most pictures.

The disnarrated elements are reminiscent of Bremond's triad, according to which every action is first virtual, then takes place or not, and if it takes place succeeds or not (Cf. Fig. 23). The latter, in turn, may remind us of Husserl's model of time consciousness, in which each moment is surrounded by protentions of the future, and retentions of the past, or the logic of actions, were many alternative courses of action branch out from particular moments in time.

Clearly, almost any picture will contain references to earlier and future moments of one or several action sequences. This is most clearly demonstrated by the analysis of comic strips: as we have shown elsewhere (Sonesson 1988; 1992), the humorous effect is often produced by



Fig. 23. The elementary narrative sequence, as described by Bremond

protentions, in one picture frame, of actions which are then not fulfilled in future frames, often forcing, by means of late retentions, a revision of our understanding of what has gone before: e.g. the case of the little man who appears to be picking up a prostitute who, in the ends, turns out to have hired a girl to iron his trousers. What was earlier anticipated, and was meant to be so, is then part of the disnarrated elements.[16]

The presence of a narrative potential in each single frame is shown by the negation of this very potential in later frames. Such a potential must therefore also exist in single pictures, as in the Kindy publicity, analysed elsewhere (Sonesson 1989; 1992), which is modelled on a still and a poster for "The Seven Year Itch", a well-known Marilyn Monroe-film. We see that the air streaming out of the air valve has caused Marilyn's skirt and the trousers of the man, respectively, to blow up (retention), and we may wonder if they will be lifted further or be restrained by the hand (protention). This is not high drama, but it does have some measure of narrativity, due to the sexual transgression, of varying degrees, which is implies.

Although they are not only "untitled" but also "unspecific", Cindy Sherman's "Film Stills" have their narrative potential, too. Consider, as one among many examples, Film Still #39: the young woman living under poor social conditions who looks angrily, sexually provocatively, or perhaps both on somebody outside the frame. Clearly, nothing as specific may be said about this picture as about the real still from the Marilyn film, and yet the general nature of what has happened before and what may happen afterwards is fairly clear. The same thing applies to most of the other "Untitled Film Stills", and to many other single pictures as well (Cf, Fig. 24).

The generic character of these stories is reinforced by the very stereotypical parts in which Cindy tends to appear: not only the action sequence, but also the persons are abstractions rather than concrete instances. The lack of concretisation of the actants/actors into persons may be something making these stories less "narrative" — stories are not supposed to be "generic" (even the folk tale in not about a generic person being chased, a generic house wife, etc.)[17]. But since it opens up the amount of possible courses of action preceding and following this particular moment in time, i.e. the number of disnarrated elements, abstraction is also a factor contributing to the narrativity of the single picture.

Since time is not well rendered in pictures, visual art, according to Lessing, it will be remembered, should ideally pick out one single moment, and, in a parallel fashion, literature, which it not very conversant with space, should be content to describe a unique attribute. Then, according to Lessing, an extension to the whole will take place in the imagination, spatially in language and temporally in pictures, that is, in the domain which the system cannot render! If we are to believe

16 There are, however, even temporal sets which hardly tell any story: so-called graphic novels, like Paul Auster's "City of Glass", mostly involve modifications of psychological predicates.

17 This generic narrativity may be found in temporal series, too: this is the narrativity found in many music videos, e.g. the chase which is not the chase of anybody in particular (of the black man/Christ in Madonna's "Like a Prayer")



Fig. 24. Some indices of virtual story-lines in Cindy Sherman's Still

in Lessing (and, in fact, many others who have written about pictures since then, including Goodman), in contrast, visual art is not only able to describe the whole of space, but it cannot avoid it: it can only show "fully determinate entities". This is certainly not true: as we have shown (in Sonesson 1989; 1994), notably against Goodman, the "density" of pictures is only relative, and all kinds of abstraction are found in them. This applies to the expression plane, in the case of more or less schematic pictures: but is also applies to the content plane of some pictures the expression plane of which is fully dense. Thus, for all practical purposes, Sherman's photographs are not about Cindy in one or other disguise, but about abstract roles in generic situations.

Bayer (1975; 1984) formulates Lessing's problem differently: it concerns the relation between the scheme of distribution for the expressions and the scheme of extensions for the referents. Bodies are carriers of actions, i.e. they are presupposed by them. Actions are continuous, but can only be rendered iconically as discrete states. The distribution scheme of pictures does not allow for succession, only for actions rendered indirectly by means of bodies and collective actions where several persons act together. However, to the extent that pictures show "fully determinate objects", they actually render certain continua, spatial ones, better than language.[18]

However, since spatial objects are (potential) carriers of actions, all spatial details serve to suggest potential stories, in particular if they are sufficiently familiar

18 What is strange, in Lessing as well as Bayer, is the idea that collective actions are different from individual ones: the former are made up of individual ones and therefore the latter most also be possible to render.

to fit with many action schemes. Thus, it seems to me that, everything else being equal, a picture containing more spatial details will evoke more virtual courses of action.

Bayer observes that when there is no "convenient link" an index is required. Such links actually serve to pick out spatial attributes for temporal continuity: in this sense the Marilyn picture seems to be "fully determinate" temporally, which is precisely not the case with Sherman's works. Cindy Sherman's "Film Stills" are not narrative in any simple sense: there is hardly any climax anywhere, no inversion of values, change of balance, or lack which is done way with, and no obvious improvement or deterioration. Yet it is difficult to avoid the impression that these pictures are imbued with narrativity.

They refer (indexically) to any number of possible continuations and past states, but all alternatives are undetermined. In spite of the singularity of the pictures themselves, what they convey to us are scheme of interpretation which are more or less empty, generic or stereotypical, taken either from everyday life or from our consciousness, itself dense with stories (from film and television as Sherman suggests, or from advertisements, the mythology of our time).

The truth of televisual narrativity is similar: this continuous stream of pictures, which never stop to let us discover their full spatial determinacy, contains ever new retentions and protentions, fragmentary stories, which are potential but never developed, as in soap operas, advertisements, the combination of the latter two, now so popular in the USA, and in music television. The effect is rendered more acute by the practice of "zapping" from one channel to the other, which is only possible because of our capacity for indexically recognising very abstract action schemes.

Instead of the "great narratives" so maligned today, our world is really full of numerous micro-narrativities, which are often generic, with anonymous or generic actors, without clear narrator, and with narrative potentials opening up in infinite directions. This is eminently true of publicity pictures: it is in this sense that buying at the market place and the preparation of a meal are present in the Panzani picture. It is there as indexicality, as relatively generic protentions and retentions of the depicted scene.

Given and new in the Panzani world and elsewhere

The temporal horizons of the picture, as described above, are clearly dependent on a projection from the action schemes of the Lifeworld, which are prior to the picture. But there might perhaps be other ways in which the picture itself contains indications of the way in which the content is to be taken – as given and new distributed as left to right, or ideal and real, projected to the upper and the lower part of the picture respectively, or central versus marginal, as claimed by Kress & van Leeuwen (1996: 186ff). The truth is that there is absolutely no reason to accept these claims. Because of our familiarity with certain occidental contraptions such as the book and, in particular, the review, we are indeed familiar with the idea that new material should appear on the right side, and this device is often used in advertisements. It does not seem to have much relevance to

the Panzani publicity, however. It is also true that books on photography recommend us to place the main motive in the middle of the photograph, but in actual photographs, this is not often appropriate. The idea of the ideal being above and reality below, as applied to pictures, is a particularly arbitrary postulate. This may all be true of some pictures, but to most of them none of these dichotomies applies.

Indeed, the distinction between given and new, and/or theme and theme, independently of its realization in space, is itself problematic in the case of pictures (Cf. Sonesson 2003b). The difficulty posed by narrativity in pictures, as Bayer reads Lessing, is that the picture is unable to abstract: Homer may show the gods drinking and discussing at the same time, but that is too much information to put in a picture. Actually, it is not the amount of information that is crucial (the picture may easily carry more) but the possibility to organise it: verbal language is able to convey relative importance, newness, theme, etc. But the space of representation in the picture is, at the same time, the representation of the space of ordinary human perception, which impedes an organisation by other systems (this was changed by Cubism, Matisse, some forms of collages and synthetic pictures, and it is more radically modified by visual systems of information, logotypes, Blissymbolics, traffic signs, etc., as it is by gestural signs). Just as we cannot see in the picture whether the gods are discussing while the a drinking or drinking while they are discussing, we cannot really tell if the tomato of the Panzani picture is first of all red, round, or a part of nature. As far as the picture is concerned, it is all this, and a lot of other things, at the same time. However, since this is an advertisement, it is not too difficult to decide, for extraneous reasons, that the naturality of the tomato is the most important property. This is a reflection from an ideological system of our culture onto the picture. Thus, the organization within the picture can only be decided, analysing the common sense status of the things depicted and taking into account the kind of ideological systems, or topics, which are current in our present-day socio-cultural Lifeworld.

Not only the dichotomies given and new, and theme and rheme, are difficult to apply to pictures, but they are hard to tell apart. These two dichotomies should properly be distinguished, as Halliday insists, but Kress & van Leeuwen, although claiming to be his disciples, never mentions the latter dichotomy. Though essential in language, the distinction is hardly feasible in pictures – are, rather, that is to say, in single, static pictures. In fact, it does make sense in comic strips and other series of static pictures, and of course in the cinema, where what is new is determined by what is given in the earlier panel, or the equivalent, and what is the theme is defined by the organization of the current panel.

There is no way, I submit, to determine what is theme and rheme (which are the proper terms, when we are not involved with series of pictures), without analysing the single picture, and notably the world depicted. As for the ideal and the real, and the central and the marginal, they must be searched for even deeper inside content.

Some more aspects of the tomato

Guy Gauthier (1979:55 ff) has made another analysis of a tomato picture, obviously in

the Panzani analysis tradition but much more attentive to the finer details of the advertisement analysed. The picture (Fig. 25) shows a tomato with a drop of water lighting up its surface, placed inside a glass bottle. Some incident light is reflected also from the bottle's sides, but the background is dark. We note also, for its possible further relevance, that the bottle, which appears enormous in comparison with the sole tomato, is placed exactly in the middle of the page, and the tomato itself takes up the central position on the bottom of the bottle. Gauthier (1979:56) begins his analysis by telling us that the tomato becomes a sign, because it immediately evokes those of its properties that are not directly present in the picture. This is not really a sign relation, but an appresented pairing, like the one from noema to noema (Cf. Lecture 2.), or like the intermodal references (Cf. E. Gibson 1969:215ff), and is equally present in real-world experience of the tomato. The drop of water, Gauthier tells us, signifies "freshness" and together with the tomato, it evokes the garden in the early morning, which in turn refers to "la nature non souillée non altérée", that is, an ecological ideal. It is remarkable that Gauthier fails to tell us how he arrives at this signification, because he is much more cautious later. However, we are reminded about Williamson's "ideology of the natural", which also seems to fit here, and therefore of a Nature very different from the "culturalised" one of Pérez Tornero: we are in the lands of simple labour, so simple it hardly detaches itself from the Nature upon which it works, but sufficient to bring the tomato from the garden to the glass bottle. On this reading, there is nothing in the picture itself which determines this interpretation, so it will simply cease to exist if the picture is transported back to another century, or perhaps to a part of the world in which the required ideological system in unknown. However, that is perhaps not all there is to it.

First, as we shall see later, it is not obvious that so much ideology is required in the present case: it may be sufficient to see the tomato as being newly-harvested. This is an obvious indexicality in the picture: we know tomatoes do not grow in glass bottles but on bushes, so someone must have put it there. The water on the tomato may be taken to be dewdrops, as Gauthier thinks, or water remaining from the tomato having been washed. In both cases, we may reasonably conclude that the tomato has not been in the bottle for a very long time, or at least, that it is like a tomato that has just been put into the bottle (This, of course, is an instance of a temporal indexicality, a retention). On its own, the water drop will never signify freshness; it is only the water drop on the tomato (a proximity relation) that will take on the meaning of tomato being newly-harvested. Thus, the tomato identifies itself as a member of the class of tomatoes being prominently fresh. Of course, in a real display of the tomato and the bottle we could, with the help of our world knowledge, observe all this, if we had chosen to pick out this aspect for scrutiny. But how do we know that is what is relevant here? If we take the illumination, the localization of the highlights, to be a simple thematising device, the watery surface of the tomato, together with the walls of the bottle, is certainly important to the message of the picture. In addition, the verbal text ("verre: goût intact") is of some help. But there is also, I believe, the basic

organization of the picture.

That brings us to the second point. Only two complete real-world objects are shown in the picture: the bottle and the tomato (the water drops can hardly be apprehended as anything more than an attribute of the tomato). Together, the tomato and the bottle form a figure on a completely homogeneous background. The figure itself is heterogeneous: the fact of their contiguity, or rather their factorality, helps picking up the essentially opposed properties of the tomato and the bottle. Therefore, we have a structure, or an opposition, directly present in the arrangement of objects, i.e., a contrast (Cf. Lecture 4.). In order to analyse this fundamental opposition and distinguish the dimensions on which it occurs, we must have recourse to world knowledge, at least as long as we do not have other, similar pictures for comparison. Most of the time, there are no exclusive oppositions, but rather two terms pushing each other in the closeness of opposite *prototypes*. The bottle is rather big, the tomato rather *small*. Moreover, the bottle has a predominantly *vertical* orientation, whereas both the tomato's axes are nearly *equal* in extension, though the *horizontal* one does seem to have a small pre-eminence. Since the illumination in the picture makes the bottle appear nearly quadrangular, and since the tomato is obviously "roundish", the first will approach the prototype of the *rectangle,* and the latter that of the *circle*. Besides being associated with the Male and the Female, as shown by Jessen (Cf. section 2 above), these basic shapes may also have other meanings: to the young child at least, the roundish forms stand for something rather than nothing, for "Etwas Überhaupt",

Fig. 25. Another tomato advertisement, as analysed by Gauthier

as shown for instance in Hoffman's (1943:39 ff) figure imitation tests, so it somehow seems more elementary. Another opposition is the one between the *compact* body of the tomato and the *contour,* which is the only visible part of the bottle, again because of the illumination. Hoffman found, in the same test, that compact forms were preferred over contoured to designate "Etwas Überhaupt", so there are redundant indications that the tomato is somehow on a more simple, "natural" level. Finally, there is also an opposition pointed out by Gauthier: the tomato is the *included* member, the bottle the *including* one. If we translate all this into common ideology, we will find that the bottle is *protecting* and *dominating* the tomato, and that it is closer to Culture (See Lecture 6 for more on these issues).

This could help justify Gauthier's (p. 57) postulation of "fragility" as a further property signified, and in fact exemplified, by the tomato. To establish this, Gauthier's commutation with other vegetables is

not sufficient because, for one thing, we cannot know beforehand that vegetables is the relevant category, and secondly, even if there is a similar advertisement using a carrot, and none using an apple, it does not follow that the common factor is ephemeral freshness, since there may be other similarities between a carrot and a tomato, and since, on the other hand, there is no guarantee that the tomato picture and the carrot picture mean the same (Cf. my critique of Lèvi-Strauss in Lecture 4.). In fact, the fragility of the tomato will be picked out as *relevant,* because such an assignation concords with the protecting/ protected structure discovered in the preceding analysis.

Gauthier also makes another observation, however, which is, I submit, much more important than he thinks: the tomato is really too big to pass through the neck of the bottle, so in the real world it could never have got into the bottle, and if we want to preserve this effect, we cannot exchange the tomato for a cherry. But does this stand for the independence of the tomato relative to the container, and is it just "une pointe d'insolite" (p. 60)? On the contrary, I believe we have here the fundamental message of the advertisement: there is an outright *contradiction* between the *state* of the tomato, its shape and size, and its *position,* for in the actual world, it could either be like it is, but *outside* the container, or it could have changed its state, be crushed, and then be *inside* the container. Actually, most containers would not have such a narrow bottle neck, and there are smaller tomatoes, so both elements have been further constrained in order to transmit this message, which is identical to the one of the verbal text: "verre: goût intact", if we admit that the natural state of the tomato stands for its taste. Although culturalised by the glass container, the tomato is at least as natural as ever. Owing to the cultural character of its position and because of the naturality of its state, it becomes on a certain level an antitype (Cf. Lecture 4.). However, the naturalization of the container has been prepared beforehand.

Indeed, there are not only oppositions between the tomato and the container, but also similarities. And not only those similarities that are presupposed be the very oppositions (e. g. both being geometrical shapes), but also similarities that follow on the opposition and modify their character. For instance, the fundamental opposition between the square formed by the container and the circle of the tomato is attenuated by the square taking on some attributes of the circle. First, the upper part of the bottle, at a position that is extremely opposed to that of the tomato, forms a half-circle, whose parallelism goes beyond that to the roundish border lines of the tomato, because the bottle neck itself repeats the tomato tops. There is also, in direct contiguity to the tomato, the rounding of the bottle bottom, though this is less prominent in the picture. Therefore, the tomato may well be antitypical to the Nature/Culture-opposition on the level of *indexicalities,* but it is the container that manifests this same antitypicality on the level of shapes. Perhaps it is because it is already somewhat naturalized that the container is able to culturalise the tomato, leaving it as natural as before, or rather, preserving its innocence for ever.

The preceding analysis is of course in no sense complete: it merely serves to indicate how the mode of signifying

present in the things themselves, as well as on the pictorial surface, may be determined by the *structure* of things, and of shapes, respectively. I now would like to return to the Panzani picture to investigate to what extent the particular organization of the pictures also here serves to put the emphasis on certain properties which may be turned into meanings and, notably, whether Italianity is really, as Barthes maintains, a signification conveyed by the picture

If green-white-redness is there, it is clearly a parasitic sign, but not in the sense of Barthes: it denotes, however, indirectly, Italianity, and is thus not a connotation. It is parasitic, however, because on its own it would not signify much; or, rather, it's meaning would be too general. It is the colours in ordered sequence of the Panzani labels which, by means of *contiguity*, narrow down the category signified; in fact, as we noted above, it is only because our real world knowledge informs us that there are things, notably flags, with ordered sequences of green, white, and red, that we are able to detach one of the attribute types, colour, from the objects displayed, i.e. because of the *structure* of the flag system; and also, no doubt, because a limited number of colours tend to organize themselves into fields of colour in the picture. But that is not all: in order to discover that our category of ordered green-white-red things is a *metaphor* for Italianity, we have to reach the Italian flag, and that will only be possible because of the redundancy of other signs pointing to Italy. The Italianity already suggested by other means will be confirmed, and also insisted upon, so much more so as, if we are to believe Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1977b17), Panzani is really French!

The above-mentioned redundancies are also needed in order to deprive the yellow colour of its potential relevance: however, if we note that this colour appears principally on the Panzani packets, once on the label of the tin can, and as the colour of the spaghetti and the cheese seen through the transparent plastic bags, we may speculate that it represents the peculiar nuance of Italianity incarnated in the Panzani products. It should also be noted that the metaphor does not necessarily stop at the category of Italianity, or the corresponding class: because of the *contiguity,* and indeed the partial *factorality* of these signifiers of Italianity with the iconical signs of food, the Italianity could be transferred to the latter, thus being specified in the sense of the typical properties found in Italian cooking, perhaps generalized to Italian dinner habits, and the Italian way of life. From then on, if not before, we enter the domain of private associations.

The Italianity in the Panzani publicity, I have argued, is a case of metaphor, and the metaphor is itself one of the variants of exemplification/identification. So we seem to end of with a position which is fairly close, while somewhat more subtle, than that of Barthes. In fact, Barthes (1964a:165) tells us the form of connotative content, in Hjelmslev's sense, is *ideology* and the form of the connotative expression is *rhetoric*. He also states (1964b:40) that literature, pictures, dreams, and so on are different substances which may convey the same expression form of connotation, corresponding to the rhetorical figures of Classical rhetoric. So far, the idea seems valid, although there are a few small problems with the way it is formulated. "Form" means to Hjelmslev those features

that are pertinent, so if rhetoric is the *form* of connotative expression, there will only be what Hjelmslev calls "formal connotations", but that is contradicted by most of Hjelmslev's examples (Cf. section 2 above.). But perhaps Barthes thinks the form of connotative expression is something different from the form of the denotational language, and indeed it is so, in the case of substantial connotation. Barthes is possibly only unclear about this point. Second, literature, pictures, and so on are particular semiotical systems, and will accordingly have their peculiar "forms", so they can only share *part of* their connotations. What is more serious, Barthes seems to think that the rhetorical figures *are* connotational language, which is absurd, because each figure will relate contents, and sometimes expressions, in different ways, but connotational language always relates a correlated expression and content to another content. In fact, rhetorical figures will connote, but so will all other signs.

Moreover, Barthes (1964 b:40) is confused about *what* the rhetorical figures will connote. In his review of this part of Barthes's work, Genette (1965:105) gives an excellent example of rhetorical connotation: if "voile" is used to signify "navire", this is a figure, not a literal sign, and it will accordingly connote "poetry". Barthes, however, thinks that the tomato will signify Italianity by means of a metonymy (p. 40), but we know that this is supposed to be a connotation (p. 27). In fact, supposing the tomato is really a metonymy for Italianity, it will *denote* Italianity by means of a peculiar kind of exemplification, but it will *connote* metonymy. The same confusion is found in the work of Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1977 b:l49 ff).

It will be useful to push a little further the analysis of Genette's example: it would be normal to use "voile" to signify "sail", and to use "navire" to signify "ship" so, if instead "voile" is used for "navire", this deviant choice will engender a connotation; but this choice is of course only relatively deviant, because it corresponds to the form of a well-known rhetorical figure, the metonymy. Indeed, it could even by said to connote conventional metonymics. That is to say, the denotational language that is the expression plane of the connotational language is already a secondary sign, though constituted by means of content inclusion. The intricate organization of a sign like this is the expression plane of the connotational language, so it is the content plane that in this case will contain the concept "metonymy". In certain context, "poetry" may follow from this as a contextual implication. But this is probably not the case in the Panzani picture.

As such, the metaphorical sign function will not get us very far. Let us now consider that ordinary things like vegetables are used to express an abstract concept by means of their similarity to other concrete objects. This is a mode of signifying which has a Baroque ring to it. However, this impression is attenuated when we note the discreet way in which the sign is executed, employing a re-analysis of the totality of the coloured surface, rather than allegorizing each one of the objects separately. But this touches on the theme of our next section.

In this section, we have argued that the Lifeworld does not as such form a language, but that there are cases in which objects of the Lifeworld will be transformed

into signs, sometimes signs of themselves. This will happen, for instance, when objects are exposed in show-windows, show-cases, exhibitions, and so on but also in pictures. Identification, we argued, is a limiting case of exemplification, as defined by Goodman, and we went on to consider a few examples of both exemplification and identification. We also saw that there must be a structure in the arrangement of objects, which permits us to determine the way a particular object is transformed into sign. Finally, we returned to Barthes's Panzani analysis, and gave to both denotation and connotation their due. In the next section, we will proceed to distinguish the part of pictorial rhetoric from that of the referent.

Ideological systems: The case of nature vs. culture

The system of interpretation in which nature and culture are opposed, but the positive values of nature end up being transferred to the particular instances of culture involved could perhaps properly be called an ideological systems (as does Williamson 1978). A lot of the themes mentioned by Barthes may be assimilated to that system: "abundance", "complete meal", "coming back from the market", "home cooking", etc. On the other hand, it does not seem to make much sense calling the series of colours appearing (in Barthes' interpretation) in the Panzani publicity an ideology of Italianity. All they do is to permit the identification of Italy as such. If Italianity plays any further part in the publicity, that is some fabricated in the particular context of the picture.

Everything depends on what is meant by the term "ideology". In using the term rhetoric as a synonym for the expression plane of what he (falsely) called connotative language, Barthes can hardly be taken to have meant to coin a completely new meaning for the term, but certainly intended it to correspond, to a greater or lesser extent, to what is commonly known as rhetoric. In a parallel fashion, it is safe to contend that, in using the term ideology for the other side of the connotative language, Barthes also wanted it's meaning to relate to what is customarily meant by that term in ordinary language. However, "rhetoric" is a label for a long tradition within the whole of Occidental thinking, which has certainly changed some of its import a number of times, but which still retains a continuity of sense from Greek Antiquity onwards, whereas "ideology" is a much more recent term, standing for a single concept, which is nevertheless rather hard to determine.

In ordinary language, and in the Marxist tradition, from which the term has probably been imported, ideology is often taken to be the same as "false consciousness". In Marx' famous terms, its represent the real conditions of life for human beings upside down (whatever the more specific meaning of that metaphor should be taken to be). In ordinary language, the term is often reserved for the political world. Then it tends to take on the more innocent sense of something that is subject to opinion, and cannot be determined by science. It is in this non-Marxist sense that the powers that be have long wanted to declare the end of ideologies, paraphrased, more recently, as the end of history.

However, from a Marxist point of view, everything is often said to be political, which means that ideology is everywhere. Some thinkers would seem to make ideology into a universal condition

of life, or at least of significant behaviour: inspired by the parallels proposed by Rossi-Landi (1983) between work and sign use, the Bari school (Petrilli & Ponzio 1998; Petrilli 2004) has suggested that communication itself is necessarily ideological (Cf. Lecture 2). Since there is no way for us as human beings to stop communicating, there does not seems to be any escape from ideology either. But then the opposition between ideology and science, important to Marxism, also must break down.

Ironically, the term started out its historical trajectory as the name of a kind of science – in fact, what we know as semiotics. A number of French thinkers, among which were Destutt de Tracy, Degérando, Cabanis, Volney, and Lamarck, wanted to follow Locke in giving substance to the third field of the division of the sciences which Locke had called semiotics, but, emphasizing at the beginning more the system of the ideas than the means used for their transmission (both aspects of which are mentioned by Locke), they called it ideology (Cf. Lecture 1 and Gusdorf 1978). But the French ideologues did not look upon the theory of ideas as being knowledge for knowledge's sake. They placed themselves strait-forwardly in the tradition of the French Enlightenment, and therefore, they wanted, and in part managed, for a time, to create a state-run system of education permitting everyone to participate the rational study of man. This is what brought Napoleon's rage on them. He transformed the term "ideologue" into a disparaging label, describing what he considered to be naivety in politics as the opposite of his own *Realpolitik*. Though looking at history from the opposite side of the political spectrum, Marx clearly shared that opinion. In *Die deutsche Ideologie*, he popularized Napoleon's use of the term.

But it is not obvious that Marx, or any of his followers, have managed to make ideology into a manageable concept. In the Marxist tradition, the concept of ideology has a long history (taking into account the relative time-span of the concept, as opposed, for instance, to rhetoric; for a recent summary, cf. Hodge 2008), and, excepting some more peculiar usages (such as that of Lukacs), the main difficulty seems to have been whether the working class would be able to see the world as it is, or whether all classes, including the working class, have their own ideology (as admitted by Althusser) presenting those real relationships in the world of practise "upside down" from their own particular angle of vision. Nowadays, the subject of ideology, even to strict Marxists, is not necessarily a social class: at least, it seems, it can also be gender, ethnic origin, etc. Outside of Marxism proper, false consciousness can now be attributed to an even wider range of subjects. The only theoretical development which has contributed to the clarification of the concept of ideology seems to be the notion of hegemony as defined by Gramsci, according to which an ideology may well be the dominating way of thinking among groups whose purposes it does not serve. Thus, the ideology of the end of ideology may only be useful for the leaders of International Capitalism, but it has periodically be entertained by a wide scope of persons, at least in the West.

We have already seen that all societies, because they are founded on the common human lifeworld, share certain presuppositions, that is, certain things they

take for granted. It could even be said that, before that, there is the human *Umwelt*, defined by the anatomical possibilities given to human beings in general (that is, in Gibsonean terms, the affordances of their particular environment). And after the common lifeworld, there are of course the different socio-cultural lifeworlds that have emerged in historical time, which also are defined by what their members take for granted. Some of the presuppositions of these may correspond to what we have earlier on called cultural affordances (cf. Lecture 2). In the more general sense of the term, they also seem to be equivalent to ideology. In a more specific sense, ideology coincides with a sub-category of the former, the presuppositions of capitalism and consumerism. Perhaps a better term for such systems of presuppositions taken for granted in particular socio-cultural societies and their subcultures would really be the old rhetorical term "topic".

In his discussion of the Panzani analysis, José Pérez Tornero (1982:64 ff) suggests we should dispense altogether with the distinction between connotation and denotation, and separate Nature from its culturalisation instead, from the way it is "marked" by features of human activities, for instance the roads and power lines found in the landscape. This is exactly the opposite of Barthes' conception. Barthes, as we now know, starts with a cultural object, whose use in a society is transformed into a sign. Pérez Tornero begins from Nature and considers how it is organized and acquires meanings from the traces left on it by Human presence. When applied to the Panzani picture, this will yield culturalisations on several levels: as material transformation in the industrial products, i.e. the Panzani wares, but also the string-bag; and, in the case of the vegetables, their gathering and transportation. But on a further level, not discussed by Pérez Tornero, there will also be the value ascribed to these objects: the subsistence of nature in the culturalized products. Indeed, because of the "ideology of the natural", current at the present time, the inclusion of the raw material in a picture of the industrial product developed from it will enhance the intimate value of the product (Williamson 1978:103ff), as is the case with the orange jam and the orange juice pictures discussed by Williamson, but also with the Panzani picture. The final culturalization, to use the term of Pérez Tornero, is a false naturalization, exactly as Barthes claimed.

One may wonder, however, to what extent this "topic of the natural", as I would prefer to say, is really ideological, in any interesting sense. It does serve the interests of capitalism. At least, it certainly helps sell Panzani spaghetti, together with some brands of juice and jam, and many other products. It is even plausible that advertisements of this kind help reinforce the topic of the natural in the present socio-cultural lifeworld, and it may do so, not only in order to be available for selling some specific products, but also to help us accept the highly "unnatural" world created by the capitalist system. But it cannot be shown that this topic has its origin either in the general or specific interests of capitalism. It is part of the presuppositions defining contemporary society, and it can be used as such. Thus, it appears to me to be wrong to say that "the topic of the natural" as such is ideological, though it may be put to ideological uses, in one sense or another of that term.

Summary

In this final portion of Lecture 5, we have discussed the content side of Barthes' Panzani analysis and what it really involves. It was suggested that, to extent that this analysis has anything to do with rhetoric, it involves *dispositio* rather than *elucutio*, the organization of discourse (and thus of the world), rather than the use of figures. Therefore, the central concept of such a rhetoric would be the topics rather than tropology. This brought us to criticise, not only Barthes' contention that the photograph was "tautologous" in relation to reality, but also the analogies suggested by Greimas and Metz between metalanguage and the discourse (whether verbal or pictorial) referring to the Lifeworld: to them, the Lifeworld is a language in a much stricter sense, in that there is something to perceive and something which is identified. Relying on the psychology of perception, and on Goodman's theory of exemplification, which we extended so as to include a number of variants, we argued that there were indeed sign functions, not in the Lifeworld as a whole, but in the depicted objects, which were similar in that respect to the display of objects in a show-window, or in the museum's show-case, at an exhibition, and so on. With the help of Goodman's notion of exemplification, which we re-analysed, we introduced identification as a limiting case, permitting an object to stand for itself over the properties which characterize it. Thus we could illustrate the way in which the picture has something in common with the theatre scene and all kinds of displays more integrated into ordinary life: they are all somehow marked of from the rest of reality, and distributed in a thematic hierarchy. It was possible to show that there is a temporal structure of thematization in the picture, in general as well as in the Panzani advertisement: what is shown in the picture is a piece of the world, also from a temporal perspective. Thus we could once again return to Lessing's exemplary analysis to suggest what it really implies. As suggested, rather implicitly, by Lessing and his latter-day commentators, such as Bayer and Wellbery, the picture does not dispose of any systematic thematizing device such as those permitting to separate given and new, as well as theme and rheme in verbal language. These distinctions, as well as others made by Kress and his collaborators, thus turn out to be completely arbitrary. In fact, the thematic device must be found in the intrinsic structure of the arrangement of the objects depicted, as related to the current schemes of interpretation. Finally, we suggested that such system of interpretation could not be identified with ideological systems, although sometimes they were used for ideological purposes.

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